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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ILLICIT INTEREST GROUPS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE MEDELLIN
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS IN COLOMBIA
by
Patricia Helena Micolta
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor
Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health,
crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political
organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence
domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit
groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on
interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and
international politics in similar ways.
Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest
groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group
formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and
policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which
include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government
documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research.
To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO
leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the
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external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to
the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the
implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the
United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the
principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating
the illicit drug business.
The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda
and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches
of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate
the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty
correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the
Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for
tougher counternarcotics efforts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1

The human use and development of psychoactive drugs1 has created a trade for
these substances. The practice of chewing coca leaves in the Andes dates back 8000 years
(Dillihay et al., 2010). The coca leaves have mild stimulating effects that can reduce
fatigue, hunger, aid digestion, and help with altitude sickness. The Peruvian Altiplano
society in the 1780-1930s not only used the coca leaf for its chemical qualities, but also
as a form of currency to pay for services rendered (Jacobsen, 1993:298-299). During the
19th, 20th, and 21st centuries the psychoactive drug trade incorporated both formal and
informal organizations. Governments, international governmental organizations, and
businesses exemplify formal organizations that have attempted to control drug markets.
The Dutch and British East India Companies2 during imperial rule and Chiang Kai-shek’s
Kuomintang benefited from the trade of opium in the early 20th century.3 In more
modern times, the dictatorship of General Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama provided a

1

Throughout this project the term “drug” is defined as “any chemical substance, natural or synthetic, that
changes a person’s mental state and that maybe used repeatedly by a person for that effect” (Northern,
1998). Psychoactive drugs are defined as “chemical substances that affect mood, perception, or
consciousness because they affect the functioning of the central nervous system (brain and spinal cord).
Psychoactive drugs are divided into 3 groups: (1) Depressants- they slow down the central nervous system,
for example, tranquillizers, alcohol, petrol, heroin and other opiates, cannabis (in low doses). (2) Stimulants
- they excite the nervous system; for example: nicotine, amphetamines, cocaine, and caffeine. (3)
Hallucinogens: they distort how things are perceived; for example: LSD, mescaline, 'magic mushrooms',
cannabis (in high doses)” (Seymour & Smith, 1987, p.1; Northern, 1998).
2

The Dutch and British traded opium illegally with China to reduce their trade deficit and open the Chinese
market. The British East India Company introduced the opium trade in Burma, which was the main
gateway for introducing opium to Chinese customers (Renard, 1996). The Chinese Qing Dynasty
prohibited the trade of opium because it caused addiction among its population. According to John Stuart
Mill, opium had become the British East India Company’s second biggest source of revenue (Mill, 1858, p.
21-22) because the prohibition of opium led to an increase in its price, as Chinese demand for opium
continued. The Westminster Review’s account of the opium trade circa 1831 before the first Opium War
(1839-1842), described a situation where opium smuggling into China was rampant, where Chinese
smugglers and consumers disregarded Chinese laws, and in which prohibition was disregarded “by the
(Chinese) government officers, who appear systematically to connive at the smuggling of opium, and to
derive a large profit from the bribes of smugglers” (Bentham, Bowring, & Mill, 1831, p. 98-99).
3

Though Chiang Kai-shek publicly denounced the opium trade, his political party and military efforts
benefited from the profit of opium (Walker, 1991).

2

haven for laundering drug money in the 1980s, and associations of coca growers like the
Cocaleros in Bolivia have advocated for the legal growth of the coca plant.4 In contrast
to these governments and associations, which have benefited or facilitated the trade in
psychoactive drugs, the U.S. government has attempted to do away with the trade of
psychoactive drugs since the 1920s.5 In the same vein, the United Nations established the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which studies the illicit drug trade
and assists countries in developing counternarcotics efforts. Other supranational
organizations, such as the European Union, have created counternarcotics programs, but
concentrate mostly in funding alternative development programs, judicial reform, and
humanitarian assistance (Department of State, 2005).
Throughout the 20th century, the psychoactive drug trade has also incorporated
informal and illicit organizations: Chinese warlords,6 Caribbean marijuana runners,
country-specific Mafias,7 Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations,

4

See Lee (1990). According to Rensselaer Lee, an expert on the politics of drug trafficking, the Bolivian
and Peruvian coca grower associations are active lobbies, which are well funded and have the capacity to
mobilize its membership in opposition to counter-narcotics efforts. In Bolivia the Cocaleros operate as a
legal interest group and have an active membership. At the millennium, the Cocaleros launched the
presidential candidacy of Evo Morales, a Cocalero leader, who in December 2005 was elected President of
Bolivia. Although Morales is the President, he continues to serve simultaneously as the Secretary General
of the Coca Growers Federation. He has launched an international effort aimed at decriminalizing the use
of coca for traditional purposes such as chewing and brewing teas.
5

The U.S. government has had a policy of intolerance for the drug trade, however during the Cold War
some of its agencies forwent anti-drug policies to pursue anti-communist forces in Asia and in Central
America (Walker, 1991; The Iran-Contra, 2006).
6

These organizations benefited from the growth and sale of opium to sustain their armies, which would
fight against communist armies in the early to mid 20th Century China (Walker, 1991).
7

Popular mafias have risen worldwide regardless of geographic location. The United States has had
organized criminal organizations made up of differing ethnicities and races, and which hail from different
cities, The Italian Cossa Nostra, the Russian Mafya, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Irish “Brat Pack” (who
are suspected of assassinating Irish journalist Veronica Guerin) are examples of international crime
syndicates that have or continue to venture in the drug business.

3

Burmese tribes, armed social movements,8 Afghan warlords,9 and street gangs in various
countries including the United States, Central America, and Brazil are among countless
other examples.10 All of these organizations have profited from the demand of
psychoactive drugs for gain or to fund other objectives.
Overall, both formal and informal organizations, whether they profit or prohibit
the trade of psychoactive drugs, are part of the international system.
In the 20th century the United States government heralded the creation of an
international counternarcotics regime of prohibition. Since the 1920s, a number of
international policies were created to restrict the psychoactive drug trade and in the 1960s,
U.S. policymakers created the “War on Drugs” to raise the level of the perceived threat
posed by drugs. Anti-drug policies tackled domestic consumption and the sale of illicit
psychoactive drugs by establishing a prohibition regime with the objective of eliminating
the supply of illegal drugs like opium into the United States.
Counternarcotics policies11 consist of complementary domestic and international
strategies. The domestic strategy involves the enforcement of anti-drug legislation,

8

Some guerrillas which have at some point participated in the drug trade have been the Sendero Luminoso
of Peru, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the
Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN). The Loyalist Volunteer Force and Irish Republican Army were
also involved in the drug trade at local levels, according to a U.S. Congress General Accounting Office
(GAO) special investigation done in 2000 (Hast, 2000). Right-wing paramilitary forces such as the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) also participated in the drug trade.
9

As reported by the Christian Science Monitor, the UNODC reported that opium poppy production
increased by 49% in 2006 (Cooley, 2006), and according to pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski,
drug profits were being used to fund Taliban insurgents in Southern Afghanistan (Regan, 2006). Also
Human Rights Watch, a watchdog organization, reported that warlords backed by the U.S. and Afghan
governments were involved in the drug trade and in human rights abuses (Afghanistan, 2006).
10

Street gangs in many urban populations throughout the world are major networks for the local
distribution of drugs and weapons.

4

which penalizes and jails dealers and users. It also calls for the interdiction of illicit
psychoactive drugs at U.S. borders, ports, airports, and along its maritime borders. The
international strategy establishes agreements and treaties with other countries. Some
treaties include extradition treaties, which allow the U.S. government to request the
extradition of individuals accused of trafficking psychoactive drugs so they can be judged
within the U.S. judicial system. Other agreements establish crop eradication programs in
drug-producing countries, destroying crops manually or with aerial chemical pesticides.
Since the 1920s, the United States has gradually escalated its investment in governmental,
human, and economic resources geared toward controlling these criminalized
psychoactive drugs. Paradoxically, the progressive increase in resources has not
permanently curtailed the supply or use of the drugs in the United States, nor eradicated
the international drug trade or the rise of illicit drug trafficking organizations. Many
analysts argue that counternarcotics policies have unintentionally increased the trade of
drugs by making drugs like cocaine a valuable commodity (Thoumi, 1994; Bertram et al.,
1996; Reuter, 2004; Buxton, 2006).
Students of U.S. counternarcotics efforts also believe that policies formulated in
the United States largely underestimate how informal organizations involved in the drug
trade have a continued economic incentive to engage in the business (Thoumi, 1994;
Bertram et al., 1996; Walker, 1996; Reuter, 2004; Buruma, 2004). According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the retail value of the global drug
market is approximately 85 billion-dollars (UNODC, 2011). The UNODC’s “World
11

This is the popular term for anti-drug policies. The name is a misnomer because counternarcotics
policies target all types of psychoactive drugs not just narcotics. For example medically, cocaine—a
prohibited drug, is a stimulant not a narcotic. However, cocaine is referred popularly as a narcotic because
legally it is labeled as a narcotic by the U.S. government.

5

Drug Report 2011” indicates that in 2009 coca farmers in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia
earned $1 billion (UNODC, 2011); in 2008 coca paste dealers in the Andes earned about
$400 million; and Colombian wholesale cocaine traffickers earned about $2.4 billion per
year (UNODC, 2010b, p. 79). The latest UNODC report issued, while this project was
written, indicate that in 2009 “profits from international trafficking to North America and
Europe amount to some US$15 bn” (UNODC, 2011, p. 125). Given the continued
multimillion-dollar earnings of cocaine traffickers in relation to other licit businesses
operating in Latin American countries, the economic power of informal organizations
involved in the illicit drug business provides informal organizations at the least, with the
ability to affect domestic and international politics. The political influence of informal
organizations involved in the illicit drug trade is the subject of inquiry of this dissertation
project.
Although governments implementing counternarcotics policies and analysts of
counternarcotics policies believe that drug trafficking organizations exist and have an
effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities
as political organizations. Legally established interest groups and movements have been
found to influence domestic and international politics because they generally operate
within legal state structures. Illicit groups, such as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs),
have been rarely accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though
they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar
ways, especially when non-violent methods for influencing policy are taken into account.
Using an interest group model, my dissertation analyzes drug trafficking
organizations as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The

6

questions the dissertation hopes to answer are the following: Under what conditions do
IIGs flourish/develop? What effect do IIGs have on policy? And, what are the effects of
these groups on democratic institutions? An interest group analysis of IIGs includes a
study of group formation, development, and demise (or potential demise) that examines
how IIGs organize, what motivates them, and how effective they can be at influencing
policy.
The study also relies on organizational theory to explain the rise and development
of illicit interest groups. Specifically, this study assesses the literature on interest group
models to create a Macro-Micro Interest Group Model that examines—(1) the external
variables that lead to the rise of IIGs and (2) the internal variables that allow IIGs to
influence politics. External conditions such as weak laws and law enforcement, large
economic incentives derived from the illicit drug trade, and extreme income inequality
among other factors can be hypothesized to have an impact on the emergence of IIGs.
Moreover, internal conditions such as the availability of economic resources, leadership
characteristics, the degree of group cohesion, expertise, membership size, the role of
selective incentives in motivating members, as well as, the group’s ability to promote its
agenda to a greater sector of a population, among other factors, are hypothesized to
influence a group’s ability to impact policy.
The dynamic between governments and IIGs is also examined in this project. To
address what effect IIGs have on democratic institutions, it can by hypothesized that the
greater the economic and political cohesion and disciple IIGs have, the more likely they
will influence democratic institutions to accomplish their goals. Factors such as state
autonomy and capacity can shed light on the ability of governments to deal with IIGs. In

7

addition, factors such as an IIG’s resources, representativeness, and cohesiveness can
explain how IIGs use different tools to affect elections and government institutions such
as the judiciary, the legislature, and the presidency.
To illustrate the interest group model and test organizational theory, the case
study method will be used on the Medellin Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs),
popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the case study method will focus
on the external factors that led to the rise of DTOs in Colombia and how DTOs based in
Medellin reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion will
be framed by the implementation of the Treaty on Extradition of 1979 negotiated
between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug
trafficking became the principal issue of the bilateral agenda between the U.S. and
Colombia in the 1980s; the extradition of Colombian nationals became an important and
pivotal method of combating the illicit drug business. Illicit interests groups, like drug
traffickers based in Medellin, became politically active in opposition to the extradition
treaty because it endangered their livelihood by threatening DTO leaders with criminal
punishment in the United States. The findings of my study suggest that DTO leaders
based in Medellin had a one issue agenda and organized politically to influence the
electoral system and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and
the executive—in an effort to invalidate the Extradition Treaty. The impact of DTOs on
politics will be shown in congruence to the life cycle of the treaty as it was invalidated in
1986, revived in 1989, banned through a 1991 Constitutional Article, and reinstated in
1997 as a result of a constitutional amendment. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979
Extradition Treaty correlate with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs

8

in relation to the Colombian government and international forces such as the U.S.
government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts. For this reason, the analysis
focuses only on the Medellin DTOs as pioneers in the drug trade and as protagonists of
the “extradition debate” that took place in Colombian in the 1980s until the mid-1990s.
Other groups such as: Cali based DTOs, the Cartel del Norte del Valle (a series of DTOs,
which developed in the mid-1990s), guerrilla organizations involved in the drug trade
such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de
Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (AUC), have also been affected by the 1979 Treaty of Extradition, but the
Medellin-based DTOs were the first to actively engage in and affect the public debate on
the policy of extradition. Although the scope of this study is limited to Medellin-based
DTOs, data already gathered on the groups just mentioned will be the subject of future
studies.
Developing a definition for IIGs alters the current notion of interest groups by
demonstrating the political impact of groups normally regarded as criminal. The new
conceptualization builds on scholarly work in security and political economy. Illicit
groups, like drug traffickers, are commonly categorized as transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs), and relevant studies explore the rise of TCOs in weak states,
emphasizing the economic and political impact they have as industries.12 An analysis of
TCOs as interest groups can further develop our understanding of the political impact that
these social entities may have on democratic institutions and international relations.
12

See Thoumi, Francisco work in Political economy and illegal drugs in Colombia. See chapters by
Rensselaer Lee and Eduardo Gamarra in Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Interamerican Dialogue.
Also, see Phil Williams’ article in World Security: Challenges for a New Century.

9

The inclusion of groups commonly regarded as “criminal” into the scope of
political science through the use of an interest group framework is not done to excuse
criminal behavior such as homicide, kidnapping, extortion, or property damage, among
other activities. The main intent of this project is to methodically study the development
of DTOs which are criminal in nature, but which have political repercussions and are
currently understudied. DTOs are usually dismissed as criminal organizations
participating in political corruption, which is defined as “a deviation from the norms that
involves a hidden exchange between a public agent and a third party” (Della Porta et al.,
1999).13 However, how can researchers study cases of systematic political corruption,
where corruption is not a deviation but the norm—where the criminal-political nexus is
pervasive? The purpose of this study is to examine the political influence of the illicit
drug industry, since in the 1980s, Medellin-based DTO leaders participated openly, “in
the light of day” and through the political system (especially since leaders did not have
criminal charges against them in Colombia), which allowed some to feel entitled to
participate in the political process. Moreover, evidence on the political nexus of DTOs in
the 1990s (Lee et al., 1999) and 2000s (Ungar et al., 2010a & 2010b) suggests that since
the 1980s, DTO leaders have continued to foster relationships with politicians, which
have generated a systematically corrupt political system, one described by Lee et al.
(1999) in which:

13

Della Porta et al.’s study on political corruption examines the relationships of mafias and politicians in
Italy. In the book Corrupt Exchanges, she denotes a variety of political corruption styles depending on the
state and social incentives given to politicians and criminal groups that engage in political corruption. Of
specific importance is that Della Porta et al. adopt a definition of “systematic corruption,” where, “the illicit
becomes the norm and… corruption (is) so common and institutionalized that those behaving illegally are
rewarded and those continuing to accept the older norms penalized (Della Porta et al., 1999:16).

10

…corruption, viewed broadly as an exchange of values between criminals and government or
political authorities, has become almost inseparable from the activities and purposes of statecraft
in Colombia. Here the issue is no longer the delivery of specific services or favors in exchange for
bribes but rather the management of relations with a powerful (if illegal) interest group to achieve
specific political objectives (Lee et al., 1999).

My study has implications for policy studies. In the post-9/11 era, politically and
financially motivated organizations such as traffickers, paramilitary, or guerrilla
movements are regarded as terrorists because of the potential for aggressive attacks on
civilian populations. Policymakers have criminalized the term “terrorist” to lessen the
political importance and motivation of criminal and armed belligerent groups. This
creates a problem for policymakers and scholars. For scholars, the “criminalization”
dismisses the significance of viewing these groups as political organizations and may blur
the focus of research about the root causes of the violence generated by illegal groups.
Criminalizing such groups ignores their motivations, administrative and economic
organization, and decision-making power. In essence, ignoring the political motivation
of terrorists creates a significant research bias.14 For policymakers, criminalizing
“terrorists” leads to a superficial understanding of why these violent actors form, how
they organize, and how their organizations persist. Ignoring these questions makes the
creation of comprehensive solutions for resolving domestic and international problems a
difficult task.
An example of criminalizing the term “terrorist” and how this confusion may lead
to an erroneous analysis is illustrated in the perception of Pablo Escobar in a 2002 Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) drug intelligence brief (titled Drugs and Terrorism: A New

14

See Stanley Cohen’s, “Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference.”
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Perspective). In this document Pablo Escobar is defined by the DEA as a narco-terrorist.
They define narco-terrorism as:
an organized group (or an individual) that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking
in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence (a government or group of
people) (United States, 2002).15

Though the brief does mention that terrorism is a politically motivated form of violence,
when the DEA further attempts to analyze Pablo Escobar and his political strategies, it
focuses on Escobar’s personality traits:
At the height of his success, Escobar was listed in Forbes Magazine among the world’s
wealthiest men. While on the surface, he was nothing more than a street thug who
became successful by trafficking in cocaine, Escobar had political aspirations and strove
to project the appearance of legitimacy, claiming his wealth was the result of real estate
investments. He eventually ran for Congress and campaigned for foreign policy changes
that would prohibit the extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States… Escobar
had a penchant for violence. He wreaked havoc on Colombia while attempting to
persuade the government to change its extradition policy. Due to the numerous
assassinations of politicians, presidential candidates, Supreme Court justices, police
officers, and civilians, as well as a number of bombings culminating in the bombing of an
Avianca commercial airliner in 1989, Escobar enraged both Colombia and the world…
Moreover, he funded his terrorist activities with the money obtained from his drug
trafficking endeavors. He was the classic narco-terrorist; his cause was simply himself
(United States, 2002).

Summarizing that Escobar’s “cause was simply himself” ignores the conditions
that led to his rise, his political motivations, the qualities of his business
organization and the cost of his organization’s actions on Colombia’s democratic
institutions.
Years after Escobar’s death, Colombia has transitioned from being a drugtrafficking country to a drug-producing country. Many of the economic, social, and
political conditions that were present when Escobar was alive still stimulate the illicit
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See Drugs and Terrorism: A New Perspective. Retrieved February 1, 2012, from
http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/DEASeptember2002.pdf.
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drug business not just in the Andes, but also throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
Criminology studies focusing on “kingpin” strategies have not reduced the rise of drugtrafficking organizations because they focus on the leaders, rather than on the conditions
that motivate individuals to organize and act within illicit networks. Strategies like “Plan
Colombia” implemented in 2000, focus mainly on eradicating cocaine plantations,
helping the Colombian government attack insurgent groups in southern Colombia and
restoring security around urban centers, but do not focus on structural, political, and
economic incentives that stimulate drug traffic and fund the war effort of armed groups in
the first place.
Colombia has weak democratic institutions, high economic inequalities, and
suffers from a historical legacy of violence.16 These conditions have given rise to many
drug trafficking organizations and armed belligerent forces, which have become
dependent on the illicit drug economy. In contrast to politically driven explanations, this
study methodically studies the rise and political impact of DTOs as illicit interest groups
so that the model can be used in understanding: (1) the development of DTOs in other
countries with similar conditions, and (2) the political impact of DTOs.
The data used in this dissertation drew from author interviews, government
documents, documentaries, newspaper and journalistic accounts, journal articles, and
scholarly books. In-person interviews were conducted with ex-members of DTOs and
government officials during 2004, 2005, and 2008. Many of the interviews with former
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Colombia has about 3.7 million internally displaced persons (Human Rights Watch, 2012); the number of
kidnappings has been reduced from 1,250 in 2004 to about 249 in 2011 (UNODC, 2010a; República de
Colombia, 2004 and 2011); the number of homicides in 2004 was 18,579 and was reduced to 12,159 in
2011. The number of massacres in 2004 was 43, which took the lives of 243 people, and in 2011 the
massacre number was 32 and took the life of 149 people (República de Colombia, 2004 and 2011).
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DTO members were done with former sicarios (gunmen), middle traffickers, and coca
farmers. First-person accounts recorded for the study complied with Institutional Review
Board (IRB) requirements for working with human subjects, and the anonymity of
subjects has been maintained throughout the dissertation. Much additional sources were
derived from news media, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research.
Because of the difficulty in finding trustworthy sources on sensitive issues like the inner
workings of DTOs, to make sure that sources acquired for this study were reliable, when
possible several accounts were triangulated with other data sources.
An assessment of the literature on DTOs and on interest group models begins on
Chapter 2. It also introduces the Macro-Micro Interest Group Model used to study illicit
interest groups. Chapter 3 evaluates the external variables that gave rise to Medellinbased DTOs. Chapter 4 evaluates the internal variables, which allowed Medellin-based
DTOs to impact politics. Finally, the concluding analysis examines the model’s
effectiveness and discusses the implication of this study on future research.
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CHAPTER 2: USING A HYBRID MACRO-MICRO-MODEL EMPLOYING
PLURALIST AND INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES TO STUDY ILLICIT
INTEREST GROUPS
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Studies on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) highlight the social, economic,
and political implications that the illicit drug business presents for nations like the United
States and Colombia. The existing research typically analyzes the effects of DTOs on
states (Thoumi, 1995; Lee 1989) and the strategies states implement to counteract DTO
effects (Bagley and Tokatlian 1985; Bagley, 1988; Tokatlian, 1988). Colombian-based
drug trafficking organizations, such as the “Medellin Cartel,” have been analyzed as
participants of an underground industry and as transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) (Thoumi, 1995; Thoumi et al., 1999, Williams, 1998; Lee 1989, 1996, 1999;
Bagley, 2003). The works of Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee pioneered the
analytic study of the illicit drug industry by discussing the political and economic
implications of these groups in Colombia. Lee’s The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and
Political Power is one of the first analyses to acknowledge the political importance of
these groups. His work on the cocaine industry refers to drug traffickers as “interest
groups with extensive resources and political connections” that interact with “coca
lobbies” in Bolivia and Peru (Lee, 1989).17 Lee’s work extensively describes the
objectives and actions of the early narcotics industry, but does not evaluate the drug
industry in Colombia as an interest group, although in the 1999 journal article coauthored with Francisco Thoumi (entitled “The Criminal-Political Nexus in Colombia”)
both authors refer to DTOs as the most powerful of interest groups:
In other words drug profits amounted to roughly 6 percent to 8 percent of Colombia’s Gross
Domestic Product in the 1990s, which makes narcotics barons possibly the dominant interest
group in Colombia. Colombian traffickers’ large surplus implies a significant capability for system
penetration activities such as lobbying, bribes, and legal investments, as well as for the exercise of
violence and intimidation against the Colombian state (Lee et al., 1999).
17

For other analysis on Bolivian coca farmer mobilization and TCO interaction see Eduardo Gamarra’s
“Transnational Criminal Organizations in Bolivia” (Farer, 1999, p. 183).
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The article highlights the criminal-political nexus and set the stage for further research,
which is the starting point for my project as my research will link previous work on
DTOs with political science models on interest groups.
An interest group model can explain three events: how structural conditions
influence the formation of a political actor; how a group develops an internal
organization; and what the dynamics are between a group and its environment. Because
illicit interest groups (IIGs) engage in criminal activity and have used violence to
influence policy, it is difficult to associate IIGs with the activities of legally established
interest groups, for this reason it is important to examine the characteristics of interest
groups, explain how they differ from social movements (which are on the fringes of
society), and to explore how an interest group model can be useful in studying IIG
political activity. Whether a group is defined as a politically influential criminal group, an
interest group, or a social movement, it is valuable to analyze politically active groups
with an interest group model as an analytical tool because the variables used are designed
to measure the political impact of groups in general. An interest group model can explore
external influences on a group, which may affect a group’s organization or a group’s
capacity to formulate a policy goal. The variables of an interest group model are valuable
because they can examine a group’s internal dynamics, measure how its membership
organizes behind a policy issue, and show how a group interacts with its external
environment to influence politics.
The chapter provides a literature review and the theoretical basis for analyzing
groups commonly depicted as criminal; moreover, the chapter defines these groups as
Illicit Interest Groups (IIGs) by using a macro-micro interest group model derived from
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pluralist and institutionalist analyses on interest groups. The model is used because of its
explanatory power and because it reduces the deficiencies of interest group models; in
particular, elite and corporatist interest group models which analyze power from the topdown. The usefulness of the proposed model is that it combines two different but
complimentary models (the pluralist and the institutionalist), which examine external
influences on a group and internal factors that allow groups to impact policy. The
following discussion will: (1) discuss the literature on social movements and interest
groups; (2) define the hybrid Macro-Micro interest group model; and (3) present the
organizational framework used to analyze IIGs.
Social Movements and Interest Groups
All societal groups (including interest groups and social movements) unite
individuals who have common viewpoints even if they are considered criminal.
Sometimes it is difficult to clearly differentiate social movements from interest groups
because both may support a particular policy or use similar tactics to influence
policymaking. The main differences between social movements and interest groups lies
in the scope of their policy agenda, the tactics they use to influence policymaking, and
their lifecycle. Determining the difference is important because it assesses whether a
groups lies in the fringes of society (i.e. an armed social movement), or if it has become
part of the political establishment (i.e. an issue specific lobbying association).
Social movements are generally composed of a broad network of organizations
that can promote numerous policy agendas. These networks can include a variety of
groups working loosely together or can lead to the creation of a substantial entity like a
political party to represent the demands of a particular movement. But since social
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movements promote broad policy agendas, participants usually have differing overall
goals and values (Bashevkin, 1996:138).18 For instance, some activists of a social
movement may be preoccupied with advancing a general social cause while others
belonging to the same movement may be participating to make more specific political
demands. Social movements aim to transform the status quo by promoting new social
institutions and consequently the movement either dissolves or transitions based on the
effort’s success or failure. Because of this, social movements have been defined as
organizations that “cooperate to advance political claims.”19
Social movements are regarded as confrontational actors because their tactics tend
to challenge existing political systems. In many circumstances, social movements
represent the demands of societal actors that do not have regular access to an established
avenue for persuading government, and thus do not have equal access to methods of
policy change. For this reason, the strategies that social movements typically employ can
range from peaceful demonstrations to more extreme measures involving the use of
violence towards civilians and property (i.e. terrorist events). The use of violence, as a
strategy, is probably why violent elements and organizations on the fringes of society are
commonly examined in the context of a social movement. Still, it has been observed that
as organized movements become more developed, they regularly rely less on
confrontational tactics20 and in many cases form more standard lobbying relationships
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While some activists may want to form political parties because their main goal is to obtain the power to
govern, others may be solely concerned with furthering just one cause. An example of a broad social
movement is the U.S. civil rights movement that agglutinated different groups, which specifically furthered
the rights of women and people of color.
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See David Meyer et al., The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century.
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with political parties and/or public officials, morphing into a structure more similar to
traditional interest groups if they succeed. Societal groups that use violent tactics to
achieve a political goal are difficult to analyze, because their ambiguous legal status blurs
how they are perceived by societies. Usually societies create polarized perceptions on
violent groups, where those who oppose the violent social movements regard them as
criminals, and those who support the group regard them as a movement, which makes a
political demand. State authorities usually regard violent movements as “criminal”
because in the defense of their political demands such violent social groups break laws.
The ambiguous status of social armed movements is a predicament that researchers have
when analyzing such groups especially when they engage in criminal activities. Should
political science leave the study of these groups to sociologists, criminologists, or
economists, even though these groups have political demands and effects on
governments? In the case of Colombia, groups such as Los Extraditables (the Medellinbased DTO’s terrorist group), the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC, have made or continue
to make political demands, but are illegal because they are either engaged in an illicit
business or use violence to pursue their political demands (or both). Because of the
political influence of these groups on state institutions, it is argued in this dissertation that
these social groups should be studied within the scope of political science.
Political scientists have generally defined interest groups as individuals who share
common attitudes and who band together to protect their established interests and seek to
influence political decisions. Rather than challenging the status quo on a particular issue
20

See Meyer et al., (1998) for the development and institutionalization of social movements in
industrialized states. By more developed it is meant that the social movement’s organization establishes a
permanent professional staff, has centralized control, is well financed, and has a large number of supportive
members.
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in the way a social movement would, interest groups look after the welfare of the group
by influencing government decision makers (Cigler et al., 1998; Bashevkin, 1996).21
For an interest group, having access to public officials is essential because it
allows for the presentation (and fulfillment) of demands (Ainsworth, 2002, p.131). When
public officials deny standard access to an interest group, it severely weakens their ability
to influence policy.22 These demands, or policy agendas, are typically narrow and usually
represent a singular cause. Because of this, members of an interest group regularly have
more cohesive ideas and goals than those of activists within a social movement. In
democracies, a multitude of social groups have been represented directly by interest
groups. Some examples include corporations, labor unions, women’s rights
organizations, and ethnic groups.
As will be suggested in more detail in further chapters, the Medellin-based DTOs,
in addition to employing violent tactics, operated like any other legal interest groups by
presenting their political demands to policymakers in an effort to affect the Colombian
government’s domestic and international policy agenda.

21

Cigler and Loomis base their definition on the David Truman’s widely cited definition. “An ‘interest
group’ refers to any group that on the basis of one or more shared attitudes makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are
implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman, 1981). Other definitions for interest groups are: “Any
association of individuals, whether formally organized or not, that attempts to influence public policy”
(Hrebenar et al., 1993, p. 9); “An organization which seeks or claims to represent people or organizations
which share one or more common interests or ideals” (Wilson, 1981); “An interest group is an organized
association which engages in activity relative to governmental institutions” (Salisbury, 1970); and
“[Interest groups] promote their interests by attempting to influence government rather than by nominating
candidates and seeking responsibility for the management of government,” (Key, 1964).
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It is probable that if an interest group is denied access to present its demands, then it will resort to more
confrontational methods for influencing policy.
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Armed Social Movements and Illicit Interest Groups
One problematic area for political science and social studies is how to categorize,
describe, and fully understand illegal social groups and how to best examine their
relationships to other state entities. Labeled as “criminal,” belligerent groups often
receive different treatment when analyzed or, as is the case when viewing them as a
social movement, they are studied in the context of a lifecycle from emergence to decline.
The problem of categorizing a group as “criminal” is that it dismisses a clearer
understanding of illegal groups that maintain an extended presence on the fringes of a
state’s legal system and how those groups, even if depicted as movements, continue to
affect policy from the outside. But by using interest group models, a closer analysis can
reveal more. These fringe groups, for the purposes of this dissertation are referred to as
illicit interest groups (IIGs); and in this study the focus is on the Medellin-based DTOs.
Research on interest groups has established different models for understanding the
power interplay between social groups and the state. Such research focuses on the
influence of legal interest groups on domestic and international politics.23 Models
encompass variables from sociological analyses and focus on environmental/structural
conditions. They allow for an examination of internal conditions that can account for the
differences in behavior of different groups such as a group’s internal power relations and
the individual preferences of group members. Though they have mainly been used to
describe legal entities, the models can provide insights into IIGs because, like legitimate
groups, IIGs can similarly impact government decision-making.24 Interest groups

23

See Thomas Risse’s “Transnational actors and world politics” (2002).

22

influence domestic and international politics and so do IIGs. Like interest groups, IIGs
can finance political campaigns and have shifting bases of popular support. While
interest groups can represent the formal foundations of various economic sectors, IIGs
can represent certain informal counterparts.25 Both exist within states, but both can be
transnational in nature, and both can become politically active to counteract policies that
affect them.
But IIGs promote illicit activities that challenge state authority by engaging in
violent conflicts, trafficking arms, or engaging in illegal commercial ventures like the
narcotics industry (Farer, 1999). While interest groups appear in all democracies, IIGs
typically arise in weak states because the presence of the state apparatus is not capable of
enforcing laws that will restrict their activities (Thoumi, 1994; Farer, 1999).
Applying an interest group model can reassess how armed movements are studied.
It can confirm the structural influences that affect a movement, shed light on the qualities
of individual members, and examine why IIGs persist.
Traditional Interest Group Models
There are a number of interest group models that analyze and try to explain the
power interplay between societal groups and the state. Some of the more traditional
models include the power elite model, the pluralist model, the institutionalist model, and
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The author of this dissertation considers that not all organized criminal organizations are illicit interest
groups, organized criminal organizations need to be politically active, and they need to influence policy to
be considered an illicit interest group.
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Examples of political-economic bases of support are: residents of Brazilian slums, which receive
economic benefits from donos da droga (drug dealers), the strengthening of the coca growers movement in
Bolivia, and the popular basis of support for armed groups linked to the drug trade such as the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Auto Defensas de Colombia (AUC).

23

the corporatist model, but others provide a better structural starting point for a discussion
of IIGs than others.
The models can be placed along an ideological continuum from those, on the one
hand, that have a structure and philosophy more suited for explaining the strength of
social group influence on state policy, to those models that have a structure and
philosophy more suited for explaining the state’s control over a social group. Certain
models are better equipped to analyze the power interplay from the point-of-view of the
state and social elites (a top-down approach) while others are better equipped to analyze
the power interplay from the point-of-view of social groups (a bottom-up approach).
The power elite model, as described in The Power Elite (1970), by C. Wright
Mills, diagrams a power structure to explain politics in the United States from the top
down. Mills argues that a small cohesive business elite controls government decisionmaking. In so doing, the elite elements perpetuated political power by limiting the
participation of other groups in society. Mills’ model develops a pyramidal power
structure containing an instrumental view of the state-interest group dynamic that
attempts to show how a social group, in this case a business group, influences state actors
to create policies that benefit a particular industry. Mills’ approach may be an interesting
and insightful way to analyze IIGs, but it leans toward providing a better understanding
of established elites rather than nascent interest groups. Mills uses benefits and
consequences in the model popularly known as the “iron triangle” to better understand
the United States military-industrial complex. His model shows how the common
interests of elite business groups, congresspersons, and bureaucrats align and reinforce
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each other for long periods of time.26 Although Mills’ power elite model is helpful in
depicting the political relationships among elites, it is not as useful when analyzing less
elite interest groups. Especially interest groups that may not have the economic means,
social status, or social pedigree to be able to coax, build social relationships, or “good
ol’boy networks” with powerful and established politicians.
After C. Wright Mills proposed this model of representation, scholars such as G.
William Domhoff in Who Rules America (2002) empirically expanded Mills’s original
research. Domhoff’s research linked members of the upper class to the corporate
economy concluding that a corporate elite exists. He also did surveys where respondents
belonging to the political elite verified that they knew other members in corporate society
at a personal level. While valuable for future discussions, this model explains more about
the established groups than those along the fringe and so is less valuable to the purposes
of this study.27
The pluralist model, on the other hand, developed as a response to the power elite
model, and can be used to examine non-elite groups with more clarity from the bottom up.
Core pluralist theorists like David Truman and Robert Dahl were behavioralists and
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For example, the defense industrial lobby provides electoral support to members of congress in exchange
for favorable legislation. Congresspersons benefit from electoral support provided by defense lobbies such
as campaign funding and/or votes. As a consequence, legislators create favorable legislation for the
defense industry, and oversee the bureaucracy that enforces the desired policy. In turn, the defense
bureaucracy obtains a mission as well as Congressional budgetary support to enforce legislation. At the
individual level, bureaucrats could potentially secure future jobs in the private sector by working on a
particular policy or by knowing the rules and procedures of the defense bureaucracy. Though it seems as
though the relationships are equally beneficial for all parities involved, the defense industrial lobby is
argued to be the most powerful party because it sets the agenda through the economic power that it has to
advance the political careers of members of Congress and of bureaucracies and their officers.
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Although Medellin-based DTO leaders became multimillionaires by the time many were in their midtwenties in the late 1970s, DTO leaders had the economic means to build relationships with politicians,
however they did not have the status to penetrate the high social status held by Colombian political elites of
the time. Since they were unable to build rapport with the political elite, many DTOs launched their own
campaigns or funded the campaigns of local level politicians.
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believed that policy outcomes in the United States could be better explained—not by
observing governmental institutions—but by observing the behavior of societal groups.
Before the behavioral revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, most institutional work was less
analytical because it focused on describing the structure of formal government
institutions and the rules and constitutions that produced those structures. Pluralists
considered that focusing on the description of formal institutions did little to actually
explain politics. They believed that they could understand political behavior if more
attention was paid to social actors and their negotiations with state officials rather than to
the legal process. An underlying assumption was the belief that societal group action
could explain more about politics than institutional rules. Their social focus allowed
them to believe that they were creating a more analytical version of political events.
Behavioralists reversed the emphasis on description by concentrating on creating
functional models that explain political behavior. David Easton’s Framework for
Political Analysis (1965) depicts social activity as inputs and government activity as
outputs. Using Easton’s framework, pluralists concentrated on social aspects of political
behavior like voting, interest group activity, and mass political behavior, while
minimizing the importance of studying formal state institutions. The behavioralist focus
on society partially explains why David Truman was the first scientist to define interest
groups as groups that share common attitudes and make claims upon other groups.28
Though interest groups form to further their common interests this quality does not make
social groups politically active. According to this perspective, groups become politically
28

An ‘interest group’ refers to “any group that on the basis of one or more shared attitudes makes certain
claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of
behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman, 1981).
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active when they need to make claims upon others through the use of government
institutions, especially when groups have a lot at stake and specific rights are not well
established (Ainsworth, 2002).
As an interest group model created in response to the power elite model, pluralists
disagree with elite theorists on the issue of interest group competition. Pluralists do not
believe that group competition is limited to a privileged group. Instead, they assume that
group competition for influencing government is fluid, open, and fair. Interest group
access to different branches of government at local and national levels guarantees
increased political participation. The model assumes that political access is available to
all groups regardless of their economic status. Because of this assumption the political
theatre is commonly referred to as a political “marketplace,” where various social groups
representing opposing interests compete for influence in a level playing field. It is also
believed that because of the existence of many divergent groups their claims balance each
other out creating a natural equilibrium. Finally the model assumes that the state is an
impartial actor that maintains order by settling disputes among competing interests.
In the pluralist model, the power of groups to influence policy is determined by
five internal group characteristics: individual member characteristics, group resources,
cohesion, expertise, and representativeness.29 In a competitive political marketplace, it is
believed that the group that excels in all of these characteristics will be the most
successful at influencing policy. Besides focusing on internal characteristics of a group,
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Member characteristics refer to socioeconomic status, media access, and the education of group leaders.
Group resources refer to financial and human resources controlled by a group. Group cohesion is the
degree of organizational control, discipline, and ideological unity. Group expertise refers to policy and
administrative knowledge. Finally representativeness is the group’s policy position relative to society
(Bashevkin, 1996).
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pluralists like David Truman argued that external characteristics such as changes in the
political, economic, social, or technological environment were important in accounting
for group development and demise. These variables were incorporated in what is known
as Truman’s disturbance theory, which contends that groups form in response to changes
in society and the economy (Truman, 1981). Disturbances such as war and economic
recession can stimulate the creation of groups whose purpose is to “restore the balance in
society.”
A pluralist approach is important to discussing IIGs because it allows for a closer
analysis of interest groups from the bottom up. By understanding the composition of a
societal group through the use of a variety of variables, regardless of its legal status,
social scientists can further explain the power interplay between a group, the state, or its
social environment. For this reason, the pluralist model is an essential part of describing
and analyzing IIGs in more detail. The pluralist model does have two main shortcomings:
The first is its assumption that the state is an impartial actor. The second is that all groups
can equally compete in the political “marketplace.” The institutionalist approach to the
study of interest groups addresses these biases.
Institutionalist models developed as a response to pluralist beliefs and question
three assumptions of the pluralist model: the nature of group competition, the pluralist
view of the state, and the nature of a group’s internal workings. While still focusing on
societal groups as opposed to the powered elite, and by studying the formation and
effects of institutions, the model is therefore a helpful counterpoint to the pluralist model.
Two scholars central to the creation of an institutionalist model for interest group
studies were E.E. Schattschneider and Mancur Olson. Both studied American politics,
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but while E.E. Schattschneider concentrated on laying out the foundations of rationalist
notions on group competition and the state, Olson explained group action by looking at
the internal dynamics of a group.
Schattschneider was not satisfied with pluralist explanations of interest group
competition in American politics. In his opinion, interest group competition was not free
of favoritism: “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a
strong upper class accent” (Schattschneider, 1960). The freedom of competition was
biased because the outcomes of group competition favored certain interests. Although
pluralists believed that interest group competition at different levels of government
dispersed power and allowed more segments of a population to be represented, in reality
competition in the political marketplace concentrated power among the upper classes
rather than dispersing power equally to other groups (Ainsworth, 2002). Schattschneider
saw the class system as an institutional aspect that affected the fair play of ideas. To
account for biases in social group competition, Schattschneider believed that it was
necessary to move away from viewing societal groups as a sole reference point. While
pluralist notions depicted the state as an impartial actor allocating resources among
competing interests, Schattschneider believed that a state’s institutional rules and
procedures structure the competition, and largely determine which interests survive for
consideration among decision-makers.30 By studying a state’s institutional mechanisms,
policymakers, and norms, a larger understanding of the social context for how
movements and groups form and compete could now be explained. Schattschneider’s
30

Though Schattschneider used an institutionalist perspective, it was an improvement on the “old”
institutionalist school because rather than just describing the rules and procedures of an institution,
Schattschneider and others explained the effects of these rules on the behavior of individuals.
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model, has influenced contemporary scholars such as Peter Evans et al.’s in Bringing The
State Back In (1985), John Ikenberry et al.’s The State and American Foreign Economic
Policy (1988), and Thomas Risse-Kappen’s in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In
(1995) among others, to incorporate the study of state and its relation with non-state
actors.
Mancur Olson’s major question in The Logic of Collective Action (1971) dealt
with why individuals join groups. The question led him to analyze the interactions within
interest groups in order to identify common variables. His work (and that of others who
have followed) has constructed models that indicate why groups form, why some are
more successful in influencing policy, and why they eventually disband. Olson, like
Schattschneider, was unconvinced with pluralist explanations of why interest groups
formed and behaved. Whereas pluralists focused on environmental causes such as
political, economic, social, and technological events31 to explain a group’s lifespan,
rationalists like Olson did not believe that these events in themselves specifically
stimulated a group’s formation or demise. The traditional pluralist variables designed to
measure a group’s ability to influence policy such as member characteristics, group
resources, cohesion, expertise, and representativeness, were inadequate in determining
why certain groups failed to influence policy.
Another rationalist critique of the pluralist model was its assumption of why
people joined a group. Pluralists assumed that members joined a group because of
cohesion in beliefs and attitudes, and this quality allowed political scientists to study
31

Environmental effects on group behavior are usually referred to as Truman’s disturbance theory. Any
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interest groups as single entities, regardless of individual member preferences. Olson
argued that this was a mistake; he did not believe that interest groups acted as monolithic
entities where all members within an organization acted on behalf of a common interest.
In his view, the pluralist treatment of interest groups committed an ecological fallacy in
which individuals took on the qualities normally attributed to a group. Such treatment of
interest groups assumed that individuals joined organizations to support a common cause,
but never really inquired why. Olson believed that more could be explained about group
action and success, if groups could be dissected to expose the different preferences of
individuals belonging to a group. In other words, Olson considered that individuals
within a group also had their own self-interest, and just because they joined a group, their
own interest would not cede to the common interest of the group. For Olson, an inquiry
on the preferences of individuals in a group would reveal the real explanations behind
why individuals choose to form, belong, or leave a group.
Both Schattschneider and Olson developed institutional approaches to analyzing
interest groups. By looking at the structures and mechanisms of states that affected
interest group formation, competition, and demise; and by focusing on characteristics of
individual members within a group, their efforts can also be drawn from the bottom up—
focusing on individual and group effects on the competition for the attention of
political/government elites. For this reason, incorporating an institutional approach is
important to discussing IIGs because it allows for a closer analysis of the social purpose
behind how groups act and the governing agents that can affect the supposedly “balanced”
power play between competing groups and the state. The interaction between
governments and groups makes the intuitionalist model an essential part of describing
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IIGs in more detail. This analysis can delve on a number of questions: how laws and law
enforcement allowed DTOs to flourish, what were the perceptions of government elites
towards DTOs and DTO leaders, and why did DTO members join DTOs, among others.
At the opposite end of the continuum is the corporatist model—where interest
groups are dominated or incorporated into the state’s structure. There are two major
categories of corporatist regimes: authoritarian corporatism and liberal, neo-, or societal
corporatism.
In corporatist models, interest groups are recognized, licensed, or given a
monopoly by the state. Competition among groups is limited and is organized according
to a state’s design. In corporatist models, interest groups become an integral part of the
state and this loss of political autonomy reduces the political impact of interest groups on
society, thereby reducing conflict and competition. Alfred C. Stepan (1978), a wellknown specialist on corporatist interest group models in Latin America, has shown that
corporatism is an elite response to state crisis because elites can control an emergent
group’s demands by using institutional mechanisms to incorporate social sectors into the
state. Thus, corporatism emphasizes structured interactions with a state’s politicians,
bureaucratic actors, and interest groups. The gist of the interaction is based on the state’s
ability to control the selection of group leaders, group demands, and group support.
In corporatist models, the balance of power tilts toward state actors. In contrast to
the power elite model, corporatist models believe that social actors do not manipulate the
state because it is the state or state officials that determine group competition. Though in
the pluralist model, group competition is refereed by state institutions, in the corporatist
model the state intervenes in the internal decision-making process of interest groups, thus
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regulating group competition according to a state’s parameters. Similar to the power elite
model, while valuable for future discussions, the corporatist perspective explains more
about the state than those groups competing for change along the fringe of society and so
it is less valuable to the purposes of the study at hand.
The two models that explain the political impact of societal groups, which focus
the effect of environmental factors that influence their actions and formation, while at the
same time offering insights into internal group characteristics are the pluralist and
institutional models of interest group analysis. By analyzing IIGs through both models, a
better picture can be illustrated of criminal organizations and how they can affect
domestic and international policy.
The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Interest Group Model
In addition to taking an hybrid of institutionalist and pluralist approaches, the
interest group model used in this exploration of Colombian drug trafficking organizations
is made more efficient by including two additional aspects: a macro-view and a microview. The two perspectives organize how external and internal factors influence group
behavior. The macro-micro-model tries to predict the character of internal reforms that
can result from environmental demands on a societal group. Without analyzing the
dynamics within the internal organization of a group and the motivations of a group’s
individual members, it is difficult to assert whether an environmental factor has any
effect. The hybridization of two models is derived from an organizational model created
by Amie Kreppel in her study on the institutional development of the European
Parliament (Kreppel, 2002). Some of the hypotheses used and tested in my dissertation
are derived from Kreppel’s organizational development study.
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Using a hybrid approach makes sense because one model by itself can only
partially describe the qualities of interest groups. In my project it is necessary to combine
the two models to produce a more complete and comprehensive explanation of IIG
behavior. Table 1 below shows the fusion of variables used to analyze groups in the
study.
Table 1: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist
Approaches

Pluralist approach

Institutionalist
approach

Macro-model variables
(external variables)
• Political events
• Economic events
• Social events
• Technological events
•
•
•
•

A state’s legal
parameters
Individual preferences
of state officials
Autonomy
A state’s capacity

Micro-model variables
(internal variables)
• Membership
characteristics
• Resources
• Cohesion
• Expertise
• Representativeness
• Selective incentives
• Group size
• Existence of high- and
low-demanders

The Macro-model column variables listed in the left column of Table 1 above,
assumes that external variables will influence internal group behavior and those internal
changes will follow external events (Kreppel, 2002:26, 214). The following hypotheses
can be used to test Macro-model variables as they explain how an interest group
flourishes and develops:
•

Hypothesis 1: The presence of favourable external variables (occurring
within a larger political environment) is more likely to influence the formation
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and development of illicit interest groups, and a group’s formation and
development should follow external events.
•

Hypothesis 1a: Changes to the internal organization and structure of an illicit
interest group should be related and deal with the environmental events that
influence the group, and the changes made should be collective goods because
they benefit the organization as a whole.

Hypothesis 1 identifies external conditions that influence the emergence or development
of a group. It also tries to determine a causal relation between an external event and the
changes within the organization. Hypothesis 1a determines whether a group’s internal
organization is affected or if a group creates a policy objective as a result of an external
event. Hypothesis 1a also tries to ascertain whether the internal organizational changes
are of collective benefit to all group members or just a few.
The Micro-model column variables, listed in the right column of Table 1 above,
can be used to determine how a group affects policy. The Micro-model variables in
Table 1 can be used to effectively describe how individuals within a group will act to
achieve a common goal and can help to explain how a group’s action will be constrained
by group dynamics (Kreppel, 2002:214). For example, in order to understand another
facet of how members achieve policy goals, the preferences and interests of the leaders of
drug trafficking organizations can be examined. The following hypotheses can be used to
test Micro-model variables as they explain how an interest group develops and impacts
policy:
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•

Hypothesis 2: The presence of internal variables, which favor a group’s
mobilization towards the accomplishment a policy goal, will allow an IIG to
affect governmental policy.

•

Hypothesis 2a: If members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a
particular issue, members will work together and the political achievements
obtained by the group will benefit all members.

•

Hypothesis 2b: Once a group has clear leadership and influence, the group
will have greater incentive to discipline its membership and attain internal
cohesion.

•

Hypothesis 2c: When a group has no clear leadership, or is unable to impact
policy, there will be little incentive for a group’s leader(s) to organize and
discipline their members.

•

Hypothesis 2d: When a group has realized a common goal, in periods of
transition, consensus among a group’s membership will decrease and may
deteriorate group development.32

Hypothesis 2 examines whether the presence of internal variables has an effect on
a group’s ability to affect policy. Hyphotheses 2a-2d look at the internal organization of
a group when it is formed and once it begins to unravel. By examining the different
internal variables, it is possible to determine whether a group will stay united to
implement a policy or if it will begin to disband.

32

Hypotheses 1-2d are derived from Amie Kreppel’s organizational study on the European Parliament
(EP) (Kreppel, 2002, p.25,48), and participating political parties, but in this study the hypotheses are
applied to the study of interest groups.
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Finally, to gage on the effect of IIGs on democratic institutions, Hypothesis 3 is
formulated:
•

Hypothesis 3: The greater the economic and political cohesiveness and
discipline IIGs have, the more likely they will be able to influence
democratic institutions to accomplish their goals.

Macro-model Variables
The Macro-model external factors that make up the pluralist area of group study
and investigation concentrate on describing how external events (political, economic,
social, technological) can influence a group’s formation, development, or demise. These
external factors are part of David Truman’s “Disturbance Theory,” which contends that
groups form to counterbalance opposition and to respond to changes in society and the
economy (Truman, 1981). As introduced earlier, disturbances such as war and economic
recessions can stimulate groups to “restore the balance in society.”
The institutionalist model’s external variables include looking at a state’s legal
parameters, the preferences of government officials, and a state’s autonomy and
capacity.33
An explanation of a state’s legal parameters is a general description of the legal
environment within which IIGs develop. It helps to frame the context that shows how
IIGs become politically active and can identify how a state’s legal system may bias
certain social groups. In addition, ambiguities in a state’s legal system can lead to social
conflicts and loopholes, making an understanding of legal parameter relevant for analysis.
33

Statist research defines institutional capacity as the “ability of the bureaucratic state to execute its
actions,” (Bashevkin, 1996, p. 148) this entails concentrating, coordinating, and exploiting state resources.
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Looking at the preferences of state officials explores the state’s elite executives
and/or legislators who are appropriate to the case study based on their policy agendas,
political platforms, and campaigns. These preferences can either counteract IIG policy
agendas or can be the result of IIG influence, making them valuable aspects to
discovering how IIGs are influenced by a state’s policies or how IIGs affect state policies.
This variable is important because the scholarly work of E. E. Schattschneider, and more
contemporary scholars such as Stephen Krasner (1978), Evans et al. (1985), John
Ikenberry et al. (1988), and Peter Katzenstein (1985) have found that state actors have the
capacity to intervene in group competition and are not impartial actors.
Evaluating autonomy gauges the degree of political independence (from other
state institutions and social actors) that state executives enjoy while governing. Studying
autonomy builds an understanding of a leader’s political maneuverability, which can, in
turn, directly affect an understanding of the nature of a leader’s coalitions, negotiations,
deal-making options, and willingness to compromise. Autonomy as a variable is
different from state capacity because autonomy measures the degree of independence that
state actors have from societal groups for making decisions. When state actors are more
autonomous they will be less concerned about societal group opinion, and consequently,
state actors will be more apt to act on their own. Once an executive has the autonomy to
act, state capacity is the ability of a leader to act on his/her will. The level of a state
leader’s autonomy also has a large influence on the potential power of an IIG, and viceversa, so is an insightful area of research.
State capacity is an evaluation of the state’s ability to function effectively;
meaning its ability (or inability) to efficiently monopolize the use of force and collect
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taxes. More specifically, state capacity is the aptitude of government elites to manage the
state apparatus so that policies can be implemented through state institutions. Exploring
the variable is valuable because, Joel Migdal in his work Strong Societies and Weak
States (Migdal, 1988) found that countries with an ineffective state capacity to collect
taxes, enforce laws, or distribute resources, are overshadowed by social actors. The
capacity of social actors to surpass the state is important to note, because having an
ineffective state capacity can create a political environment with a higher propensity for
the development of IIGs. In Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Juan
Linz and Alfred Stepan also found that a functioning state is a necessary condition for the
consolidation of democratic regime (Linz et al., 1996, p. 7). If the state is not able to
effectively establish rule of law, then democratic institutions will be vulnerable. This
observation is important to the study of illicit interest groups because groups thrive in
areas that cannot be regulated. Linz and Stepan refer to this as the “problem of stateness”
(Linz et al., 1996, p. 18) where a state’s institutions are unable to “effectively exercise
[their] claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory, could not
collect taxes, and could not implement a judicial system” (Linz et al., 1996, p. 18). The
“problem of stateness” is an obstacle for consolidating democracies such as Colombia’s
democracy, because a weak state is unable to protect the rights of its citizens due to the
lack of state capacity throughout its territory. The “problem of stateness” for many
countries becomes cyclical because the lack of state capacity, in turn, leads actors to
resolve more conflicts through the use of violence and corruption, instead of a state’s
legal institutions, which in turn, continue to weaken a state’s institutions.
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Micro-model Variables
Micro-model variables drawn from a pluralist approach look at the internal factors
of a group. Macro-model seeks to understand the development and institutionalization of
a group by examining descriptive elements such as a group’s membership characteristics,
resources, cohesion, expertise, and representativeness. These attributes focus mainly on
aggregate qualities rather than on the individual preferences and incentives of a group’s
members. Pluralists hypothesize that, the group that excels in all of these internal
characteristics will be the most successful at influencing policy.
Exploring membership characteristics includes investigating the socioeconomic
status and education of the group’s executive or elite members compared to the
remaining membership population.
Examining resources means identifying the financial and human forces leveraged
by the group. This includes studying a group’s financial and human resources to see how
these are used to influence policy.
Cohesion is the degree of organizational control, discipline, and ideological unity
present in a group. In particular, this study focuses on describing the level of economic
and political cohesion evidenced in efforts to move agendas forward. Economically
speaking, this means looking at how effectively groups gather, manage, and pool
financial resources. Politically, it means analyzing how coordinated and structured the
group’s efforts are in their effort to achieve a policy objective.
Expertise refers to a group’s policy and administrative knowledge that yields a
discussion about a group’s internal operations, such as how effective and developed its
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communications network, technological know-how, security apparatus, legal
representation, and public relations capacity may be.
Representativeness is a measure of the group’s policy position relative to society
(Bashevkin, 1996). Representativeness can be evaluated by studying how a group is able
to sell its particularistic policy agenda to the rest of society by shaping public opinion.
This variable can also explore how groups approach politicians with the effort to present
their policy agenda. In the case of Colombia the presentation of interests is usually done
through campaign donations, but also through the use of clientelist networks. Clientelism
is generally defined as a patron-client relationship that takes place between people of
unequal status, which is characterized by an unequal exchange of favors, and that relies
heavily on face-to-face contact (Martz, 1997:10). The role of DTO leaders within
clientelist networks to obtain their policy objectives will be explored. Also, it is expected
that IIGs that have aspects of their agenda successfully conveyed and supported (even if
they are only partially supported) by a larger population have an easier path for social
acceptance and development than groups who do not.
The hybrid interest group model used in the study at hand derives variables from
the institutionalist approach to examine the internal structure of an organization by
focusing on factors such as selective incentives, group size, and the nature of the group’s
high- and low-demanders. These attributes mostly concentrate on the individual
characteristics of interest group members and are useful in analyzing the state-group
dynamic by studying actor interests, preferences, and strategies.
Selective incentives, as referred to in Mancur Olson’s Rise and Decline of
Nations (1984), are benefits or deterrents that are determined by a group’s leadership and
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are applied to the membership of an organization to induce the appropriate collective
action. Olson’s incentives help explain what motivates members to join a cause, what
keeps them involved, and to what degree they will remain in an organization to
accomplish a collective goal. By looking at selective incentives in an IIG, an
understanding of the group’s potential motivations and commitment at the member-level
can be revealed. Selective incentives can prevent group deterioration by attempting to
keep the membership satisfied and united. As Olson describes, these incentives can be
positive or negative.
Positive selective incentives yield benefits that reward individuals for belonging
to the group. Though members may perceive a larger, more long-term collective goal,
they may need short-term positive selective incentives to inspire continued support.
Collaterally, these incentives may help members identify more strongly with the larger
cause and commit their support further, which in turn allows for the unification and
survival of the group.
Selective incentives can also be negative. A particular group may find it
necessary to coerce its membership or impose a negative incentive in order to achieve its
central goals. Negative incentives can range from collecting monthly dues to resorting to
violence, punishment, or fear.
In the case study analyzed in this dissertation, it is valuable to be aware of certain
types of selective incentives: material, expressive, and solidary (Ainsworth, 2002)—all of
which aim at building cooperation, but which employ distinct and different methods.
Material incentives are tangible goods received or levied in exchange for a person’s
allegiance. An example of a positive incentive could be cash or a paycheck, while its
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negative counterpart could be a fine. Both use objective value as a method for asserting
compliance. On the contrary, an expressive incentive is an intangible, ideological benefit
received from participating in the purposive attainment of a clear cause: the individual
receives psychological reward by feeling that they are part of a solution or movement. In
some cases, while the attainment of the larger ideological mission of the group may
remain farther off (or even unattainable), providing certain opportunities that allow
individuals to express their participation or support toward a future goal can yield a
rewarding benefit that leads to group compliance and teamwork. A solidary incentive, as
James Q. Wilson describes, is a motivation that yields “rewards arising out of the act of
associating that can be given or withheld from individuals” (Wilson, 1995). Examples of
this type of incentive, such as social recognition, honors, or deference toward a member
of a group, can result in positive benefits to an individual by the mere fact that it signals
favor or special treatment. When referring to groups, solidary selective incentives are
used to inspire positive group interactions that strengthen the ideals of membership, focus
the overall mission, and bolster the group’s identity. Members receive a benefit from the
psychological feeling of exclusivity and through convivial interaction with other
members. These types of selective incentives are also intangible.
Conclusions can be drawn about the precision with which leadership
organizations, within a group, control their individual members by evaluating intangible
selective incentives and discovering them within IIGs studied—selective incentives are
what drive a group’s cohesion. Different incentives signal different strategies of
motivation, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. While material selective
incentives can be used efficiently to direct individual actions in most situations, it is often
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a less useful method for inspiring the desired outcome when motivating larger groups.
On the other hand, expressive incentives can be more motivational and self-inspiring for
a group, making certain incentives more valuable for certain purposes. It is expected that
in this study on IIGs selective incentives will enhance the cohesion and discipline of a
group.
Group size is another important measure worth considering when analyzing IIG
behavior. According to Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, in small organizations
members can voluntarily34 do the work necessary to obtain a collective good because it is
more likely that the benefit will exceed the costs of doing the work. Olson refers to a
“collective good” as a good that cannot be excluded or kept from being consumed by the
rest of the group. In democracies, an example of a collective good could be a state’s
military defense or law enforcement, in which case even those who are not forced to pay
taxes may still gain benefits. Olson’s theory establishes that garnering collective goods
are easier to develop and maintain in smaller groups because the benefits will not have to
be divided to the same degree. The size of the group allows the membership to
coordinate their actions quickly and small groups are able to keep their members more
accountable. The close relation among members of an association allows a mechanism of
“social sanctions” as Olson terms it (Olson, 1971, p. 60-65) —a type of peer pressure, to
make members increase efforts and hold each other accountable.
In contrast to small groups, Olson argues that large groups have a more difficult
time achieving a collective good. This problem occurs because the brunt of the work is

34

By voluntarily it is meant that individual members will provide a good without the use of incentives or of
coercion.
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done by a small number of people in larger organizations, and a majority of the people
benefit from the efforts of the small, active core. The inequity in the amount of work
done by the membership is the central challenge to the survival of organizations.
Although the members of a group may support the idea of obtaining a collective good,
they may not have the incentives available to motivate action at that larger, broader scale.
The discrepancy between the belief in obtaining a collective good or benefit and the
actual work required is termed the problem of collective action:
Though all of the members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining
this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing a
collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily
would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not. (Olson,
1971, p. 21)

The demise of larger groups can usually be attributed to the collective action
problem. The disparity in the workload, be it physical or mental, may discourage
members because, for some, the costs may become greater than the benefits. A collective
action problem is minimized by providing or increasing selective incentives.
Olson’s theory provides a backdrop from which a comparison can be made to the
IIGs in this study. The question of how group size affects an IIGs ability to deal with the
problem of collective action can test and also enlighten the analysis with another angle
explaining the potential threats to a group’s ability to affect domestic and international
policy.
The third internally focused institutional variable that will be used in analyzing
IIGs in this study is measuring the presence and quality of high- and low-demanders. In
Ainsworth’s Analyzing Interest Groups, high- and low-demanders are depicted as
individuals who place a different value on a particular good. In relation to the collective
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good, high-demanders are viewed by Ainsworth as members who value a good to a point
where they are willing to dedicate most or all of the effort required for achievement,
which is then enjoyed by low-demanders, who enjoy a free ride on the efforts of others.
In this relationship, there is little collective effort between the two types.
In a larger organizations, Olson believes that the benefits are distributed among a
larger number of members and that the work done is more costly: “the larger the group,
the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person acting in the group interest
receives…the smaller the share of the total benefit going to any individual… and the
larger the costs” (Olson, 1971, p. 48). High-demanders in larger organizations may have
to spend more time and money communicating and coordinating strategies toward the
achievement of a collective good. According to Olson, large organizations also have
more members who are low-demanders as a result of the wider distribution of selective
incentives. So, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to counter-balance the effect
of low demanders, and the more difficult it is to achieve a common good. In contrast a
smaller group has an easier time in achieving collective good because it was a greater
number of high-demanders. The smaller the size of a group, the more efficient it is in
attaining a collective good.
Though high demanders need less incentive to produce a collective good, they
may have more at stake and so may act due to personal interest, which is an interesting
point when studying IIGs. For example, Pablo Escobar’s efforts, which will be discussed
in more detail in a future chapter, show that he had a large personal stake in attempting to
derail the extradition policy between Colombia and the United States, although the
collective good, from his effort to invalidate the Extradition Treaty, would have affected
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all individuals in the society who prospectively could be extradited. Escobar acted as a
high-demander, while others who potentially would have benefited from his actions could
be depicted as low-demanders. This example points out the positive aspect of evaluating
the qualities of high- and low-demanders within IIGs—to explain the development,
nature, and strategy of collective action within a group.
Analysis
Using a hybrid interest group model with micro- and macro- viewpoints that pulls
together variables from both institutional and pluralist interest group studies and applies
them to organizations often deemed as criminal provides a new vantage point for
evaluating: how structural conditions influence the formation of a political actor, how a
group develops an internal organization, and what the dynamics are between a group and
its environment. In the chapters that follow, I will illustrate how the interest group model
described in this chapter is a valid method for identifying how these groups operate
politically. By focusing on both the institutional and pluralist elements that effect illegal
groups, and by framing the description with an understanding of societal groups from the
bottom up, a clearer picture can be made of illegal groups that affect domestic and
international policy.
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CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING 1980s-ERA MEDELLIN DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS USING AN INTEREST GROUP MODEL: EXTERNAL
VARIABLES
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As described in the last chapter, a hybrid Macro-Micro-Modelhas been
formulated to help analyze illicit interest groups consisting of an investigation of the
"macro" (external environmental) variables and "micro" (internal organizational)
variables relative to a given group. This chapter will examine aspects of the Macromodel's external variables that influenced the rise, development, and transformation of
1980s-era Colombian drug trafficking organizations.
As shown in Table 2 below, the external variables are only part of the entire
picture crafted by the model. In this chapter I will focus on the characteristics in the left
column classified as Macro-model variables that fuse pluralist and institutionalist
approaches. External factors include: political events, economic events, social events,
technological events, a state's legal parameters, individual preferences of state officials,
autonomy, and a state's capacity.
Table 2: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist
Approaches

Pluralist approach

Institutionalist
approach

Macro-model variables
(external variables)
• Political events
• Economic events
• Social events
• Technological events
•
•
•
•

A state’s legal
parameters
Individual preferences
of state officials
Autonomy
A state’s capacity
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Micro-model variables
(internal variables)
• Membership
characteristics
• Resources
• Cohesion
• Expertise
• Representativeness
• Selective incentives
• Group size
• Existence of high- and
low-demanders

Political Events
At the start of the 20th century, the United States government’s international
counternarcotics campaign consisted of a series of international agreements and laws that
sought to reduce the international psychoactive drug trade. In particular, the U.S.
government was concerned with stopping the opium trade. The series of early
international agreements provided the legal precedent by which the U.S. government
would seek international cooperation in curtailing the traffic of other psychoactive drugs.
For the purposes of this discussion the most significant political event, which influenced
the rise of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, was the declaration of the “War on
Drugs” by the Richard Nixon administration.
The U.S. government became concerned about the effects of psychoactive drugs
because of a rise in consumption among domestic youths (Nixon, 1969a) and troops
abroad in Vietnam. Following his campaign promises, President Nixon established
several Task Forces and implemented Operation Intercept to stop marijuana imports from
Mexico in 1969. In particular, the war focused its efforts on marijuana and heroin.
Marijuana was considered a “Liberal hippie drug” and heroin had become popularly used
among U.S. troops stationed in Vietnam. United States officials argued that the control of
drug traffic was a vital interest that needed to be addressed because of an increase in the
costs of crime, public health, and worker productivity. In 1970 Nixon launched the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act and in 1971 he declared, “America’s public enemy
number one was drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to
wage a new, all-out offensive” (Nixon, 1971). For symbolic justification, and to enhance
political acceptance, policy makers utilized a “Tough on Crime” approach, to promote the
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idea that psychoactive drugs were a threat at the social, economic, and military levels.
Drugs were depicted as “exogenous” to American society, which needed to be prevented
from permeating U.S. borders (Tokatlian, 1988). In a 1972 speech addressed to athletes
attending a White House conference on drug abuse, Nixon explained why the drug war
needed to be fought abroad:
We are attempting to wage a battle against drug abuse… it is what we might describe as total
warfare against drug abuse in the United States and in the world… we want to try to stop drugs
coming into this country at the source. We don’t produce heroin, for example, in the United States.
They do produce it—the poppy that grows heroin-- in Turkey. They produce it in some parts of
Southeast Asia… (Nixon, 1972).

Nixon’s speeches not only revealed the international strategy for combating the heroin
trade, but that it had domestic implications, since he believed that by targeting drugs in
source countries he could reduce addiction and crime in the United States:
Evidence has continued to build up during 1973 indicating that we are now on the way to winning
the battle against this grave problem. International sources of heroin supply are being pinched off,
narcotics prices are up while the quality of narcotics supply is down, and the capabilities for drug
enforcement and treatment have been upgraded at all levels of government (Nixon, 1973).

By 1974, President Nixon concluded that his administration had resolved the heroin
problem:
Drug abuse is a problem that we are resolving in America. We have already turned the corner on
heroin. But the task ahead will be long and difficult, and the closer we come to success the more
difficult the task will be… Drug traffickers must be dealt with harshly, and where the law is not
sufficient to the task, we must provide new laws, and we must do so rapidly (Nixon, 1974).

And in line with his “Tough on Crime” approach, throughout Nixon’s presidency
counternarcotics efforts strategy consisted of stopping drugs abroad and at home by
targeting U.S. mafias and small time dealers, and rehabilitating drug users. His efforts
continued to follow the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, which was an original ten-
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step counternarcotics framework (Nixon, 1969a).35 The Act was revamped by the Reagan
administration in 1980 to further reinforce counternarcotics efforts domestically and
internationally. The Reagan administration strengthened the implementation of the Act
by allocating more economic resources. However, one difference between the two
administrations was that the Reagan administration dramatically increased law
enforcement resources and did not allocate significant resources towards the
rehabilitation of addicts. Another difference was that Reagan’s efforts targeted the
cocaine trade, whereas Nixon’s strategies and speeches do not mention cocaine; Nixon’s
administration did not consider cocaine a problem.
Although the Reagan administration had already established a domestic agenda
focused on crime reduction as a major priority, events such as the elevated homicide rate
in South Florida and the 1986 cocaine-related death of professional basketball player Len
Bias, catapulted the issue of drugs and drug abuse into mainstream culture and facilitated
the implementation of a new “tough on crime” policy.
According to the 1996 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1997),
Americans changed their perception of the issue of drugs as “the most important problem
facing the country” between 1986 and 1989. In 1986, 8% of the American population
believed the drug issue to be the most important social problem to address, but by

35

Some of the provisions included: correcting deficiencies in the Marijuana Tax Act, coordinating federal
and state law, strengthening international cooperation to stop drugs at the source, suppressing of illegal
imports by strengthening interdiction efforts, suppressing of national traffic by increasing law enforcement
resources and organizing Task Forces, and funding education, research, rehabilitation, training programs,
and law enforcement conferences.
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November 1989 that number had reached nearly 38%, putting it above other fears such as
nuclear war, international tensions, and unemployment.36
To respond to the public’s worries and continue with his crime reduction agenda,
When the Reagan administration formulated its anti-drug agenda it increased budgets for
law enforcement agencies like the FBI and DEA (Crandall, 2002). The administration
also changed the mission of many departments that were not involved in counternarcotics
efforts. For example, the 1982 Posse Commitatus Act reformed institutions like the
military, making them more involved in counternarcotics efforts. Overall, the Reagan
administration empowered all counternarcotics agencies to persecute the drug trade at
home and abroad. At home, Reagan-style drug enforcement concentrated on prosecuting
drug users and dealers with Task Forces and other criminal justice methods such as
minimum mandatory sentences. The administration also sought to protect the U.S.
borders through military surveillance. To stop the flow of narcotics coming from abroad,
the “1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances” was introduced as an effort to generate greater global
cooperation from U.N. members to combat the drug trade. In addition, the administration
increased monetary aid given to producer countries for reducing the supply of drugs
being produced or trafficked within producer countries. Regardless of the increased
funding, most of the responsibility and costs to combat drug traffic rested on producer
countries usually with scant economic resources (Tokatlian, 1988; Bagley, 1988).

36

According to the 1996 sourcebook, by 1992 which was a presidential election year public opinion
towards the issue of drugs dropped to 8% trailing behind the economy at 42% then unemployment, poverty,
healthcare, respectively, and tied with education, government spending, and government dissatisfaction.
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The strategy implemented by the Reagan administration was unilateral. Although
the United States was the biggest consumer of cocaine, the U.S. government largely
passed the responsibility and blame of the drug problem onto foreign producing countries,
which were pressured to implement tough counternarcotic efforts, even though these
countries had weak law enforcement institutions and limited budgets. In contrast, the
policy of prohibiting the cocaine trade increased the price of the commodity and
continued to increase profits for DTOs.
Economic Events
Three major economic events influenced the rise of DTOs in Colombia. The first
is the establishment of an economic logic for counternarcotics, which for the last 40 years
has continued to work under the philosophy of limiting supply to force an increase in the
price of illicit drugs thereby lowering buyer demand. The supply-side policy has resulted
in the opposite effect: lower per kilo prices for cocaine and expanded participation
involving a broader collection of producers. The second event deals with economic
developments in the Colombian market that have made illicit activity both more
profitable. The third event is the Colombian tradition37 of smuggling and its influence on
the modern illicit drug trade.
Since the 1970’s Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, the economic strategy of
cocaine counternarcotics efforts has been to reduce supply in order to raise retail price so
that it becomes unavailable and unaffordable in U.S. markets. However, economists like
37

Because of high protectionist import tariffs placed by the Colombian government to protect the national
industry, many Colombians have developed the practice of importing smuggled goods, which were sold in
the black marked at lower prices, than products legally imported into the country. Also, Colombians have
also been adept at exporting smuggled goods such as precious stones, like emeralds, pre-Columbian figures,
and cattle, consequently, smuggling networks which pre-dated the drug trade became useful once the illicit
drug trade was established in the 1960s and 70s.
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Francisco Thoumi argue that this line of reasoning is flawed. His research shows that the
price of illicit drugs such as cocaine is not dependent on its supply, but on the risk
involved in smuggling (Thoumi, 1994). For this reason, the higher the regulation of the
drug trade, the higher the risk involved and the higher the price and profit. U.S.
authorities and international drug control agencies believe that success in
counternarcotics efforts can be measured through the retail price and purity of drugs in
drug consuming countries and on the number of domestic seizures. The 2010 report
compiled by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argues that the
retail price of cocaine is rising and that the purity of cocaine is lowering because of a
shortage of cocaine in the illicit market. UNODC reported that this “success” is due to
the efforts made by Andean countries in eradicating illicit crops and an increase in global
cocaine seizures. The same report registers the wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine
at $12,500 in the United States (UNODC, 2010, p.79). However, when the current price
for a kilogram of cocaine calculated by UNODC, is compared to kilogram prices of
wholesale cocaine over the past decades, the trend shows that prices have been actually
falling down, not up. In the 1970s, a kilogram was around $60,000, in the 1980s the
price was $45,000, in the 1990s the price was around $18,000 (Gomez, 1990, p. 63). The
drop in prices is evidence that the number of actors involved in the drug trade, not only in
Colombia, but also in most countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean has
been increasing. The decrease in the wholesale price of cocaine in the millennium does
not discourage cocaine traffickers from the trade because it is estimated that Colombian
traffickers still earn $2.1 billion per year, so the profit-margin is still higher and
comparable to most legitimate and freely traded products (UNODC, 2010, p. 79).
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When Medellin drug trafficking organizations began to smuggle cocaine in the
1970s and 1980s, they were motivated by the astoundingly high profit margin. Since
there were fewer actors involved in cocaine and marijuana trafficking in the 1960s and
1970s, the supply of drugs was also smaller which affected wholesale price. Cocaine in
the 1970s was smuggled mostly by “mules”—people smuggling cocaine in small
amounts. Once cocaine began to be smuggled in large-scale shipments, the supply of
available cocaine in U.S. markets multiplied and supply became less of a factor in
calculating wholesale price.
The decreasing trend in wholesale cocaine prices across time suggests that more
actors are becoming involved in drug trafficking, and this economic trend continues to
support the observation that DTOs are not economic cartels. During the 1970s and 1980s,
pioneer cocaine traffickers were able to build full-service, vertically integrated drug
trafficking organizations, where a trafficker could own every aspect of the supply chain
in the production of cocaine. The creation of full-service DTOs led U.S. government
officials to believe that they were working together to control the price as an economic
cartel would operate. Following this logic, DTOs, it was assumed, would profit from the
high demand for a commodity that was in short supply. However, full service DTOs
based in Medellin never operated like economic cartels.
The first reason is that the illegal status of cocaine drove the market price, not the
supply. Second, cocaine was easily produced and is not a commodity like oil that is in a
specific geographical location requiring a high-degree of technology to extract. Third,
the barriers for entry into the cocaine business are low, so it is difficult to control the
number of actors that supply cocaine (Thoumi, 1994, p.149-150). Finally, the supply
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method of Colombian drug organizations has been to flood the market with cocaine in
order to reduce risk and make profit. Even if 80% of shipments of cocaine are lost, the
traffickers can still make a significant profit from the remainder 20%.
Drug trafficking organizations were initially called cartels by the U.S. State
Department for political reasons, to present these organizations in the same negative light
as the economic cartel known as Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.38 By associating Medellin DTOs with a foreign
organization, that already had a negative image among the U.S. public, departments and
agencies in the U.S. executive branch were able to more easily manage expectations and
shape public opinion.
The second economic event that influenced the rise of Colombian DTOs was the
inability of the Colombian market economy to reduce unemployment, economic
inequality, and inflation. In the early 1980s, the foreign aid and domestic economic
reforms that were made during the 1970s, placed the Colombian economy in a relatively
favorable economic position during the regional recession of the 1980s, especially when
compared with other countries in Latin America that were undergoing a debt crisis. To
deal with the regional recession the government drew from its foreign exchange reserves
to compensate for both trade and national account imbalances (The Library of Congress,
1988).
But despite good macro-economic indicators, individual social and economic
indicators measuring quality of life suggested that Colombia was still a society with high
inequalities. Per capita income in 1986 was approximately $1,330 dollars, which placed
38

In the 1970s OPEC caused two oil crises, which led to a worldwide inflation of prices in general.
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Colombia tenth among the nineteen Latin American countries. According to the Library
of Congress’s macro-economic analysis of 1988, “real change in per capita GDP had
consistently lagged behind change in aggregate GDP by two percentage points since 1982
and was actually negative for 1982 and 1983” (Library of Congress, 1988). Moreover, it
was believed that the economy and government policies failed to distribute the gains of
economic production any more equitably in 1986 than it had fifty years earlier. To boot,
income inequality continued to be high and in the 1980s as much as 70 percent of income
was earned by only 20 percent of the population (The Library of Congress, 1988). Also,
the Gini coefficient on average from 1960 to 2008 was around .52 (Conference Board of
Canada, 2011; Economic Comission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
2010), one of the highest levels of income inequality in Latin America—where the
income ratio between the richest decile was 25 times richer than the poorest (ECLAC,
2010).
In the 1970s and 1980s the economy also suffered from unemployment and
inflation. Although manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors grew, the economy
was unable to absorb enough labor to reduce unemployment below 10%. By the 1990s,
the informal labor sector comprised about 46 percent of the workforce (Ffrench-Davis &
Machinea et al., 2007, p.226). The economy also suffered from unemployment and high
inflation—persistent annual increases in the consumer price index of 20 to 25 percent had
been evident since the mid-1970s (The Library of Congress, 1988).
Economic problems like inequality, unemployment, and inflation, which took
place in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as core external factors that nurtured the
development of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. Lack of economic
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opportunities and low wages led many Colombians to take advantage of the economic
opportunities found in the smuggling of imported goods and later in the trafficking of
illicit drugs like marijuana and cocaine. High levels of income inequality,
unemployment, and inflation were typical ailments of economies in Latin America,39 the
reason why these macroeconomic factors can be seen as contributive causes to the rise of
DTOs is because at the least, in Colombia people of low socioeconomic status could take
advantage of the opportunities provided by the illicit drug industry to avoid the limited
economic opportunities offered by the licit economic sectors.
During the 1980s economic areas associated with cocaine and marijuana
trafficking exacerbated levels of inflation, because this informal sector generated an
inflow of U.S. dollars. The inflow of dollar, changed the financial, real estate,
construction, and agricultural industries disproportionately to other legal sectors, because
of their capacity to absorb laundered money (Gomez, 1990, p. 75-81; Thoumi, 1994). The
increased buying power of those associated with the illegal drug industry led to an
increased demand and price for goods, which led to greater inflation. The price of land
also continued to rise and failed to correlate with median wages. The Gini coefficient for
land concentration since 1960 has been of .86, which is the sixth-highest in the world
(Cardenas, 2002, p.6; UNDP, 2011, p.197).40
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the 1980s, which is popularly known as the “lost decade” because of the debt crisis that afflicted the
region.

40

In 2011 the United Nations Development Programme reported that the concentration of land in Colombia
is one of the highest in the world, where 52.2% of the arable land is in the hands of 1.15% of the population
(UNDP, 2011, p.206) and that land concentration has increased from 2000-2009. The report also suggests
that land concentration is due to historic legacies, market forces, revenues from illicit drug industry, and
government policies.
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Among the early Colombian traffickers, who reportedly arose from humble
beginnings and may have seen trafficking as an economic issue rather than a moral one,
include Jaime Builes. Builes was from Fredonia, Antioquia, and was reportedly the son
of a very poor peasant family who worked for a landowner. Builes became known for
trafficking marijuana and cocaine in the mid-1970s and bought the landowner’s estate
where he and his family had worked. He also bought all large parcels of land surrounding
the town. He eventually owned most of the small businesses in the town and in doing so
inflated the prices for real estate in the region (Castro Caycedo, 1996). Years later,
Builes was tortured and killed in Mexico by authorities in the early 1980s, and because he
owned most of the properties in Fredonia, the economy of the region plummeted because
family members were unable to manage the lands and businesses Builes had acquired.
Jaime Builes’s case illustrates the economic opportunity taken by early trafficking
pioneers and their incredible capacity to profit from drug prohibition policies. The new
found wealth allowed Builes to acquiring lands and businesses that would not have been
possible to acquire had he not been involved in the drug business, since the high degree
of economic inequality in rural areas greatly reduces upward mobility.
The third economic event that led to the development of DTOs is the
specialization of smuggling that evolved in Colombia. Francisco Thoumi notes in his
seminal work, Economia Politica y Narcotrafico that having a tradition of exporting
smuggled goods and networks of immigrants in consumer states can explain why the
illicit drug business arose more readily in Colombia. The availability of international
networks necessary to market cocaine and launder money in the black market in the
United States and Mexico created an economic advantage (Thoumi, 1994, p.178-179).
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Many smugglers that started smuggling emeralds, coffee, and cattle during the 1950s,
gradually became involved in the drug trade in the late 1960s and 1970s as the cocaine
business became more lucrative. According to Thoumi, the ability to export smuggled
goods was the comparative advantage that Colombians had over other Andean countries
and other Latin American countries. Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers may not have had
the networks to transport cocaine to other countries, and for a while Bolivia and Peru
remained coca paste producers, whereas Colombian traffickers were first and foremost
international traffickers before delving into the production of coca paste in the 1990s.
Colombian traffickers began smuggling marijuana in the 1960s and 1970s
especially after the implementation of 1969 Operation Intercept, which blocked the U.S.Mexico border. In Medellin, Alfredo “el Padrino” Gomez Lopez headed one of the first
organizations trafficking cocaine along with emeralds and other smuggled goods (Castillo,
1987; Salazar, 2001). His associates were Jesus Emilio Escobar Hernandez and Fabio
Restrepo Ochoa. The Ochoa brothers became powerful Medellin DTO leaders in the
1970s and 1980s and were relatives of Fabio Restrepo Ochoa (Castillo, 1987, p.52).
Gomez Lopez used his pre-existing contacts with Bogotá-based emerald traffickers to
utilize their Mexican networks for the sale and distribution of cocaine.41 The Gomez
Lopez/Escobar Hernandez/Restrepo Ochoa trafficking organization was dismantled in
1976 after U.S. authorities disrupted its networks. Gomez Lopez later left the business,
but new traffickers took over the smuggling networks while he was detained for a year on
a minor charge.
41

In the 1970s politically, Gomez Lopez was affiliated with the Conservative Party and contributed to its
congressional campaigns. In 1974 he is said to contribute to the unsuccessful political campaign of
Conservative presidential candidate, Alvaro Gomez Hurtado (Salazar, 2001, p.53).
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Social Events
Two of the most influential social events that led to the rise of illicit drug
trafficking organizations was Colombian immigration to the United States and the change
in demand for cocaine among international consumers.
During the 1960 and 1970s Colombians immigrated to the United States. Some
immigrants from Medellin or Cali formed hubs in cities like Miami, New York and Los
Angeles, and became key personnel in receiving and distributing drugs in these cities.
Dealing with fellow Colombian nationals reduced the risk that authorities could infiltrate
trafficking networks (Thoumi, 1994).
A change in demand for illicit drugs was another external social factor that
influenced the rise of the illicit drug business in Colombia. Because of the limited supply
of cocaine in the 1970s, and its increased popularity in American society, the wholesale
price of cocaine was more expensive than marijuana. A 1977 Newsweek magazine article
titled “The Cocaine Scene” depicts the early trends in the consumption of cocaine in the
United States:
Among hostesses in the smart sets of Los Angeles and New York, a little cocaine, like Dom
Perignon and beluga caviar, is now de rigueur at dinners. Some party-givers pass it around along
with the canapés on silver trays; some fill ashtrays with cocaine and set them on the table. Others
dispense it more grudgingly. "Hostesses say it ruins appetites," says one Hollywood partygoer,
"and they get upset to see their guests playing with the beef Wellington" (Steele et al., 1977).

The Newsweek article depicts how cocaine was a status drug of the rich and famous
which consequently increased the demand. In interviews conducted by the U.S. public
television program, PBS’s Frontline, traffickers like the Ochoa brothers and George
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Jung42 commented that the popularization of cocaine in Hollywood and among the rich,
increased the marketability of the drug for them:
Frontline: But did you ever sense that you were getting a lot of free advertising in the United
States--in Hollywood movies, in magazines--in the way it was portrayed as a glamour drug?
Juan David Ochoa: Yes, of course. It was given publicity because it's consumed by people of
high status in society, and that gives you publicity. That made it actually sell more” (Frontline,
2000b).
George Jung: It became an accepted product, just like marijuana. I mean Madison Avenue
promoted cocaine. The movie industry. The record industry. I mean, if you were well to do and
you were a jet-setter, it was okay to snort cocaine. I mean Studio 54 in New York, everybody was
snorting cocaine, everybody was laughing and having a good time and snorting cocaine. I don't
think that the government of the United States had any idea what the hell was really happening
until it was too late… Because there's a mindset in this country that it's okay for upper class white
America to do drugs and it's okay and they shouldn't be punished severely for it. If you're from
the ghetto or what have you and you do drugs, then you should be punished severely. The
government allowed the media and the record industry and the movie industry to promote
[cocaine] and nobody ever stood up. Nobody ever said no to this” (Frontline, 2000c).

As cocaine became a “status drug,” it became a highly desired commodity, because the
“status label” led to an increase in its price, profitability, and production.
Technological Events
Overall technological innovations helped traffickers because technological
innovations contributed to the development of drug trafficking in Colombia. Airplanes,
cellular phones, radar equipment facilitated trade. Moreover, as DTOs became wealthier,
they were able to use the latest technology to hide or transport illegal drugs, which
continued increase their wealth.
The technology to refine cocaine was not complicated or expensive; the barriers
to entry into the business were low. The low barriers to entry allowed a number of actors
to participate in the drug trade as it became more popularized. In the beginning of
cocaine trafficking the transportation and shipment of illicit drugs was not complex

42

George Jung was a close associate of Carlos Lehder and a pilot for Medellin-based DTOs.
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because packages were small and only required hidden compartments in bags, pieces of
luggage, or in clothing.
As demand grew and traffickers became wealthier, DTO leaders were able to
create industrial sized refineries in remote jungle areas of Colombia that were difficult to
detect (Lee, 1989, p. 30; Clawson and Lee, 1996, p. 38-39). Once traffickers were
capable of shipping larger quantities transportation and communication became more
complex. Cocaine was often hidden in secret compartments or, with the aid of advanced
technology, transformed into book pages, statues and foodstuffs. Initially, in the late
1970s and early 1980s, it was the use of small Cessna planes that allowed DTOs to
increase their shipment capacity and dramatically increase their wealth. Some of the
technological innovations that were used by traffickers, before they became more
affordable and used by the general population, included cellular phones and radar
equipment for planes and boats.
Technology also was also useful for authorities in their surveillance of air traffic
and coastal areas. Greater surveillance of the Caribbean in the mid to late 1980s led
traffickers to move their routes to Central America. Greater surveillance at airports led
DTOs to use more precautions when sending mules or small shipments in packages.
Overall, technology enhanced cocaine traffic and allowed drug trafficking
organizations to avoid authorities and increase their capacity to make profit, which in turn
provided DTOs with economic and political power.
State’s Legal Parameters
The discussion on how a state’s legal parameters affects the growth of Colombian
DTOs focuses on the issue of money laundering because lax laws allowed DTOs to
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obtain great wealth. On the international side, the United States government, which had
heralded a war on heroin in the 1960s, was not controlling the traffic of cocaine in the
1970s, even though a prohibition on the trade and consumption of this drug was in place.
Lax regulation on drug traffic transferred over to the financial sector. Since international
counternarcotics efforts were centered on heroin instead of cocaine, authorities were
unaware that millions of dollars were being filtered in the financial system, which
allowed for the growth of DTOs in Colombia.
In the 1960s, the absence of strong laws indirectly allowed for the creation of
loopholes in banking procedures in Colombia and permitted monetary transactions
without governmental regulation. However, money-laundering laws were weak not only
in Colombia but also internationally. Traffickers were able to smuggle American dollars
into Colombia through financial institutions, such as American banks, off-shore banks in
the Caribbean, banks with secrecy laws in countries like Switzerland, Luxemburg, and
Panama, and casas de cambio (money exchange/transfer stores).43 Most of these
institutions were not prepared in the late 1970s and early 1980s to prevent drug
traffickers from using their services to launder money, and many bankers did not want to
prevent these funds from being deposited.
Carlos Toro, who worked with trafficker Carlos Lehder, said he would often meet
with legal bank representatives to discuss narco-dollar deposits (Frontline 2000). The
money would be easily wired to Colombian accounts where it was further laundered
(Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 90). The Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela brothers of the Cali DTO and
43

Money laundering through money exchange stores is still a problem. In April 2008, Wachovia refused to
do business with these stores because they sent a lot of unaccounted money to Mexico. The money is
believed the proceeds from Mexican DTOs, which are using stores to laundering money.
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Jorge Ochoa bought the First Interamericas Bank in Panama with the objective of
laundering drug proceeds. Manuel Noriega, Panama’s military leader, would take a
percentage for every dollar laundered throughout the country’s banking system (Castillo,
1991, p. 115; Lee, 1990, p. 181).
Not until 1980, after the launch of Operation Swordfish, a DEA money laundering
operation, did the U.S. government place restrictions on the amount of money that could
be declared when sending or receiving wires, and when depositing money in U.S. bank
accounts (Castillo, 1987, p. 171). After December 1980, amounts greater than $10,000
had to be declared. The owner of proceeds greater than $10,000 dollars had to justify
how he/she earned the money and also had to justify these funds to a baking institution
and the government through Currency Transaction Receipts (CTRs). Such regulation
was done to prevent money laundering in banks, and it reduced large deposits from
entering the financial system, which in turn left traffickers with the problem of legalizing
and being able to actually receive their profits.44 However, traffickers devised ways to
circumvent restrictions by using different mechanisms such as what is popularly known
as the “smurf system45” (Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 90). In the “smurf system” a number of
people were hired in the United States and in Colombia to deposit, send, and eventually
withdraw small quantities of money that would be less than $10,000 dollars.
Money laundering was also facilitated through the use of monetary policies. In
Colombia, presidential administrations with the objective of strengthening Colombia’s
44

Yet, this declaration in the end became a way to launder $10,000 dollars at a time. The customs form
used to declare the proceeds could be used to legalize small amounts of cash. If the person was ever
audited he/she could show that these small $10,000 dollar amounts were declared so they were legal.

45

The “smurf system” is how the system is popularly known, as it refers to the popular 1980s cartoon “The
Smurfs,” which were essentially a community of blue little characters with different roles.
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international monetary reserves have unintentionally facilitated the laundering of illicit
money by implementing economic policies that would allow citizens to exchange large
amounts of dollars for pesos. Tax amnesties were a type of economic policy was
popularly known in Colombia as la ventanilla siniestra (sinister window) and it legalized
large proceeds without the need to report their origin. Throughout the years, various
presidential administrations have used similar techniques regardless of political party
affiliation. For example, during the Belsario Betancur Presidency, Law 9 of 1983
implemented a big dollar exchange amnesty due to an economic crisis, which needed
foreign exchange reserves; Law 75 of 1986 Article 50 and Law 49 of 1990 during the
presidencies of Virgilio Barco’s and Cesar Gaviria’s respectively, gave exchange
amnesties. Law 49 of 1990 allowed Colombians abroad to deposit money in Colombia
without much control, so in trying to prevent capital flight the government encouraged
the laundering of drug proceeds. In 2008, during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, the increase
in oil prices and the international devaluation of the U.S. dollar, led the Colombian
central bank to buy dollars with the intent of stabilizing its price vis-à-vis the Colombian
peso, which was becoming overvalued. The use of this monetary strategy was
implemented so that Colombian exports would not become expensive in the international
market. However, buying dollars unintentionally benefited traffickers, because it allowed
their profits to enter the market with relative ease.
Law enforcement, during the “Golden Era” of drug trafficking from 1969 to
1984,46 was practically non-existent in Colombia and abroad. In many cases police
46

The time period of this so-called “golden era” starts with Operation Intercept that moved the marijuana
traffic from Mexico to Colombia. The “golden era” ends with the assassination of Minister of Justice
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who is assassinated in April 1984, and which started the persecution of DTO leaders.
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forces knew who the traffickers were, where they lived, and where they operated, but
there was little enforcement of laws to stop nascent drug trafficking organizations.47 The
high concentration of wealth obtained by the illicit drug business, gave traffickers the
power to bribe judicial and enforcement agencies. Newspapers reported the arrest of
traffickers, but they were released either on legal technicalities or because they escaped
from jail (Castillo, 1987). Therefore, even when select representatives of the judicial
system were able to obtain prosecutions for drug traffickers, other more powerful
elements would use bribes to pay off politicians, judges, and the police to look the other
way.
International enforcement was also weak. According to George Jung,48 a pilot
who worked with Carlos Lehder and who was a pioneer in the marijuana and cocaine
drug traffic in the 1970s and 1980s, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was not
informed and/or had little funding to stop cocaine traffic in its early years:
At that time you have to remember also that DEA was really not on top of what was going on in
the Caribbean. I mean, they were offloading huge motherships constantly out there off the
Bahamas and off the coast of Florida day and night and as far as aircraft coming and going they
really didn't have the equipment or the manpower to do anything… I think that they knew about it
but they didn't think it was that much of a really major problem and they just couldn't get the
funding anyway because nobody believed it and nobody really cared (Frontline, 2000).

The lax enforcement of anti-narcotic laws in the 1970s and early 1980s allowed the
cocaine business to grow and develop. Law enforcement officials corroborate George
Jung’s opinion of law enforcement at the time. In an interview with journalist Ron
Chepesiuk, Ken Robinson an ex-member of the New York Enforcement Task Force
47

Fabio Castillo’s journalistic work in Los Jinetes de la Cocaina has an appendix which he obtained from
the Colombian police in 1987 with the names, profession, and addresses of known drug traffickers, their
boats, airplanes, and air strips, yet little was done in the 1970s and early 1980s to confiscate trafficker
assets.
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The movie “Blow” starrs Johnny Depp and is a biography of George Jung’s life.
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(NYDETF) asserts that the DEA efforts in the 1970s concentrated on combating heroin
because cocaine was thought of as a “small time” drug. Moreover, government policy
documents in the 1970s during the Gerald Ford Presidency believed that cocaine was not
a problem, because it did not result in crime or hospital emergency room admissions.
Instead a Task Force organized by the Ford Administration concluded that the focus
should be on heroin, amphetamines, and mixed barbiturates (Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 31).
The weak legal system in Colombia and abroad contributed to the rise of DTOs
because it created an opportunity for them to do business. Lack of regulation in the
different aspects of the business from the acquisition of drugs, the transportation, and
finally the laundering of drug proceeds, allowed traffickers to become wealthy and
politically powerful, primarily because it was easy for them to remain in business.
Individual Preferences of State Officials
On a social level, at the beginning of the drug trade, most of Colombian society
was unaware of or indifferent to the level of economic and political power that was being
amassed by trafficking organizations. Colombian society did not foresee that the drug
trade had negative consequences such as violence, corruption, and addiction. The society
focused more on the economic benefits of the drug trade such as the influx of dollars to
the economy. Although society enjoyed the monetary benefits of the trade, drug
traffickers were frowned upon by elites largely because of the differences in social class
and education.
The writer Gonzalo Guillen, a journalist who met with then congressman Pablo
Escobar, while traveling to Spain to cover Felipe Gonzalez’s inauguration as Prime
Minister, pejoratively refers to Pablo Escobar’s physical appearance:
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I spoke of generalities with a funny speaking antioqueño49 man, who had a sneaky look in his
eyes, wore sneakers, jeans and a silk shirt with prints that were annoyingly flashy. It was
extravagant that this common individual who looked like a crook would travel representing an
official committee… I did not see the man again until three days later… I recognized Escobar
because of his black, greasy, and curly hair, which would fall on the right side of his face and
because of his primitive mustache... (Guillén, 2007).

Such disdain for traffickers was expressed by traditional elites throughout Colombia,
because traffickers although wealthy, were not considered to have the socially ascribed
status, education, manners, or taste. A popular anecdote involving Jose Santacruz
Londoño, a Cali based trafficker, relates how Santacruz was denied entrance to a Cali
social club called El Club Campestre. Although Santacruz had enough money to buy a
membership, he did not have the pedigree.50 In response, Santacruz constructed an exact
replica of the social club’s building for himself and his friends just to mock the Club
Campestre’s directors (Castillo, 1987; Chepesiuk, 2003, p. 68; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 165).
On a political level, elites saw drug trafficking at this time as a problem of
consumer nations such as the United States and Europe. President Belisario Betancur
was very vocal on this issue and towards the beginning of his term in 1982, he refused to
extradite nationals for trafficking based on a nationalist argument (Kavass, 1990, p. 157).
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs who served during the mid-1980s in an
interview with PBS’s Frontline comments on Colombian society’s perception of the drug
trade:
The Colombians felt that it was not a Colombian problem. First of all, is that they didn't use it
and, basically, it was going to the consumers in the United States. They were making money.
49

An antioqueño is a man from the department of Antioquia, of which the capital is Medellin.
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The Rodriguez Orejuela brother’s in Cali and the Ochoa brothers in Medellin were also socially
discriminated against. The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers entered a few social clubs, but their membership at
the Club Riviera and Club Campestre were revoked once Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela was arrested for
trafficking in Spain (Rodriguez, 2007, p. 165). The Ochoa brothers were not able to enroll their children in
prestigious schools in Medellin, so they opted to construct a bilingual school for their children (This
author’s interview with the wife of a trafficker, 2005).
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And it was a U.S. problem, not a Colombian problem… the fact is, if our people did not consume
this, they would not produce it. That's just the reality of the equations of the free market, right?”
(Frontline, 1995).

When Juan David Ochoa a member of Medellin-based DTOs is asked whether the
cocaine trade was accepted in Colombia he replies, “It wasn't properly accepted, but
nobody ever said anything about it” (Frontline, 2000). Due to this indifference, many
politicians in Colombia turned a “blind eye” to the drug trade and in some cases
politicians collaborated with members of drug trafficking organizations to influence
policy in favor of trafficker interests.
As time passed, society became aware of the dangers associated with drug traffic
such as drug addiction, crime, narco-terrorism, and paramilitarism. However, society and
politicians tacitly accepted traffickers because of the legal and illegal business DTOs
generated, primarily because DTOs became an industry that provided employment for
many people.
State Autonomy
The Two-level Game Model devised by Robert Putnam in his article “Diplomacy
and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” is useful because of its focus on
a government’s executive branch. The focus on the executive branch allows the
researcher to examine both, international and domestic, influences that affect the
executive’s ability to reach an agreement and/or carry out a policy linked to an agreement.
Specifically, a two-level game model argues that, in democracies, state autonomy plays a
role in determining whether an international agreement will be reached or implemented.
The less social constraints a chief of government has at a domestic level, the greater the
autonomy enjoyed and the easier it is for the executive branch to reach an agreement with
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an international actor. Alternatively, if an executive is able to acquire more autonomy
from international pressures, then it is easier for the chief of government to enact policies
that appease the demands of domestic groups.
In the case of counternarcotics efforts, Latin American presidencies have to
negotiate how counternarcotics treaties and efforts will be implemented at an
international level, but also at a domestic level. At international levels, Latin American
presidencies negotiate with the government of the United States to reach agreements on
issues such as: economic aid, military aid, extradition, fumigation of illegal crops,
maritime space and surveillance, and immigration, among others. When negotiating an
international agreement, Latin American presidencies also have to consider domestic
pressures from institutions or social actors. Some of the domestic actors that can be
involved in the negotiation of an international agreement can include the business
community, environmentalists, military and police personnel, other branches of
government, and illegal interest groups such as drug trafficking organizations.
A two-level game analysis has been used in studying counternarcotics efforts in
Colombia. Tatiana Matthiesen, in The Political Art of Conciliatio,n analyzed the Virgilio
Barco and the Cesar Gaviria presidencies. She compared the implementation of Barco’s
confrontational counternarcotics policies against DTOs to Gaviria’s conciliatory
counternarcotics policies with DTOs. Matthiesen’s main argument highlighted the ability
of the Cesar Gaviria government to create a turning point in Colombian counternarcotics
efforts, as his presidency sought more independence from U.S. government pressure to
implement a conciliatory policy with DTOs, which would establish negotiations with this
illegal sector in an effort to reduce violence.
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Specifically, during Gaviria’s tenure, Government-DTO negotiations were
centered on agreeing to waive DTO leader extradition to the United States and
compromising on the terms of surrender, if DTO leaders would agree to turn themselves
over to authorities. Matthiesen’s analysis focuses on Cesar Gaviria’s role as a great
conciliator of international and domestic pressures, because Gaviria created a domestic
solution to the problem of urban violence in Colombia. Gaviria believed that whereas
narco-trafficking was an international problem that the international community had to
resolve, narco-terrorism was a Colombian problem that could be resolved through
negotiation. In Matthiesen’s view, Gaviria adeptly sold the negotiation process to the
George H. W. Bush Administration by riding the coattails of Virgilio Barco’s
confrontational policy with DTOs and promising to continue to disrupt the illicit drug
trade, implementing a series of early and successful anti-drug efforts (such as arresting
traffickers, intercepting shipments, grounding airplanes, confiscating properties, and
reforming the justice system), and by gradually changing from a policy of confrontation
to a policy of conciliation (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 264-267). Within a month of taking
office, Cesar Gaviria was able to obtain the necessary trust from U.S. authorities to
confidently implement his policy of conciliation.
Matthiesen’s research is an in-depth historical analysis, which presents the
dynamics between U.S.-Colombian relations on the implementation of counternarcotics
efforts. However, Matthiesen’s two-level game analysis has some limitations related to
the model and the period of time chosen for the study. First, since the model’s focus is
the executive branch, it highlights the decision making power of the executive branch in
its handling of international and domestic influences, but at the same time minimizes the
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impact of very powerful international and domestic actors, which were more powerful
than Gaviria’s government—the U.S. presidency of George H.W. Bush and Medellinbased DTOs. The power of these two actors greatly reduced President Gaviria’s political
autonomy on the issue of extradition, because while the Bush Administration was
pursuing a policy of escalating the “Drug War,” Medellin-based DTOs were pressuring
for a ban on extradition and favorable terms of surrender.
Even though Matthiesen showed that Gaviria obtained more political
maneuverability from U.S. government officials in the implementation of
counternarcotics policies, the two-level game model assumes that Presidents Gaviria and
Bush can negotiate on equal terms, when in fact the leaders have great economic and
political power disparities. The disparities always favored the more powerful country.
Starting in 1989, during President Virgilio Barco’s tenure, newly elected President
George H. W. Bush had already created a more cooperative agenda, which escalated the
drug war by increasing funding to Andean countries. Whereas in 1987 Colombia received
$11.55 million dollars towards counternarcotics efforts, the Bush administration
increased counternarcotics aid by giving $75 million dollars in 1989, which included a
$65 million dollar emergency aid contribution,51 given right after the August 1989
assassination of Presidential Candidate Luis Carlos Galan (Walker, 1996, p. 209;
Crandall, 2000, p. 32). Historian, William O. Walker, shows that by the February 1990
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This aid package was a symbolic gesture because in reality the gist of the emergency aid was aimed at
helping the military and was composed of conventional military equipment. The aid was not geared to the
police and did not include munitions to pursue DTOs such as surveillance equipment, weapons, bulletproof
vests, armored vehicles, and the like (Walker, 1996, p. 209). The military aid reflects that the Bush
Administration, although sympathetic to President Barco’s plight, was still in a Cold War mentality. The
Administration was sending funds to militarily protect U.S. companies in Colombia from left wing
insurgents, rather than sending funds to the police for counternarcotics efforts.
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Cartagena Drug Summit, George H.W. Bush had reached a more broadminded
appreciation of the illicit drug trade in which he acknowledged and shared responsibility
on the issue. The policy required the United States to work on consumer demand and for
Andean countries to work on the supply-side of cocaine production (Walker, 1996).52
During the Gaviria government, bilateral relations between the United States and
Colombia centered first on counternarcotics efforts and second on economic issues, since
the Cold War era was over, and at the time, counter insurgent efforts were not as
imperative. President Bush increased economic aid and continued to increase military and
counternarcotics aid as laid out by the Cartagena Summit, thus increasing funding in
1991 to $126 million dollars (Crandall, 2000, p. 32). By increasing its support to Andean
countries, the Bush Administration sought to implement a more efficient anti-drug policy
than that implemented by Ronald Reagan’s administration,53 which provided little
funding and failed to recognize the human toll accrued by Colombian society as a
consequence of a policy of confrontation with DTOs. The interaction between the Gaviria
and Bush Presidencies was cordial and U.S. government officials acknowledge that Bush
personally liked Cesar Gaviria, so the Bush Administration was tolerant of Gaviria’s
policy of conciliation with DTOs: “George Bush loved him so we had to work with him
even though we thought he was soft on drugs” (Crandall, 2000, p. 146). Gaviria’s
adeptness in pursuing a policy of conciliation relied in reassuring the Bush administration
52

At the Cartagena Summit, Bush established the Andean Regional Initiative to open U.S. markets for
Andean goods to increase revenue for these countries, so they could fund their counternarcotics efforts.
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The Reagan Administration placed the issue of extradition and counternarcotics efforts atop of its agenda
with Colombia. When Jorge Luis Ochoa was released by a judge in 1987, the Reagan Administration
criticized Virgilo Barco’s counternarcotics efforts and reprimanded the Barco Administration (the first to
administer harsh anti-narcotics efforts amidst great DTO leader resistance) by refusing to grant Colombia’s
entrance into General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by denying visas to Colombian citizens
among other measures (Matthiesen, 2000).
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that he would continue to implement counternarcotics efforts, despite of governmentDTO leader negotiations that his government was going to undertake.
Although Gaviria was able to obtain George H.W. Bush’s trust, the problem with
Gaviria’s conciliation policy was that he lacked the necessary political autonomy to
broker a negotiation that would be favorable for the Colombian government. DTO
leaders had the capacity to fund political campaigns for the 1991 constitutional assembly,
to use violence to coerce a negotiation process, and to mold public opinion. Even
Gaviria’s decrees, written to establish a legal parameter for the surrender of DTO leaders,
were written in response to DTO offensives. For example, Gaviria created Decree 2040
of September 5, 1990 in reaction to the August 30th kidnapping of journalist Diana
Turbay, ex-president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala’s daughter, by the group Los
Extraditables—a group led and funded by DTO leaders. The Diana Turbay kidnapping
was the start of a campaign54 (referred to as the Liberal kidnapping campaign) that led to
backdoor negotiations with DTO leaders plans for their surrender to authorities. The
hostage situation reduced Gaviria’s political autonomy because he was unable to oppose
DTO negotiation terms without fear for the safety of hostages. Consequently, by the end
of the process, the Treaty on Extradition was constitutionally invalidated. Pablo Escobar,
who was allowed to construct his own prison La Catedral, and choose his own prison
guards, “surrendered” the same day. As news of Escobar’s prison lifestyle and of
executions within the prison surfaced, Gaviria ordered Escobar’s transfer but Pablo
Escobar escaped. Retrospectively, Cesar Gaviria has acknowledged that the government
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The Liberal kidnapping campaign resulted in a ten-person hostage situation whose victims were relatives
of President Gaviria’s and colleagues within the Liberal party
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should not have given so many concessions to Pablo Escobar, “we made a huge mistake
(La Catedral), we underestimated the capacity of Escobar for corruption and intimidation”
(Keane, 2003).
The other slight limitation of Matthiesen’s research with regards to the issue of
political autonomy is the time span of the study. Although her research on
counternarcotics policy is an extensive in depth analysis of the dynamics of foreign
policy and its domestic constraints, an analysis of two presidencies does not provide a
historical trend regarding the Colombian presidency’s political autonomy in the
implementation of extraditions. Matthiesen argues that Gaviria was successful because he
conciliated international and domestic demands to reduce narco-terrorism. However,
even though Gaviria was able to convince U.S. authorities that his presidency would
continue to combat the illicit drug industry, while simultaneously establishing
negotiations with DTO leaders, his success in implementing two incompatible policies
was short lived. Gaviria’s policy of conciliation only lasted for about a year and ten
months from September 1990, when negotiations with DTO leaders began, to July 1992
when Pablo Escobar escaped from his own prison. The policy of conciliation, as
implemented by Gaviria’s administration, instantly became a policy of confrontation with
DTOs, which became a year and a half long manhunt for Pablo Escobar. Immediately
after the La Catedral fiasco, President Gaviria returned to a policy of total
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, which was the policy that Presidents
before Gaviria practiced, and that Presidents who followed Gaviria continued; thus
leading to a permanent re-institutionalizing of counternarcotics policies including the
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Treaty on Extradition, which was officially reinstated in 1997 with Ernesto Samper’s
presidency.
A comprehensive historical approach of the impact of presidential political
autonomy on DTOs would have to look at presidencies in the period from at least 19792010. The starting point would be 1979, which was the year that the Treaty on
Extradition was established between the United States and Colombia. This was also the
first major counternarcotics agreement between the two countries. The existing power
disparity between the United States and Colombia has to be considered because of the
capacity of the United States government to set the agenda in bilateral relations. As the
policy has developed, certain counternarcotics elements have become standard parts of
each presidency’s policy. The Colombian executive has little power to sway away from
U.S. counternarcotics demands, because if they do, the United States government has
many diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to sanction Colombian governments,
such as the annual counternarcotics cooperation certification process. Consequently,
Colombian presidencies enjoy little to no political autonomy to oppose U.S. government
counternarcotics demands. Political autonomy, in this case, examines the ability of
Colombian presidents to follow U.S. counternarcotics efforts independent of domestic
opposition. A high degree of autonomy would indicate that the president enjoys enough
independence or support from domestic actors where he or she is able to carry out a
policy or make an international agreement without domestic constraints. A moderate
level of autonomy indicates that the president has some independence or support from
some domestic actors, but not enough to implement a policy. A low degree of autonomy
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indicates that the president has little to no autonomy to carry out a policy because of great
domestic opposition.
Of the seven Colombian presidents between 1979-2010 that have had to
implement counternarcotics efforts and enforce the Treaty on Extradition, most have
enjoyed high to moderate levels of autonomy on the issue of extradition. With regards to
the issue of extradition, five of seven presidents Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Belisario
Betancur, Ernesto Samper, Andres Pastrana, and Alvaro Uribe Velez have all enjoyed
high levels of political autonomy on extradition because they faced little to no opposition
on the implementation of extradition from domestic groups. In contrast, Presidents
Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria experienced moderate to low levels of political
autonomy on the issue of extradition because they faced higher levels of domestic
opposition, which was illustrated by public opinion polls, newspaper editorials, public
official statements, and by violent DTO attacks on political elites, government
institutions, and on civilians.55 Moreover, only three presidents: Belisario Betancur, Cesar
Gaviria, and Alvaro Uribe Velez have tried to sway away from U.S. counternarcotics
efforts by opposing extradition or using extradition as a discretionary negotiation tool.
All failed in their efforts and eventually returned to a policy of complet alignment with
U.S. counternarcotics policy. Betancur opposed the treaty on nationalist grounds. He had
some leeway to refrain from enforcing the Treaty on Extradition because the Cold War
was still the more important issue in the region so the U.S. government did not impose
sanctions. However, when Betancur’s Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was
assassinated, his policy on extradition changed and he implemented the Treaty without
55

this evidence will become evident in the section on cohesion and representativeness.
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strong domestic opposition. Gaviria and Uribe obtained tentative support from U.S.
Administrations in the use of extradition as a discretionary tool, coincidentally, from the
father and son presidencies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. But both, Gaviria
and Uribe, eventually aligned with U.S. policy. President Gaviria completely aligned
with U.S. policy after Escobar escaped La Catedral. President Uribe tried using the
extradition policy as a discretionary policy to negotiate the demobilization of paramilitary
leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, but quickly extradited the paramilitary
heads once they were publicly divulging their relationship with politicians who belonged
to his political coalition. Uribe extradited these leaders without domestic opposition.
Political autonomy is the strongest tool at the disposal of Colombian governments
to implement counternarcotics efforts and attack DTO leaders and their organizations.
This is especially true while Colombia’s legal institutions remain weak.
From this observation, it can be hypothesized that when state autonomy is high,
DTOs find it difficult to mobilize politically against the government. They may
participate in politics by funding political campaigns, but it is unlikely that they will use
violence to challenge state institutions. On the other hand, when state autonomy is low,
DTOs find it easier to challenge state authority, including the use of violence to challenge
the state on issues that they seek to affect. As it will be discussed in this project’s section
on group cohesion and representativeness, Medellin-based DTOs were actually able to
lower presidential autonomy by shaping the public debate on extradition through the use
of violence.
Finally, although the political autonomy of a president does not affect the
formation of drug trafficking organizations, it does affect the longevity of organizations
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once their leaders become known and established, because once they are known, they can
be persecuted and potentially extradited. Over the years, the high political autonomy that
Colombian presidents have enjoyed with regards to the issue of extradition, has led this
policy to become institutionalized by subsequent governments. Its practice has not been
challenged, since Pablo Escobar’s escape from prison in 1992, because this event
epitomized the weakness of legal institutions to enforce laws on wealthy and powerful
traffickers. In cases where legal institutions are weak, and as long as public opinion
continues to believe that legal institutions are weak, it is likely that the autonomy of the
presidency to extradite nationals will continue to be high, because the only authority that
can effectively be enforced, is that of the international authority requesting the traffickers.
State Capacity
The Colombian state has been unable to enforce the rule of law throughout its
territory especially in rural areas where there is little state presence in the form of police
stations, education facilities, hospitals, or courts (Garcia, 2008). Reduced state presence
creates a “problem of stateness” (Linz and Stepan, 1996), where state institutions are not
able to prevent people from using violence to resolve conflicts. Because the state is
unable to permeate the entire Colombian territory it is not able to impose and enforce
stricter laws to drastically reduce high levels of impunity and violence.56 The “problem
of stateness” is one of the main and direct causes for the rise of illicit interest groups
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In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Colombia had a homicide rate of around 70 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants (UNODC, 2011). By 2008 the homicide rate was reduced to 33 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants, which was the same homicide rate as in 1988 (Desde Inicio, 2009). To put these numbers into
perspective, in 2010 Honduras peaked the homicide list with 88 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and
Mexico’s homicide rate was 18 per 100,000 the highest since the government started implementing
counternarcotics efforts in 2004 under President Felipe Calderon (UNODC, 2011).

81

(IIGs) such as the Medellin-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), because the
lack of law enforcement allows non-state actors to rise and operate without constraints.
When the marijuana traffic moved to Colombia from Mexico in the 1970s, the
areas were the traffic established was suitable for growing and smuggling marijuana,
because areas in Northern Colombia had a reduced state supervision, and geographically
Colombia’s coastline was close enough to the American market via smuggling routes
throughout the Caribbean; the proximity of Colombia to the United States’ coastline
allowed small planes packed with drugs to travel across the Caribbean (Frontline, 2000).
The unsupervised marijuana smuggling networks became useful once cocaine traffic was
established in the mid 1970s.
Colombia’s rugged geography also exacerbated the “problem of stateness,” and
contributed to the rise of drug smuggling in the country. The mountainous terrain and the
Amazon canopy of this large country kept many rural areas isolated, making it difficult
for local and national governments to monitor (Thoumi, 1994:179-178). Consequently, it
was easy for DTOs to construct airstrips, foster coca crop cultivation, and build refineries
in isolated areas. The terrains were virtual “no man’s land” with little to no state
authority and where non-state actors like paramiliaries and guerrillas were able to
establish their own rule of law, while benefiting from different aspects of the drug trade.
The tradition of using violence to resolve conflicts, as established by the civil
conflict known as La Violencia in the 1950s, led Colombian traffickers to be ruthless in
the manner that they conducted business especially in cities (Thoumi, 1994). Many rural
émigrés to urban centers like Medellin used violence instead of courts to resolve social
conflicts in poor neighborhoods. The neighborhoods lacked police posts, and eventually
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became hotbeds for traffickers and hit men known as sicarios, when the cocaine trade
became established in the 1970s and 1980s. Hit men usually belonged to gangs, which
controlled entire neighborhoods oversaw different aspects of the illicit drug business.
Some gangs or bandas enforced their style of security on the population of the
neighborhood and delimited the entrance of authorities, people, and vehicles into the
gang’s neighborhood (Salazar, 1990). To establish neighborhood security, gangs
developed the practice of extortion and charged businesses, public transportation, and
commercial vehicles a fee for operating in their neighborhood.
Moreover, while doing fieldwork for this project I was able to observe how gang
leaders in their early twenties function like city managers, within their neighborhood.
Their role as neighborhood leaders evolves from the fact that gang leaders become
authority figures as a consequence of their power over the control of violence within their
geographical area. So even though street gangs are involved in a high degree of illegal
activity, as “neighborhood leaders,” gang members also engage in legal activities such as
arranging that public utility companies service a neighborhood. In the case of the Pablo
Escobar neighborhood, the gang leader arranged with the local water company for the
necessary tubing to service the neighborhood’s water supply.
In sum, since the whole process of establishing city settlements took place
without state supervision, state law enforcement institutions unintentionally ceded the
monopoly over the use of force to gangs. The process of re-establishing rule of law in
these neighborhoods has been cyclical and has depended on the power struggles that take
place among DTO leaders and on the haphazard incursions of law enforcement into gang
controlled neighborhoods to put down flare ups of violence.
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In sum, the geographical closeness to the U.S. market, the lack of state presence
in rural and urban areas in terms of law enforcement allowed the non-state actors to
establish their own areas of power. Drug trafficking organizations took advantage of lax
law enforcement to plant illegal crop, create industrial-size refineries, to fund
paramilitary organizations, and to use urban gangs for the settling of trafficking disputes
and other DTO related activities.
Analysis
A central question this project set out to answer was under what conditions do
illicit interest groups, such as DTOs, flourish/develop? For this purpose this Hypothesis 1
was developed to explain the relationship between the external environment and the
development of DTOs. It hypothesized that,
The presence of favorable external variables (occurring within a larger political environment) is
more likely to influence the formation and development of illicit interest groups, and a group’s
formation and development should follow external events.

Overall, the analysis of external variables provides evidence supporting the above
hypothesis. Political, social, economic, technological, factors led to development of
DTOs. The indifference of government officials, the lack state capacity, and the reduced
states autonomy also influenced DTOs to flourish and become powerful.
The implementation of the “War on Drugs” first in the 1960s and later in the
1980s has attempted to curve illicit drugs at their source, to prevent drugs from reaching
U.S. borders. However, the unintended consequence of the U.S. counternarcotics policy
since the 1960s has been the rise of Colombian DTOs and the spread of illicit drug traffic
throughout Latin America. Since cocaine became an illicit commodity in high demand, it
transformed into a high priced commodity not because of its lack of supply, but because
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of the risk involved in smuggling the drug to major markets like the United States and
Europe. The high profit margin gained from smuggling cocaine opened a profitable
opportunity for traffickers who had experience with underground smuggling networks.
Many of the environmental and institutional conditions that led to the rise of the illicit
drug business in Colombia were factors that reduced the risk of conducting business.
According to Thoumi, Colombians were not culturally more violent or corrupt than other
citizens of the world; Colombia simply had the “best package of incentives to lower risks,”
(Thoumi, 1994) which led to the growth of the illicit drug industry (Reuter, 2004).
Of the seven factors described above, six lower the risk of apprehension by
authorities, which inevitably stimulated the economic development of DTOs. A weak
legal system allowed traffickers to do business without the fear of being investigated or
apprehended. Colombia’s geography lowered the capacity of government monitoring,
and this factor decreased horizontal accountability of government officials to the central
government, especially in remote areas. Colombia’s rugged geography coupled with the
absence of state presence decreased state supervision, and increased the likelihood of
corruption. Having a heritage of exporting smuggled goods such as emeralds decreased
the risk of doing business because trustworthy business contacts were already established
to smuggle cocaine through secure routes. A network of Colombian immigrants in the
United States also helped reduce risks, because immigrants could be trusted to receive
drugs, distribute them, and send money back to Colombia without fear that the
connections would be infiltrated by U.S. law enforcement. A change in U.S. demand for
cocaine as compared to marijuana became a better venture for drug traffickers because
cocaine had a lower risk of being detected by anti-narcotics agents since it was less bulky.
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Finally, the simple technology for refining cocaine also reduced the risk of being caught
by authorities, since the refining process was cheap and easily emulated. Technological
innovations also allowed traffickers to transport and hide cocaine from authorities.
Finally, external factor such as the indifference of Colombian elites to the power
of the illicit drug trafficking organizations, and the lack of international focus on money
laundering or even on cocaine as a “problem drug,” facilitated the growth of the cocaine
industry in Colombia, because DTOs flourished under the radar for about 15 years during
the “golden era” of drug traffic between 1969-1984. The economic power acquired
during this period allowed traffickers to gradually increase their power vis-à-vis the
government and eventually led to a decline in state autonomy, which led to
destabilization of the political system and a temporal invalidation of the Extradition
Treaty with the United States.
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATING 1980s-ERA MEDELLIN DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS USING AN INTEREST GROUP MODEL: INTERNAL
VARIABLES
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As described in chapter 2, a hybrid Macro-Micro-Model has been formulated to
help analyze illicit interest groups by investigating the "macro" (external environmental)
variables and "micro" (internal organizational) variables relative to a given group.
Chapter IV will examine aspects of the Micro-model's internal variables that influence
the rise, development, and transformation of 1980s-era Medellin drug trafficking
organizations.
As diagrammed in Table 3 below, the internal variables are only part of the entire
picture crafted by the model. In this chapter, we are concerned with the characteristics in
the right column classified as either a pluralist or institutionalist approach. Internal
factors include: membership characteristics, economic resources, group cohesion, group
expertise, group size, high and low-demanders, selective incentives, and
representativeness.
Table 3: The Hybrid Macro-Micro-Model Employing Pluralist and Institutionalist
Approaches

Pluralist approach

Institutionalist
approach

Macro-model variables
(external variables)
• Political events
• Economic events
• Social events
• Technological events
•
•
•
•

A state’s legal
parameters
Individual preferences
of state officials
Autonomy
A state’s capacity
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Micro-model variables
(internal variables)
• Membership
characteristics
• Resources
• Cohesion
• Expertise
• Representativeness
• Selective incentives
• Group size
• Existence of high- and
low-demanders

For the purposes of the case study, discussion of the association of Medellinbased drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) centers on a few key leaders, even though
the association was known to encompass trafficking organizations all over Colombia.
The leaders of the Medellin-based DTOs are: Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa Brothers,
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder Rivas.
Membership Characteristics
A discussion of the socioeconomic status and education of group members allows
the measurement of homogeneity and/or specialization of an organization’s membership.
It is also a descriptive variable that provides a general survey of a membership’s
composition, historical context, and ability to influence policy. This section introduces
the characteristics of major Medellin DTO leaders and employees.
Leadership: Pablo Escobar
In 1949 Pablo Escobar was born in Rionegro, Antioquia, a town on the outskirts
of Medellin. His maternal grandfather was involved in the business of smuggling whisky.
His father was a peasant and his mother a public school teacher. The family was
economically disadvantaged and in the 1950s would move often because of La
Violencia—a ten-year period of civil conflict in Colombia (1948-1958). In 1961 the
family relocated in Envigado, a town south of Medellin, and settled in government
housing. Escobar finished high school and after graduation attended college at the
Universidad Autónoma where he took some accounting classes but never obtained a
degree (Salazar, 2001:32-44). In his youth he also worked with his cousin Gustavo
Gaviria stealing and reselling tombstones. He also stole cars and later became involved
in two smuggling organizations. The first smuggling organization was run by Don

89

Alberto and the second was run by Alfredo “el Padrino” Gomez Lopez’s organization
where Escobar was a gunman (Castillo, 1991, p. 50; Castro, 1996, p. 283; Salazar, 2001,
p. 55). Gomez Lopez’s organization specialized in importing American cigarettes and
appliances into Colombia and also had contacts with emerald smugglers in Bogotá, who
exported to markets in Mexico (Castro, 1996). In an interview granted to journalist
German Castro Caycedo (1987), Pablo Escobar recounted how he became involved with
the cocaine business:
Pablo Escobar: In this country one is bred in war, I was brought up in the war, a very violent war,
which was the war of Malboro (cigarettes). I swear that not even the paisas, unless they were
bandits of that time, knew about that fight. Let’s say that is what existed before coca began,
(which was the war) where the first drug traffickers came from and which created the first sicarios
(hit men)…
It is true that Don Alfredo always was a smuggler of cigarettes, whisky, watches, and second hand
pianos. He would buy these up there in the United States, then he would bring it by boat, and
would smuggle it through Turbo or through Tolú. Once he brought in thirty-eight trucks. I
remember the scandal that broke… That was the part of history when smugglers started going into
the drug business. At that time I was working for another smuggler, Don Alberto, who was my
mentor, because he was a warrior, intelligent, and resourceful…
I had just graduated from high school. Look, I have started to think about those things and it
becomes clearer for me that those examples (set by the first smugglers) determined the future of
my life and the life of other kids who started to live with many illusions, but who did not want to
work at a factory or a store. What we saw (in those smugglers) was the opulence, plus adventure,
plus the power that money brings. Or are you going to tell me that money does not provide power
and fame. And you cannot tell me that there exists one single human being in this world who
doesn’t like money, fame, and power, especially at that age (Castro, 1996, p. 283).

According to Pablo Escobar in this 1987 interview it was the wealth of early smugglers
that motivated him to become a smuggler in spite of the violence practiced within this
sector. It was through these smugglers that he learned about the profitable drug trade by
working as a cargo escort and gunman. As an armed escort for smuggled cargo, Escobar
became familiar with smuggling routes and as a gunman he regularly used violence to
intimidate. Early smugglers taught Escobar how to manage the underground economic
structure for smuggling goods. It was through Don Alberto and Gomez Lopez that he
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learned to payoff customs, police, and military officers as well as the use of small town
politicians to transport illegal cargos through Colombian highways (Castro, 1996). Aside
from economic incentives to gain favor amongst authorities, the violent wars Escobar
refers to as the “Malboro wars” taught him how to intimidate competitors. An interview I
conducted in 2005 with a 1970-1980s DTO worker reveals that Pablo Escobar only rose
to power because he was violent:
DSS0040: Escobar would terminate the small “kitchens,” (popular name for coca paste refineries)
because he wanted to be the sole provider of refined cocaine. And he finished with (production in)
Casquilla and Caldas. At first he would offer to buy production at a low cost, but if they wouldn’t
agree to the price, he would finish their production of refined cocaine. He would finish with their
owners, their workers, and the refinery itself… Pablo surpassed the Ochoas, well every trafficker
had to go through him (to buy cocaine to send), so they kept their head low (Interview DSS040,
2005).

Early smugglers earned the respect of many in society because they brought in
affordable imported goods desired by all social circles of society, but especially by
affluent and middle class sectors that could easily afford them. Moreover, the capacity to
earn absurdly large amounts of money, sufficient enough to bribe authorities, gave
smugglers an untouchable aura because they provided a service to high-end clients. At
the same time, state authorities were easily persuaded because smugglers provided them
with alternate sources of income. Recalling how his mentor Don Alberto smuggled 32
trucks full of merchandise, Escobar described how authorities reacted when they found
out:
In that ride, all of the police along the way (From Turbo to Medellin) received money. Man, at
that time even the Communal Action Juntas came out and asked for money and so did the police
inspectors of the surrounding villages because the shipment became general gossip the moment
the cargo was unloaded from the ship, to the bongos, and loaded into the trucks… (Castro, 1996).

Respect and economic power gave Colombian smugglers a special status within the very
rigid class system in which they operated. Smugglers had the ability to create jobs and

91

provide normally unaffordable goods at affordable prices by undermining the
government’s import tariffs. Finally, because of the profitability of their trade, smugglers
provided an avenue for upward mobility to many Colombian’s of humble origins like that
of Escobar himself.
The Gomez Lopez smuggling organization based many of its operations in the
Santisima Trinidad57 neighborhood of Medellin, considered a warehouse and prostitution
district (Salazar, 2001, p. 55). In the Santisima Trinidad neighborhood Pablo Escobar,
and his cousin Gustavo Gaviria, became acquainted with early entry-level and mid-level
cocaine traffickers like Carlos Lehder and Griselda Blanco.
When Carlos Lehder was released from Connecticut’s Danbury prison in 1975 he
contacted Pablo Escobar who at the time was smuggling a few kilos of cocaine through
drug mules (Streatfeild, 2000). After the Escobar/Lehder meeting, Escobar became
Lehder’s cocaine provider and this connection allowed Lehder to become a key player in
the transportation and selling of cocaine in the U.S. market.
Another mid-level cocaine trafficker who Escobar became acquainted with was
Griselda Blanco, who was better known by U.S. law enforcement circles as the
“Godmother,” “the Queen of Cocaine,” or the “Black Widow of Cocaine.”58 By 1975
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This neighborhood is also known as Barrio Antioquia, and is located in the wharehouse district right next
to the Olaya Herrera International Airport, which was a central point for the import and export of smuggled
goods.
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See Gugliotta and Leen (1989), Merlmestein, Max (1990), Eddy et al. (1988), Smitten (1990) and the
documentaries “Cocaine Cowboys” and “Cocaine Cowboys Two” for more information on Griselda Blanco
and South Florida’s involvement in the illicit drug trade in general. Griselda Blanco became a mayor
distributor of cocaine in Miami during the late 1970s and early 1980s. She became known as the “Black
Widow of Cocaine” in the United States because she reportedly bragged that she killed one of her three
husbands. Before becoming a cocaine distributor, she was a young prostitute until she married Jose Dario
Trujillo who had criminal connections to organized crime (La Viuda Negra, 1994). During the early 1960s
she had three children with Trujillo and became acquainted with the members of the drug business.
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Griselda Blanco had already been a major cocaine distributor in New York, and in the
late 1970s Blanco became a distribution leader in the Miami cocaine market. The contact
between Escobar, other Medellin-based DTO leaders, and Griselda Blanco contributed to
the cocaine market takeover of Miami by Medellin-based DTOs. It was in 1979 that
Time Magazine described Miami as “Trouble in Paradise” (South Florida, 1981) because
of the crime wave typified by the “Dadeland Mall massacre” where rival drug dealers
opened machine gun fire on each other (Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 10).
Once Pablo Escobar and Gustavo Gaviria became fulltime cocaine traffickers in
the mid to late-1970s, they developed a business strategy that involved procuring coca
paste in Peru and Ecuador, and refining and shipping it through 20-30 routes (Mollison et
al., 2007, p. 56) to their distributors in the United States. By 1977, Escobar was twentyeight, a millionaire property owner, and one of Medellin’s up-and-coming drug
traffickers (Salazar, 2001). Although Escobar became rich while young, his rise within
the drug business was not accidental, it was due to: learning the trade from trafficking
Trujillo died in the late 1960s in Queens and shortly after Blanco married Alberto Bravo her second
husband—a pioneer in the cocaine business, with whom she lived with in Queens, New York in 1971. By
1972 she and Bravo became wealthy distributing cocaine for “El Padrino” in Medellin (Castillo, 1987, p.
53). In 1975 U.S. authorities indicted Blanco and Bravo for smuggling cocaine to the United States and
arrested members of her distribution ring (Castillo, 1987, p. 53; Lubasch, 1976). It is believed Griselda
Blanco moved to Miami and Carlos Bravo returned to Colombia to avoid U.S. authorities. Soon after the
U.S. government indictment, Griselda Blanco and Alberto Bravo had a personal standoff, and Blanco
reportedly killed her second husband in Bogotá (Corben, 2006). In the mid to late 1970s Blanco married
Dario Sepulveda her third husband, with whom she had a fourth son named Michael Corleone Sepulveda
around 1977. Pablo Escobar worked for El Padrino’s organization in the early 1970s at the same time
Griselda Blanco and Alberto Bravo were leaders of cocaine distribution in Queens, New York (Salazar,
2001, p. 47-49). Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers became suppliers of cocaine for Blanco once she
established herself in Miami. However, her dealings with Escobar and the Ochoas would end around 1985
because of her use of violence. She not only reportedly had her husband Dario Sepulveda killed over a
child custody battle, but she also killed a first cousin of the Ochoas, Marta Ochoa Saldarriaga who was
supplying Blanco with cocaine in Miami (Mermelstein, 1990; Guggliota et al., 1989, p. 214; Smitten, 1989).
These murders led major traffickers to cut Griselda Blanco out from the cocaine supply chain and Medellin
DTO leaders placed a bounty on her (Mermelstein, 1990; Corben, 2006). U.S. authorities finally arrested
Griselda Blanco in 1985 and she spent 20 years in prison for drug trafficking and murder until her release
in 2005.
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pioneers Don Alberto and Lopez Gomez, using the ruthlessness he learned as a
professional hit man, forging valuable business contacts that allowed him to reach U.S.
markets, leveraging the high profit margin for trafficking cocaine, and taking advantage
of the weak law enforcement in Colombia and abroad.
Leadership: The Ochoa Brothers
The next important leaders of Medellin-based DTOs were the Ochoa brothers—
Jorge Luis, Juan David, and Fabio Ochoa. The Ochoa brothers were born into a family
known for breeding and training Paso Fino horses in Colombia. Their great-grandfather
won awards for his horses and their father was a recognized horse breeder and the owner
of the famous restaurant Las Margaritas, a place frequented by horse aficionados and
traffickers. Journalistic accounts suggest that Hernando Restrepo Ochoa and Fabio
Restrepo Ochoa, uncles to the Ochoa brothers and themselves pioneers of the marijuana
drug business of the 1960s and early 1970s, introduced the Ochoa brothers to the drug
trafficking business (Salazar, 2001; Castillo, 1987, p.65; Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 26).
Juan David and Jorge Luis Ochoa officially claim that a friend introduced them to the
business (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000; Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000), but it is
believed that Fabio Restrepo Ochoa ceded his business to the Ochoa brothers around
1976, and shortly after –in 1978, Fabio Restrepo Ochoa was murdered (Castillo, 1987, p.
65; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 27).
The Ochoa brothers claim that their ranching family was wealthy so they did not
enter the drug business because of economic need (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000;
Salazar, 2001, p. 73-74; Castillo, 1987), but some biographical accounts suggest that
Jorge Luis Ochoa, the eldest brother, went to Miami to work off debts (Salazar, 2001, p.
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74). While in Miami, it is believed that Jorge Luis Ochoa discovered the profitability of
the cocaine trade versus the marijuana trade. Regardless of the Ochoa brothers’
economic standing, the illicit drug business provided them with an opportunity to profit.
By 1978, Jorge Luis Ochoa was sending cocaine from Colombia to his youngest brother
Fabio, who was stationed in Miami (Gugliotta et al., 1989; Eddy et al., 1988). Fabio
Ochoa worked with Miami-based distributors Rafael Cardona and Max Mermelstein;
together, the three men were in charge of managing pilots, receiving and selling cocaine
shipments to distributors like Griselda Blanco, and laundering and/or sending money
back to traffickers in Colombia (Mermelstein, 1990, Castillo, 1987).
During the early 1980s, the Ochoa brothers worked with Pablo Escobar, Jose
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder to try to consolidate the upstream and
downstream stages of the cocaine trade. Rodriguez Gacha would manage the acquisition
of cocaine paste and Escobar would control cocaine refinement. In the downstream
stages of the cocaine trade during this period, the Ochoas and Lehder would organize the
transportation of cocaine to the Caribbean and into the United States (Eddy et al., 1988, p.
290). The mutual cooperation between these traffickers allowed them to send large
shipments of cocaine into U.S. markets by plane or boat, which marked a clear
progression between the cocaine traffic of the 1980s when compared to the marijuana
traffic of the 1970s that relied on the use of mules. Whereas mules could only traffic a
couple of kilos, the transportation of cocaine via airplanes and boats from the late 1970s
onward could transport tons of cocaine.
Little to no information exists on the level of the Ochoa others. Aside from their
experience in the illicit drug business, they had managerial skills because they supervised
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a range of other legal businesses throughout Colombia. In Jorge Ochoa’s words, the
cocaine business was a great part-time job,
Frontline: I still don't quite understand what you did on a day-to-day basis?
Jorge Ochoa: One doesn't dedicate all one's time to that… I also dealt with horses. I had a lot of
activities. I wasn't solely dedicated to the business; it doesn't take all of your time.
Frontline: So drug trafficking was a lucrative part-time job?
Jorge Ochoa: Part-time, yes (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa, 2000).

From biographical accounts on the Ochoa brothers, it is known that they had a more
comfortable upbringing than that of Pablo Escobar. The Ochoa brothers were influenced
by their familial connections to the drug trade and the family restaurant allowed them to
absorb information on trade routes and to make connections with members of the
smuggling world (Interviews - Juan David, 2000; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 26-28). It is
reported that the Ochoas were among the echelon of DTO leaders because of their
transportation links to the United States since they were able to use their Hacienda
Veracruz in the outskirts of Barranquilla, Colombia as a transshipment point because the
property had a large airstrip to send off planes full of cocaine across the Caribbean (Eddy
et al., 1988, p. 296; Guggliotta et al., 1989, p. 127). According to pilot George Jung, the
Ochoas also became important because they had political connections that could provide
for the protection of trafficking routes (Interviews – George Jung, 2000; Streatfeild,
2000). Moreover, in 1981 they were involved in the formation of the group Muerte A
Secuestradores (MAS), to stop guerrilla and common criminals from kidnapping the
relatives of traffickers.59

59

The guerrilla group M-19 had kidnapped their sister Martha Nieves Ochoa.
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Leadership: Jose Gonzalo “el Mejicano” Rodriguez Gacha
The third important DTO leader was Jose Gonzalo ‘el Mejicano’ Rodriguez
Gacha. Little information exists on the upbringing of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha.
He was born in Pacho, Cundinamarca in 1946, a small town located in between Bogotá
and the emerald mines of Muzo, Boyacá. At the beginning of his career he worked as a
gunman for Alfonso Caballero, an emerald smuggler who would sell his clandestine
merchandise in Mexico and Miami. Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha became very
important to Medellin-based traffickers because of his international trade connections via
Mexico.60
According to journalistic accounts, Rodriguez Gacha did not have registered
identification with the Colombian state (Castillo, 1987). He was called “the Mexican”
because of his reported love for all things Mexican. Most of his properties were named
after Mexican ranchera music that depicts stories of macho hustlers and heartbreak. In
1976, police records began to register Rodriguez Gacha’s involvement in the drug
business. Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers worked with Rodriguez Gacha in
upstream and downstream aspects of drug trafficking. In the early 1980s Rodriguez
Gacha already had amassed many properties and was a pioneer in the cultivation and
refinement of coca in the jungle regions of southern Colombia. Some of the most wellknown industrial-sized refinement complexes were in the jungles of the Caqueta
department and the complexes were known as Villa Coca, Coquilandia, and the infamous
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Other traffickers that benefited from the Mexican smuggling routes were the brothers Builes in particular
Jaime Builes from Fredonia, Antioquia who exported cocaine through Mexico to California, Louisiana, and
Florida (Castro, 1994).
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Tranquilandia. These complexes were constructed around 1982 and destroyed in 1984
by Colombian authorities.
Rodriguez Gacha created a security apparatus that would protect trafficker
properties in rural areas, such as the El Magdalena Medio region of Colombia where
large tracts of land were bought cheap because armed guerrillas, specifically the FARC,
had a sphere of influence. Politically, Rodriguez Gacha became important because he
was instrumental in creating counter-insurgent paramilitary groups in the 1980s, which
later evolved into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which were a powerful
force from around 1994 to 2004.
Overall, Rodriguez Gacha, like Escobar and the Ochoa brothers, learned about the
smuggling trade from mentors. Rodriguez Gacha’s learned trafficking from 1960s
emerald smugglers, but he surpassed his mentors because he industrialized the production
and smuggling of cocaine. Specifically, Rodriguez Gacha adopted the Mexican trade
routes established by the illegal emerald trade. The Mexican routes were forged in two
ways. The first way consisted of selling the smuggled product to Mexican traffickers
who would transport it into the U.S. market. The second way the routes were created was
by paying off local Mexican authorities (politicians, state police, or federal police) to
transport merchandise through Mexico and into the U.S. border (Castro, 1994). The
“Mexican connection” allowed Rodriguez Gacha to own the Mexican routes and become
a cocaine intermediary between Medellin-based DTO leaders who wished to send
shipments through Mexico. Many of the Mexican smuggling routes and/or contacts used
by Colombian smugglers in the mid-20th century would continue to be in use in the early
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2000s, as the Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their capacity to control
vast amounts of territory and smuggle cocaine through the U.S./Mexican border.
Leadership: Carlos Lehder Rivas
The final leader of significance in this discussion is Carlos Lehder Rivas. Lehder
Rivas was born in 1950 in the small city of Armenia, Quindio. He was born into an
upper middle-class home. His father Guillermo Lehder was a German citizen who settled
in Colombia after World War II and married Helena Rivas Gutierrez, a former beauty
queen with whom he had four children (Orozco, 1987, Streatfeild, 2000). Lehder’s father
was known in Armenia because he established a German restaurant. According to
George Jung, an associate of Lehder and a former DTO pilot, Lehder’s father and mother
separated. She moved to New York City and brought Carlos Lehder with her when he
was in his teens (Streatfeild, 2000). When Carlos Lehder was about 25 years old in 1974,
he was convicted for dealing marijuana and stealing cars61 in New York and spent 16
months in prison. Once out of prison, Lehder bought properties in the Bahamian Island
called Norman’s Cay, which he reportedly bought for a little more than $150,000 dollars.
The properties included a house, a marina, a yacht club, a hotel, and more importantly: an
airstrip. To acquire properties and smuggle cocaine, he allegedly paid Bahamian Prime
Minister Sir Lynden Pindling an amount between $4,000 and $8,000 dollars to prevent
surveillance by Bahamian authorities.62 On September 1979, fleeing from a possible
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According to an interview with George Jung (Streatfeild, 2000; Eddy et al., 1988), Carlos Lehder would
steal cars in the United States and ship them to Colombia where they would be sold. Cars in Colombia
during most of the 20th century were expensive items comparable in value to a real estate investment such
as an apartment. The high value of cars was due to exchange rates and the import tariffs placed by the
Colombian government on imported goods, which made smuggling profitable.
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arrest for trafficking cocaine to the United States, Lehder returned to his hometown of
Armenia, Quindio a multi-millionaire (Orozco, 1987).
Fellow traffickers suggest that Carlos Lehder was an adventurer, which possibly
explains why he became involved in the illicit business (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa,
2000). It is unknown how Lehder became initially involved in criminal activities. An
interview with George Jung, who was Lehder’s cellmate at Danbury U.S. Federal Prison,
suggests that one of his older brothers was involved in importing stolen cars from the
United States and selling them in Colombia (Streatfeild, 2000; Eddy et al., 1988).
However Jung explains that much of Lehder’s education occurred while imprisoned, that
he was a methodical apprentice, and that he made many connections:
It was basically a school. My bunkmate was Carlos Lehder, he said he was from Colombia and he
spoke excellent English, well mannered and his clothes were pretty neat… he asked me if I knew
anything about cocaine…
He said, "Did you know it sells for $60,000.00 a kilo in the United States?" And I said, "No. I had
no idea. How much does it cost down in Colombia?" and he said, "$4,000 to $5,000."
Carlos and I spent close to a year together, working and planning everyday… But Carlos never
ceased, never stopped. He was like a student is, constantly pumping people's brains about money
laundering, about this, about that, about automobiles, about airplanes, about boats. In fact there
was a guy in there for smuggling with boats and he spent hours and hours with him learning
navigation, and there was a president of a bank in there and he pumped him constantly about the
banking system in America and how one can launder money, and he kept files and files on
everything. He kept notes constantly. He never stopped. He was obsessed with it (Interviews George Jung, 2000).

Although his middle class upbringing may not clearly explain why Carlos Lehder
became a cocaine trafficker, the connections and knowledge acquired while imprisoned
allowed Lehder to become a valuable link for DTOs operating in the Caribbean.
According to Jung, when Lehder was imprisoned in Danbury he did not know Pablo
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Lehder boasted about his Bahamian connections in Colombia, and his statements were the basis of an
investigative report on Lynden Pindling’s involvement with drug traffickers by the U.S. television network
NBC. Moreover the Bahamian authorities organized an investigative commission, which found that Sir
Lynden Pindling and his wife were spending more than they earned, but Bahamian authorities were unable
to prove that Prime Minister Pindling’s wealth was tied to drug trafficking (Eddy et al., 1988).
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Escobar (Streatfeild, 2000). Once Lehder returned to Colombia in 1976, he made contact
with Pablo Escobar and George Jung began flying planes and selling larger quantities of
cocaine for Escobar and Lehder. When Lehder bought property in Norman’s Cay,
Bahamas, in 1978, he used the island as a transshipment station for planes carrying drugs
and money.
Politically, Lehder was one of the most extravagant actors involved in the drug
trafficking sector, and he was a one of the most vocal critics of the U.S.-Colombian
Extradition Treaty. Lehder’s political rhetoric borrowed from fascism, populism, and
1960s liberal ideas on drug use.
Lehder’s rise within the international cocaine trafficking sector was directly
influenced by four external factors: the shift in demand from marijuana to cocaine, the
established smuggling networks left by the marijuana trade that were used for cocaine
distribution, the lack of enforced counter-narcotics laws in the Western Hemisphere, and
the lack of money laundering controls in the United States. These external factors
provided an economic incentive for Carlos Lehder to enter the cocaine trade. Carlos
Lehders rise to political power, especially in Quindio’s local politics, was due to the
tolerance of political elites with drug traffickers and the lack of controls on how
politicians financed their political campaigns at national and local levels.
Around 1986, once disagreements split Colombian cocaine traffickers into two
groups—those traffickers based in Cali and those based in Medellin, the main actors in
the Medellin DTO association became Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder. It should be stressed that these individuals
managed their own DTOs, but many times worked together to pursue common economic
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and political interests. This cooperation can be found in the creation of MAS and Los
Extraditables.
Leadership Analysis
The characteristics of the leadership of Medellin-based DTOs suggest that they
were all entrepreneurs who had an ambition to become wealthy without much formal
education. All of them were contemporaries, born in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Their training was mainly practical experience, learning their trade at an early age. By
the time they were in their thirties all Medellin-based DTOs were multi-millionaires.
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) leaders initially became millionaires because there
were few traffickers in the business.63
With the exception of Carlos Lehder, all of them had a clear link (sometimes even
a family link) to illegal activities early in life. Once these Medellin-based traffickers
became leaders in their own right they started “industrializing” their cocaine smuggling
operations. Instead of using mules to carry drugs, they created huge refineries and used
small airplanes.
One difference found among DTO leader backgrounds, which influenced their
different attitudes towards the use of violence, was the nature of their initial experiences
in the business. Because Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were originally
trained as gunmen in smuggling organizations, their use of violence was more regular.
Carlos Lehder and the Ochoa brothers had been known to use violence, but mostly within
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The price of cocaine in the late 1970s and early-1980s was approximately $60,000 per kilo.
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trafficking circles to resolve business disputes.64 Their socio-economic backgrounds and
attitude towards the use of violence had implications for their operations and efforts to
influence the political agenda. For example, the Ochoas were very discreet and more
concerned with co-opting the political establishment. They had no ambition to obtain
direct political power. Though Lehder was in charge of MAS65 political propaganda, he
never targeted Colombia’s traditional political establishment. Lehder, a white
supremacist, saw himself an elite due to his German heritage and also because of his
success as an entrepreneur. Rodriguez Gacha was not as ruthless as Pablo Escobar in
warring with the political elites, but he was ruthless with leftist guerrillas and was
responsible for the decimation of the Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union), the FARC’s
legal political party. Rodriguez Gacha became a sworn counterinsurgent and allied
himself with cattle ranchers who ruthlessly opposed guerrilla harassment in the Middle
Magdalena region. In contrast to most Medellin-based DTOs, Pablo Escobar’s overnight
success as an entrepreneur led him to believe that he deserved a role in the political and
economic establishment. Escobar used violence on political elites and innocent people to
obtain results.
Membership Characteristics and Selective Incentives: Lower-level DTO Members
A discussion of the people who worked for Medellin-based DTO leaders is
important because it provides insights about the internal structure of the cocaine industry
in Colombia. It also provides an explanation of why individuals join such organizations.
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The Ochoas for example were accused of sending an assassin to kill cocaine pilot-turned-DEA informant
Barry Seal in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

65

An organization created by traffickers to kill guerrillas who kidnapped traffickers. This organization will
be discussed in the Organizational Cohesion section.
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Analytically, it is futile to discuss the membership characteristics of workers such as their
socio-economic status and education without considering the effect of selective
incentives. This section will delve into membership characteristics and the incentives
that drive workers to join DTOs.
The socio-economic status and educational levels of workers of Medellin-based
DTOs depended on the type of work. Based on first-person interviews I conducted with
former, non-elite DTO workers, most participants were very carefully hired based on a
family, friendship, or neighborhood connection –not necessarily on skill.
Patricia Micolta: Was it easy to get people to work in the organization?
DSS0031: It was not easy, but once a really good friend or family member saw you make money, then
it was easier to get someone to work for you or get them in the business. But it had to be someone that
you could back up or they could back you up, but you wouldn’t do this with some one that you didn’t
know. The person had to be very recommended…. (Interview DSS0031, 2005).
DSS0040: Pablo did not like vitrinas (show-offs). The quieter you were the longer the relationship
you would have in the organization” (Interview DSS0040, 2005).

Close familial relationships created the necessary trust to reduce the infiltration of police
informants, but it also was a way to enforce discipline within the organization.
Employees who made a mistake might have to pay with his/her life or the life of relatives
and friends. For the most part, because many DTO employees were related, the majority
of employees had similar backgrounds usually coming from poor socio-economic and
educational levels.
The objective of individual trafficking organizations was to make profit, reduce
risks, and avoid authorities. Drug trafficking businesses employed coca farmers, drivers,
pilots, cocaine refiners, mules, people to ship out and receive merchandise,
gunmen/bodyguards, and professionals such as accountants and lawyers. Although it is
difficult to determine the socio-economic, educational status, and familial linkage that all
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DTO employees had with total certainty, the overall trend among DTO workers was that
the socio-economic status and educational levels of non-professional employees was very
low. Most workers did not have an elementary level education and worked with DTOs
out of economic necessity.
One agrarian DTO worker who was interviewed indicated he earned about 20,000
pesos66 per day on legal crops whereas a coca farmer can earn about 100,000 pesos per
day and are given room and board (Interview raspachin, 2008). Considering that the
minimum monthly salary in Colombia in 2008 was about $461,500 pesos, which equaled
approximately $256.39 dollars, coca farmers could make in one week what they would
otherwise have made in a month.
The reason why many people do not become coca farmers, even if they are
unemployed, is because coca crops are located in isolated regions of Colombia far from
their families and of course there is a risk of getting caught by authorities. Farmers get
paid once the coca paste is sold to cocaine processing labs in cities, so there is a risk that
if authorities confiscate the coca paste or intercept a cocaine processing organization,
peasants may not get paid for three months worth of work. The job of a coca farmer (or
raspachin), is ideal for single peasant young men or women who do not have children.
Yet many peasants in need of money who have families also work in coca plantations
because cocaine paste dealers pay well and have a constant demand for unskilled labor.
Coca paste refiners are also composed of unskilled laborers whose salaries are
similar to coca farmers. Coca paste refiners in 1982, when Tranquilandia, the industrial-
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$20,000 pesos was about $11 dollars a day in 2012, and $100,000 pesos was about $55 dollars, at an
exchange rate of $1,800 pesos per dollar.
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sized cocaine lab was made, were paid around 100 pesos per month, which was around
three times the minimum wage of the time (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 290). If these amounts
are compared to the wages of a coca farmer in 2008, the salary changes of these workers
through time have matched mainstream inflation rates.
Once U.S. drug enforcement agencies became more fully aware of the cocaine
trade at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, mules started “body-packing” cocaine.
On average, a person can carry 65 cocaine pellets in their intestines. Women are known
to carry more cocaine in their sexual organs as well.
The demographics of drug mules can vary. In the 1970s, U.S. citizens and airline
workers were commonly hired to transport drugs and money. With time Colombians
increasingly participated in the drug trade as mules and were usually recruited from poor
neighborhoods or small rural towns. In the last decade, research suggests that mules are
paid about $100 dollars per pellet or as much as approximately $6,500 dollars per roundtrip. This is substantial when compared to the $256.39 per month that constitutes a
minimum monthly wage in Colombia.67
Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) gunmen or bodyguards (depending on the
job at hand) usually came from marginal urban sectors, had little to no education, and
often started as minors. While they risked their lives, they received very little
compensation for their work at least $100 for a job, but compensation depended on the
importance of the target68 (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 30; Las Fachadas, 1999). In a country
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For more information on Colombian drug mules see the director’s commentary in the DVD Maria Full of
Grace.
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During the late 1980s in particular around 1989 the Extraditables ordered the killing of police officers.
During this time hit men were paid around $2,500 dollars for policemen, $2 million dollars for military
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like Colombia, with high unemployment among the unskilled labor force, being hired as
a gunman or sicario was an opportunity to have a job that paid more than the minimum
wage. I conducted interviews with ex-sicarios in Medellin, which revealed that these
men often entered this line of work because of money, but also because they wanted to be
thought of as “tough,” because an older brother was already a sicario, or because they
wanted to get back at someone as an act of revenge:
DSS0040: My older brother was the first to go down the path of the sicariato69 this was in 1970,
when I was 13 years old I ran away from home… I went to another city I dedicated myself to
living a “low-life” to attack, to rob, and I became part of a combo (a gang) and we would kill…
From 13 to 16 I did “low-life” jobs and then at 16 I wanted to do more “finer” work… I dedicated
myself to the sicariato (became a professional hit-man). I became a leader and managed 63
sicarios. We did the dirty work and would receive jobs from the different organizations. We
would receive contracts we would be sent a picture and address and we would do a job” (Interview
DSS040, 2005)
Jair Bedoya community leader of Casa Mia70: When I was in school the Magnificos (the
popular name for traffickers because they became rich overnight as if through a magic act) would
provide us with school supplies. So they were our heroes. We started to join bandas (gangs) and
do jobs, buy a motorcycle wear name brand clothes. Parents couldn’t provide with such things
officers (Mollison et al., 2007, p. 150). Government numbers suggest that between 1989-1993, 1000 police
officers died. However, for every 1 police officer that died, 10 gang members were killed in retaliation.
The conflict skyrocketed the homicide rates specifically in Medellin and in 1991, at the peak of the
violence, 7,081 people were murdered and the homicide rate was of 296 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
To give a comparison the Latin American homicide rate is of 25 per 100,000 and the most recent homicide
rate for Medellin in 2010 was at 60 homicides per 100,000 (UNODC, 2011b:79).
69

The career of a hit-man is popularly referred to as an institutional career like that of the clergy, academia,
the bureaucracy, and in the streets of many towns in Colombia an in Latin America sadly enough being a
hit-man is a career path.
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Jair became a sicario as a teenager in the 1980s and in the mid-1990s. He and others in the neighborhood
of Sandander in Northwest Medellin formed Casa Mia a non-profit organization to create peace in marginal
neighborhoods. The power vacuum that overtook Medellin after Pablo Escobar was killed, and other DTOs
were dismantled, raised the level of violence in marginal neighborhoods in the mid-1990s. Gangs and
emerging DTOs vied for power to control Medellin’s neighborhoods and the drug traffic (wholesale coca
paste, cocaine refinement, and retail sale of cocaine and other drugs). Eventually, Casa Mia through its
effort to forge peace was recognized internationally and obtained funding from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). Casa Mia implemented programs like Restorative Justice—the
creation of justice by implementing conflict resolution strategies. Grass roots organizations like Casa Mia
became mediators of peace and justice in societies where state institutions are often unable to establish
justice. However, this society-based mechanism for peace has had limitations as funding by the UNDP for
the organization was pulled and Jair died on 2008. When I interviewed Jair he was armed because he had
recently suffered a severe knife wound caused by a juvenile gang member in his neighborhood. Casa Mia
still exists as a community organization led by Marta Macias, who has been very vocal about the 2009
increase in homicide rates at the Comuna 6, where the neighborhood Santader is located.

107

because people here are very poor. So in the 1980s our motto was who could be the first to kill,
and in the 1990s the motto was who could do a bigger job like robbing an Exito (supermarket)…
Things began deteriorating because kids started killing people just because they were seen as weak,
because they were easy pray, so people began banding together and forming militias” (Interview
Jair Bedoya, 2004).

Accounts by members of DTOs, such as Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, who dealt
with providing security or organizing assassinations for Pablo Escobar, show the
relational closeness of these workers. Many hit men operated in gangs composed of
entire families. For example, the well-known gang, the Muñoz Mosqueras, consisted of
15 children from the same family. Five of the children were eventually killed and three
were jailed as a result of their drug-related activities (Salazar, 2001, p. 172). If gangs of
gunmen were not family related, they belonged to the same neighborhood such as the
infamous gang Los Priscos who worked for Escobar and lived in the Aranjuez
neighborhood in the northeast hills of Medellin. The northeast hills of Medellin have
become notorious for its gang wars, especially during the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s. Excluding the hilly neighborhood of El Poblado located in the southeast hills
where middle and high-income individuals live, in the new millennium Medellin still
remains a city surrounded with hills composed of hundreds of poor neighborhoods
controlled by gangs whose leaders rarely reach 25 years of age.
The socio-economic and educational level of more trained workers like pilots,
accountants, and lawyers was substantially higher than those who did unskilled labor, and
at this level, the DTOs also used an international labor force. Many of these employees
came from middle-income origins, which allowed them to pay for educational training.
At professional levels of training and status, the increased earnings were much more
attractive than what could be earned in comparable licit jobs, for example, pilots in the
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1980s could get paid a percentage of every kilo transported; a pilot transporting cocaine
could make thousands of dollars in one shipment. George Jung, who flew for 1980s
Medellin DTOs, (it is estimated) made close to $100 million U.S. dollars (Interviews George Jung, 2000), yet the risk of getting detained by authorities, or being extradited to
the United States due to their status in the organization was high. For example, the two
well-known American pilots who flew cocaine for Medellin-based DTOS, George Jung
and Mickey Munday, were both apprehended and convicted by U.S. authorities. Both
pilots were given sentences of 30 and 9 years respectively (Streatfeild, 2000; Hunter,
2006).
Analysis
The membership characteristics of Medellin-based DTO members have been
mainly influenced by external variables. Prohibitionist anti-narcotics policies as
established by the United States government, for example, helped maintain the
international price of cocaine at high levels and these prices translated into high profit
margins. These high profit margins motivated many established imported goods
smugglers or emerald exporters to become marijuana or cocaine traffickers in the early to
mid-1970s.
In this analysis of Medellin DTO leaders, many of the brief biographies suggest
that DTO leaders became leaders because of three factors: they learned their trade from a
mentor or family member, they built international networks, and they used their skills to
profit from the cocaine trade. These member characteristics are not unique. With every
generation, leaders emerge who learn their trade from veteran traffickers and new
organizations are created. In many cases the unknown understudy becomes a leader until
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he/she retires, is apprehended, or is killed. In 1987, Pablo Escobar was already aware of
generational changes within the industry before he became a DTO leader:
Pablo Escobar: The war of Malboro (smuggled cigarettes) was the…

German Castro Caycedo:The prelude?
Pablo Escobar: Yes that’s it. The prelude to all the wars that later took place. I think if we were
going to remember and do history, you would have to break this (period) in three. Let’s say that
until 1973 you have smuggled goods and smugglers. From 1973, until 1979, the first two
generations of cocaine traffickers, and from 1980 until now (1987), the last group (of years) is the
one the gringos apparently refer to as “the cartel”… (Castro, 1996).

The continuous training of traffickers from generation to generation fueled by the
profitability of the cocaine trade explains the rise of drug traffickers not only in Colombia,
but also in Latin America and the Caribbean.
An interesting aspect of the illicit drug industry is that it provided unskilled
laborers hailing from lower socioeconomic sectors with upward social mobility. The
profitability of the international cocaine trade allowed individuals in these sectors to
bypass the strict class structure and the high-income inequality that has existed in
Colombia’s economy. The economic stimulus of the illicit drug industry continually
feeds the illusions of many underprivileged Colombians who believe that a sicario from a
poor neighborhood can become rich. The illusion is fed by the exceptional real-life cases
in which obscure hit men became millionaires. Whereas Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha both exemplify the illusion of the 1980s, after their deaths, other
leaders have emerged, like the case of “Don Berna,” who in the 1990s rose to become a
leader of the cocaine trade and the subsequent paramilitary organizations of the 2000s
(Quien Es, 2003).
The economic success of this industry was the main driving force that motivated
unskilled workers to become part of the industry and of DTO organizations. While
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skilled/professional workers may have had better opportunities in finding work in legal
industries, unskilled workers had more limited and less lucrative options. The economic
success of the illicit drug industry, versus the low economic status of unskilled workers,
has distorted any cost-benefit analysis, thus skewing the analysis towards the benefits
associated with having a job and an above average salary. In contrast, the costs such as,
jail time and death, which are often associated with becoming a mule, a hired gunman, or
a coca farmer, are often ignored. The motivations to have a well-paid job, coupled with
lax laws and a weak economy, led many individuals belonging to low socio-economic
sectors to choose jobs associated with the illicit drug industry.
In creating an industry, Medellin-based DTOs economically benefited its direct
membership by creating jobs, and it also benefited spin-off economic sectors in the
Colombian economy. However, the major problem with this business has been its illicit
nature. Since DTOs trade with an illicit commodity, DTO leaders created conflict for
Colombian society because they have to protect all organizational divisions from
authorities and from rivals. So even though DTOs may provide economic opportunities
to a variety of social sectors, the illegality of the business creates violence and corruption,
and weakens democratic institutions, which leads to a greater cost to society because
problems generated by this industry permeates many social sectors. The following
discussion explores the economic resources of Medellin-based DTOs and the use of these
resources to gain political influence.
Economic Resources
Studies on the illicit drug business have had difficulty establishing the exact
earnings of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. Since the business is illegal,
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there is no certainty on how many kilograms of cocaine were produced each year and
exactly how much was sold in the international market. It is also difficult to establish
exact upstream costs to produce a kilogram of cocaine and exact downstream costs to
ship a kilogram of cocaine and to launder money. But some economists have attempted
to calculate the net earnings from the cocaine industry in the 1980s and 1990s; estimates
range from as low as $170 million to as high as $5 billion per year (Clawson et al., 1996;
Thoumi, 1994). In comparison, in 1994 towards the end of the Medellin DTO’s lifespan,
the oil industry’s earnings were about $3 billion a year or 5.7 percent of Colombia’s GDP.
It is estimated that the Medellin-based DTO leaders were billionaires by the mid1980s. Some conservative estimates indicate that Pablo Escobar was worth $3 billion,
while other estimates such as the one calculated by Forbes magazine in 1989 declared
that Escobar was the seventh-richest man in the world with an estimated fortune of $25
billion (Gibbs, 2009). Rodriguez Gacha’s worth was also estimated in the billions at $1.3
billion (Lee, 1990). When PBS’s Frontline asked the Ochoa brothers how much money
they had made from drug trafficking, Juan David Ochoa said he probably made about $26
million from drug traffic (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000). Regardless of this
discrepancy in trafficker earnings, the money fueled support for the businesses that
became an additional sources of income and employment in Colombia.
Lehder and Escobar owned newspapers that spread their political propaganda.
Escobar sponsored a television program on issues that affected the Department of
Antioquia. Lehder also bought a bank (El Banco de Caldas) to launder money, which
was managed by his uncle. Because security was a prime objective for traffickers, they
established private security firms with the permission of the Ministry of Justice. For
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example, Escobar owned a security firm called Seguridad Nutibara. The establishment
of private security firms allowed for unlimited access to personal bodyguards. Other
investments included the establishment of two executive airlines by the Ochoas and a
fleet of fumigation planes owned by Rodriguez Gacha. Types of businesses established
to launder money or to invest DTO earnings included hotels, football clubs, bus fleets,
cycling teams, cattle and horse ranches and businesses that could be used both, legally
and for the transportation of cocaine, such as a fleet of buses.
Although the exact earnings of the industry are incalculable, what is known is that
DTO leaders made millions of dollars. Earnings allowed them to run their operations,
provide jobs, and influence policy. Their impact on society can be observed by the
number of economic investments they made in 1980s Colombia with little to no
governmental or social oversight (Gomez, 1990). Given that hindsight is twenty-twenty,
it was difficult for authorities of the time to know that the emerging cocaine industry
would become a long-term institution. However, Colombia’s weak legal system allowed
DTO leaders to easily obtain permits for airplane and bus fleets and private security
companies. The ease in which DTO leaders were able to hide their assets through the use
of “straw owners” also made it difficult for authorities to know exactly who owned the
companies that applied for permits. The weakness in the legal system may have stemmed
from having weak money laundering laws, but weaknesses also stemmed from the great
ability of DTO leaders to use their millionaire assets to bribe public workers and
politicians. The use violence and the limited government protection for public workers
also increased corruption because, in the face of violence, bribes became more attractive
proposals for workers facing the dilemma of granting or prohibiting public favors to a
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DTO leader. The intent of this analysis is not to excuse public officials for failing to
strengthen the legal system or for being unethical; however, given the enormous
economic resources available to traffickers in the 1980s and 1990s, it was easy for DTO
leaders to override the very weak legal mechanisms that existed to stop the political
influence of the cocaine industry.
Group Cohesion
Group cohesion is the degree of organizational control and discipline that a group
when implementing an agenda. Many journalistic accounts narrate events that suggest
that DTOs had some degree of cohesion because DTO leaders organized business
meetings, were vocal anti-extradition advocates, and contributed to the same political
campaigns (Castillo, 1987; Orozco, 1987; Gugliotta et al., 1989; Salazar, 2001; Legarda,
2005). To assess the degree of cohesion, this section will first discuss the development of
early DTO associations such as MAS, then it will focus on the economic and political
cohesion of DTO leaders based in Medellin, and finally the section will examine the
development and cohesion of Los Extraditables (The Extraditables Ones). Overall, the
discussion on cohesion will show that the economic and political organizational cohesion
of DTO leaders was gradual and that it peaked with the formation of the group Los
Extraditables, which was formed to overturn the 1979 Extradition Treaty.
Development of Early Trafficking Cooperatives and MAS
Initially Medellin-based DTOs worked with traffickers throughout Colombia to
ship drugs to the United States. From the early 1970s until 1988, Cali based traffickers,
such as the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, had cordial business relations with the Medellin
organization and worked to reduce risks involved with the traffic of drugs. For example,
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Colombian trafficking organizations cooperated in laundering money through a bank
called El Banco de Trabajadores owned by the Rodriguez Orejuelas. Another example of
cooperation between Cali and Medellin DTOs was their joint investment in Spain’s
financial sector and the sharing of legal teams to prevent their extradition to the United
States (Castillo, 1991; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 105-110). DTOs also cooperated in security
and political matters; for example, on December of 1981 traffickers organized to form the
group Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS, Death to Kidnappers). Muerte A Sucuestradores
(MAS) was created in reaction to the November 12th 1981 kidnapping of Martha Nieves
Ochoa, a sister of the Ochoa brothers who was abducted by the M-19 guerrilla group.
Whereas MAS’s official71 paramilitary operations ended around 1982 once the Ochoa
sister had been returned to her family, its economic networks ended around 1988 when
Medellin and Cali based DTO leaders engaged in a war for the control of the
international cocaine market.
The formation of MAS to avenge a kidnapping is evidence of the inability of the
Colombian state to be able to monopolize the use of force throughout its territory to the
degree that the state may control the development and activities of violent non-state
actors like paramilitary groups such as MAS or guerrillas like the M-19. Given that DTO
leaders were involved in the illegal drug trade, they could not resolve conflicts through
legal institutions by turning to Colombian authorities for help. The incapacity of the
Colombian state to provide security allowed non-state actors to arm themselves and
resolve conflicts through the use of violence.
71

This project defines “official MAS operations” as those anti-kidnapping operations, which MAS
members publically sought to implement through communiqués and which resulted in the truce between
MAS and the M-19 guerrilla group. Other killings and paramilitary operations were attributed to MAS after
1983, but were implemented by other criminal or paramilitary groups.
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Traffickers have not been the first to use violent conflict resolution, because other
legal actors throughout Colombia’s conflictive history of civil conflict have used this
tradition of resolving conflicts. For most of Colombia’s history, landowners have
provided for their own security, to protect their lands and families and to combat
common crime and for protection during periods of civil strife. The period of La
Violencia during the 1950s was the last major conflict, before the 1980s, where
landowners armed themselves to resolve rural disputes over land. As traffickers began to
accumulate wealth from the illicit drug trade they became landowners and bought large
tracts of land, some of which were located in areas controlled by guerrilla groups.
Traffickers like other landowning elites, who sought to protect their property and family,
created Muerte A Secuestradores.
As a predecessor paramilitary organization, MAS sought to punish guerrillas who
kidnapped and practiced extortion by collecting “taxes” (popularly known as vacunas)
from rural landowners. The M-19 and most importantly the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were two guerrilla groups that mainly contributed
to the political mobilization of traffickers via the formation of paramilitary groups such
as MAS and later the Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena
Medio (ACDEGAM). ACDEGAM became the organizational precursor to the group the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, the United Self-Defenses of Colombia), which
demobilized from 2004-2008. ACDEGAM was composed of cattle ranchers and
traffickers, like Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, who was one of its founding members and
who helped create it to combat FARC influence primarily in the Middle Magdalena
region (Reyes, 1990).
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Different accounts reveal how MAS formed. Some say that it was the Ochoa
brothers that invited 20 of Colombia’s major traffickers to their famous restaurant/club
called Las Margaritas in Medellin (Castillo, 1987), yet other accounts believe the
meeting was composed of 223 traffickers and held in the city of Cali (Eddy et al., 1988, p.
287; Gugliotta and Leen, 1989, p.92-93). Other reports reveal that 100-200 traffickers
met, but instead, they were invited to Pablo Escobar’s Hacienda Napoles (Salazar, 2001).
Though the number of traffickers and the location is disputed in all accounts (Castillo,
1987; Salazar, 2001; Eddy et al., 1988, p. 287, Gugliotta and Leen 1989), all of them
suggest that this meeting or series of meetings were significant because the illicit drug
industry’s leadership gathered to pool money for a security apparatus to counter guerrilla
harassment and discuss business matters. The purpose of MAS, as a loose coalition of
DTO leaders, was to monitor guerrillas in their regions and alert each other on the actions
and whereabouts of kidnapped victims. At the time, besides kidnapping the Ochoa sister,
the M-19 guerrillas had kidnapped the children of another trafficker and attempted to
kidnap Carlos Lehder. The summit or series of summit allowed some traffickers to meet
and discuss business matters such as creating insurance companies, making connections
to finance shipments, renting or sharing routes, offering courier services within the
United States, designating colors for identifying shipments, and the distribution of the
U.S. market and their areas of operation in Colombia (Castillo, 1987, p. 114-115; Castillo,
1991, p. 202-204). It is also probable that the creation of Tranquilandia, an industrialsized coca paste-processing lab in the Colombian Amazons, which was owned by a
cooperative of several traffickers, was also discussed during the MAS meetings (Eddy et
al., 1988, p. 290-291). In the 1980s between 60% and 80% of the U.S. market was
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divided between the Medellin and Cali groups; the Medellin DTOs operated mostly in
Miami and the Cali DTOs mostly in New York (Castillo, 1991, p. 19; Thoumi, 1994, p.
151). Although this functional division may have occurred prior to the development of
MAS, the group’s economic networks allowed a loose association of traffickers to
cooperate not only in business interests, but also in political concerns, such as
establishing death squads to counter guerrilla harassment.
Muerte A Secuestradores engaged in a media campaign to denounce guerrillas. Its
formation showed the ideological differences between these emergent economic groups
and guerrillas. Although both traffickers and guerrillas often came from similarly
marginal sectors of society, the trafficker political agenda was capitalist while that of
guerrillas was communist. Through the use of airplanes, MAS pamphlets were dispersed
over soccer stadiums in major Colombian cities to spread their anti-guerrilla sentiment
(Terrorismo, 1982; Eddy et al., 1988:288). An 11-point communiqué dropped from a
helicopter into a soccer stadium announced the creation of MAS and its purpose,
…2. Kidnappings have been carried out both by common criminals and subversive elements, with
the latter trying to finance their activities by targeting people like us, whose hard-earned money
has brought progress and employment to this country, and much needed schools, hospitals and
etc.;
3. At said meeting, the 223 mafia bosses, representing every region of the country, agreed to
finance this endeavor through personal contributions of $2 million pesos each [approximately
$20,000 dollars], which, put together, add up to $446 million pesos [approximately $4.4 million
dollars]. In our effort to fight the practice of kidnapping, these resources will be used to pay for
rewards, execution of perpetrators, and equipment… (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 288).

The MAS communiqué was written in a matter-of-fact style and detailed all the money
and manpower to be used to combat kidnapping and guerrillas.
It is widely believed that Carlos Lehder was in charge of MAS propaganda (El
Destape, 1983; Castillo, 1987, p. 113) because another leaflet, which was dispersed and
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printed in 1982 in the newspaper El Mundo in Medellin, was signed by Lehder and had
the following message:
“What I (Carlos Lehder) propose is an anti-kidnapping project, similar to the Peace Commission,
but it is paramilitary. That this commission… use two forces: a team of judges and prosecutors;
and the other force will be tactical and will be made up of the best ex-military and ex-agents, the
most expert paramilitary civilians, civil defense, foreign mercenaries… A force of two thousand
men would be sufficient. A force that we Los Secuestrables (the potentially kidnapped ones)
would help finance, because we prefer to spend our fortunes defending our families and towns
than have them taken away from us… MAS is a movement… that should be of worry exclusively
to common kidnappers and subversives ” (Salazar, 2001, p. 84).

Unlike the succinct MAS communiqué, this leaflet was a confused train of though, which
likens a “peace commission” to a “paramilitary manhunt.” The only similarity between
the two flyers was that both propose to combat kidnapping with funds and a force of
about 2000 men (the communiqué mentions a force of 2,230 men (Eddy et al., 1988, p.
288)). A reason why this second flyer is interesting is because in it its author, Lehder,
considers himself part of a traditional commercial and landed elite. In an earlier
paragraph Lehder states:
“When you kidnap the entrepreneurs and managers, our economy crumbles… In the last ten years
hundreds of prestigious families have had to leave the country in fear. The industrialists and
constructors sold and left. And kidnappers shot at me… but miraculously, I escaped” (Salazar,
2001, p. 83).

The flyer is interesting because in his mind Lehder is not a smuggler but rather an
entrepreneur and a leader, who proposes that elites –like him– and the government should
unite to fight kidnapers.
Soon after the distribution of MAS propaganda, M-19 guerrilla members were
chained together and placed in front of newspaper buildings with signs that read, “I am
from the M-19 and I am a kidnapper” (Orozco, 1987; Castillo, 1987). Other actions
taken by MAS included kidnapping and killing several M-19 members in the department
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of Antioquia, and turning M-19 members to the Colombian military. Due to these actions,
the M-19 returned the kidnapped Ochoa sister and stopped harassing traffickers.
The creation of MAS also allowed for an increase in economic partnerships.
Cocaine trafficking in time became a sophisticated business that insured shipments to
spread-out risks and reduce loses. The level of organizational formation can only occur
when individuals form associations or cooperatives. Max Mermelstein, a shipment
receiver for Medellin-based DTOs in Miami, explains in an interview for PBS’s
Frontline, “We would bring in 400, 450, sometimes 500 kilos on a shipment and if it all
belonged to one person and we did take a loss, it would be a bad hit. It would hurt” (Cran,
1997). So to reduce losses, a shipment would bring cocaine from several traffickers to
spread the risk. Insurance companies for illicit drugs would pay for 100 percent of a
trafficker’s shipment at Colombian prices if a shipment was confiscated, but if the
shipment reached its destination the insurance would take a percentage (about 10%) from
the shipment’s gains (Castillo, 1987, p. 114; Thoumi, 1994, p. 148; Clawon et al., 1996, p.
38). Many insurance companies were established by seasoned traffickers to make profit
on the shipments of smaller traffickers who wanted to send cocaine, but did not have
routes or planes to transport drugs (Clawson et al., 1996). If traffickers needed money to
send a drug shipment, they could ask a financier to invest some money on the shipment,
and once the shipment reached its destination the investor would get a large return for
financing the shipment. This type of financing was popularly known as la apuntada72
(Thoumi, 1994; Clawson et al., 1996). When cocaine wholesale prices dropped in the
mid-1980s and traffickers disputed ownership of routes they previously rented or shared,
72

Literally translated as the sign-up, as in “sign me up to send a shipment.”
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insurers like Escobar or Ochoa became powerful figures because most traffickers had to
pay them to transport drugs.
To conclude, the formation of MAS allowed independent trafficking
organizations to network and establish business and security ties. The benefits of
associating separate DTOs resulted in the co-ownership of the Tranquilandia lab and the
sharing of money laundering mechanisms through the First Inter-Americas Bank coowned by Jorge Luis Ochoa and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela. Other functional ties, such
as mutual insurance and the sharing of routes, allowed DTOs all over Colombia to reduce
risks. Politically, the creation of MAS to counter-balance guerrilla influence led groups
like the M-19 guerrilla to stop harassing DTO leaders.
Trafficker networks established through MAS more or less continued to function,
but they definitely ended on January 13, 1988 when the Cali and Medellin-based DTOs
fought each other for the ownership of trafficking routes and the U.S. markets. After the
M-19 and MAS leaders negotiated a truce, the group’s reason for being seized to exist.
However, political cooperation and economic ties among traffickers based in Cali and
Medellin continued until January 13, 1988. At national levels, political cooperation
among traffickers centered on invalidating the 1979 Treaty on Extradition and on funding
the political campaigns of anti-extradition candidates. No evidence exists that MAS
directly coordinated the efforts of Medellin and Cali based groups to invalidate the
extradition treaty, but traffickers based with both cities influenced the same political
process.
The economic ties that were enhanced by MAS leadership meetings continued,
until economic tensions began to flourish resulting from a decline in the international
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wholesale price of cocaine in the mid to late 1980s. Price decline occurred because
Medellin and Cali based DTOs shifted from shipping small quantities of cocaine to
shipping tons of cocaine in cargos via ships and airplanes. As tons of cocaine was being
produced and shipped, the cocaine market became saturated, and conseqently caused the
price of a wholesale kilo to drop from US$60,000 to about US$22,000 dollars (Lee,
1990:18-19). The decrease in price also reveals that DTOs are not economic cartels,
because if they were, DTO leaders would have successfully colluded to rig wholesale
prices so that prices remained high. As the cocaine market became more saturated and
profits decreased, divisions among traffickers began to develop and the subtle
cooperation established during MAS trafficker summits dwindled.73
Wars between drug trafficking organizations were not new events among
Colombian traffickers. Pablo Escobar’s explanation of why cigarette smugglers in the
1970s fought each other, is very reminiscent of the late 1980s wars between the Medellin
and Cali DTOs
(The Marlboro cigarette war) It started because Don Alfredo would bring in so many trucks, Don
Alberto would bring in other trucks, and Jaime Cardona would bring in some other trucks. The
cigarettes would be placed in the market and because the saturation of product everyday was
higher, the competition increased, the price would go down and everyone would lose money. So,
the first bullets started flying. As a consequence, the business started heating up…(Castro, 1996, p.
289).

The cigarette war led many traffickers who had startled to dabble in the cocaine trade to
become full-time cocaine traffickers because more money was to be made in the cocaine
trade as compared to the importation of smuggled cigarettes. Ironically, Pablo Escobar’s
explanation for the cause of the cigarette war, that market saturation caused “the
73

It should also be mentioned that the explanation mainly offered here is the political-economic version of
the rupture between Colombian DTOs. Other more sociological reasons for the break-up suggest that the
disagreements over women and conflicts among lesser dealers (ajuste de cuentas) resulted in the violent
conflict between Medellin and Cali DTO leaders (Legarda, 2004, p. 99-101; Chaparro, 2005, p. 212).
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Marlboro War,” he and other traffickers essentially repeated the very same economic
missteps with the cocaine market. Cocaine traffickers in the 1980s flooded the market by
sending cocaine in large shipments, which in turn, eventually led to a drop in the price of
wholesale cocaine as the drug became more readily available in U.S. markets. Instead of
dealing with the fact that the cocaine market had saturated, DTO leaders based in
Medellin and Cali started fighting over market share. Also, in similar fashion, some
traffickers sought to expand into opium poppy and heroin production, as an alternative to
the cocaine trade. Because of plummeting wholesale prices, it is believed that Pablo
Escobar tried to collude prices with Cali based traffickers to attempt to increase profits;
however, the Rodriguez Orejuelas did not agree that Escobar should become the sole
leader of the mafia group (Chaparro, 2005, p. 213). Since they did not come to an
economic agreement, a war between DTOs ensued.
The economic explanation for the divisions between Medellin and Cali based
DTO leaders can be easily measured because of the negative change in the price of
wholesale cocaine as a result of market saturation. Other explanations of the rift between
the two organizations rely on the personal characteristics of DTO leaders. Most accounts
suggest that Pablo Escobar was not as tolerant with Cali based DTO leaders, as the Ochoa
brothers were, mainly because Escobar had a different philosophy on the use of political
violence than the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, who were the major players among Cali
DTOs (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 336-337; Castillo, 1991, p. 27; Giraldo, 2005, p. 44;
Chaparro, 2005, p. 215). Most information on Medellin and Cali DTOs suggest that the
Ochoa brothers and the Rodriguez Orejuelas shared a similar philosophy towards politics
and authorities, which consisted on minimizing the use of violence and maximizing the
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use of campaign contributions to politicians and bribes to public officials in order to
benefit their business interests. Evidence of business and personal affinities between the
Ochoa brothers and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers is their co-ownership of the First
Inter-America’s Bank, their investments and vacationing in Spain, and their legal
cooperation (they were simultaneously apprehended in Spain and the U.S. government
asked for their extradition for drug trafficking). In addition to their joint business ventures,
the Ochoas and the Rodriguez Orejuelas had the same philosophy on politics and
violence. They never ran for political office like other Medellin-based DTO leaders did,
and tried to distance themselves from any use of political violence on government
officials. The use of violence, by the Ochoas and the Rodriguez Orejuelas, was mostly
limited to the drug business. The Ochoa brothers did use political violence and formed
paramilitary groups like MAS, but the violence was applied to non-governmental actors
like the M-19 guerrillas, when this group kidnapped their sister.
Escobar’s ambition to dominate the U.S. market and his unilateral and
incremental use of violence against government officials—starting with the 1983
assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Colombia’s Minister of Justice—soured relations
between him and other Colombian DTO leaders. According to journalist Camilo
Chaparro, while both, Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela were jailed in Spain,
Pablo Escobar had taken over some of the Rodriguez Orejuelas’ routes, imposed a system
of taxes onto other traffickers, and charged for the use of routes. Whereas traffickers such
as Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder agreed to Escobar’s terms, traffickers
based in Cali were not pleased with Escobar’s demands and fought him (Chaparro,
2005:211-212).
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Philosophical disagreements between Medellin and Cali DTOs over markets and
the use of violence escalated to such a degree that violent confrontations erupted
throughout Colombia. The escalation resulted in the January 13th 1988 bombing of the
apartment building, Edificio Monaco, where Escobar’s family lived. In retaliation, Pablo
Escobar bombed a chain of pharmacies called Drogas La Rebaja owned by the
Rodriguez Orejuelas throughout Colombia. The Ochoa brothers and Jose Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha tried to mediate between Escobar and the Rodriguez Orejuelas to no
avail (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 337; Castillo, 1991, p. 257; Interviews - Juan David
Ochoa, 2000; Chaparro, 2005, p. 214), until a truce was finally negotiated during 1990
and 1991 in preparation for the 1990 elections of assemblypersons to the National
Constitutional Assembly. Traffickers believed that their biggest concern that year was to
concentrate resources to obtain a legal ban on the extradition of nationals in the new
constitution, so DTO leaders in Cali and Medellin negotiated a truce (Castillo, 1991, p.
253-258; Rodriguez, 2007, p. 201). The eventual death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 put an
end to the DTO market dispute, for obvious reasons. However, Cali DTO leaders only
dominated the U.S. cocaine market for two years until 1995, when Colombian authorities
apprehended them. Their capture led other up-and-coming DTOs, such as the traffickers
based in the Norte del Valle,74 to emerge and challenge Cali DTO leaders’ control over
market share (Castillo, 1997; Chaparro, 2005, p. 212).
In sum, the creation of MAS is politically and economically significant because it
shows the ability of traffickers to network and emulate business strategies, but its breakup would provide early clues for the later demise of the loose association of Medellin74

North of Valley, Valle del Cauca is the department where they operate.
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based DTOs. External variables such as: the problem of stateness, reflected in the weak
law enforcement capacity in Colombia and abroad; policymaker indifference to drug
traffic; and high profit incentives found in cocaine traffic due to prohibitionist economic
policies, created a favorable environment for an organization like MAS. As an
organization, MAS was created when major cocaine traffickers were at the peak of their
wealth, during a period, which could be termed as the “Golden Era of Cocaine Traffic” in
Colombia. This era started in 1971 when the “Drug War” was officially created in the
United States, and ended in 1983, when Pablo Escobar was forced to resign from a
congressional post, at which point Escobar waged a war against Colombian political
elites. During this era, and specifically in 1981 when MAS was created, most Colombian
DTO leaders, such as: Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and the Rodriguez Orejuela
brothers based in Cali, were relatively unknown and worked and lived in Colombia
without fear of being apprehended by authorities because none had pending
investigations or charges against them.
Two major factors that led to the demise of MAS are: the drop in price of
wholesale cocaine and different philosophies in the use of violence. The drop in
international prices for cocaine reduced the profit margin for traffickers, which in turn led
to rivalries between DTO leaders as they scrambled to obtain greater international market
share. The proposal to unite all cocaine traffickers under Pablo Escobar to collude prices
was not well received by Cali DTO leaders who wanted to maintain their business
autonomy. Differing philosophies on the use of violence also led to MAS demise. Pablo
Escobar’s ruthlessness in the use of political violence gradually distanced him not only
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from Cali DTO leaders, but also from other traffickers based in Medellin like the Ochoas
–whom preferred managing a business to waging war against the state.
The creation of MAS enhanced economic cooperation between fellow DTO
leaders, and it became an organizational model for coordinating political goals—
primarily for uniting DTO leaders to counteract guerrilla harassment. In the case of MAS,
its creation supports this study’s Hypothesis 1, which states:
Hypothesis 1: Developments in the internal organization of an illicit interest group should follow
changes to its role within a larger political environment.

MAS formation was influenced by external variables: a high profit margin derived from
the illegal cocaine traffic, weak law enforcement in Colombia, and the inability of the
United States to curtail drug traffic. The high earnings derived from prohibitionist
economic policies increased the international price of cocaine and allowed Colombian
traffickers to amass millions of dollars. The high profit margin, derived from cocaine,
allowed traffickers to form and finance militias and print propaganda for MAS.
The formation of MAS also supports Hypothesis 1a, which states:
Hypothesis 1a: Changes to the internal organization and structure of an illicit interest group should
be related and deal with the environmental events that influenced the group, and the changes made
should be collective goods, because they benefit the organization as a whole.

When DTO leaders throughout Colombia decided to create MAS as a counterweight to
guerrilla harassment, DTO leaders create an organization to mitigate environmental
issues that affected their newly acquired lands, their lives, and those of their relatives.
The issue of security became a collective good that the organization wanted to achieve
for the benefit of its membership. Through the formation of MAS, DTO leaders sought
increased security as a collective good that they would enjoy if they employed their
resources in similar fashion to a “crime watch association,” but which had much deadlier
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implications. The MAS pamphlets dispersed in soccer stadiums illustrate the resources in
terms of men and money, which were invested to crackdown on kidnappers and
subversive groups like the Movimiento-19 de Abril (M-19).
The creation of MAS also supports this study’s Hypothesis 2, which tests micro
model. Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 2a: If members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a particular issue.
Members will work together to solve the issue, and the political achievements obtained by the
group will benefit all members.

The issue of insecurity led DTO leaders to unite resources to stop guerrillas from
kidnapping family members and extorting vacunas. Once MAS united and suppressed
the M-19 guerrilla who had kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the M-19 leadership
returned the Ochoa sister. Although M-19 submission directly benefited the Ochoa
brothers, the M-19 submission to and eventual truce with traffickers increased security
for all traffickers because they would no longer be harassed by the M-19—the political
objectives of counteracting guerrillas were achieved and benefited all traffickers.
Hypotheses 2c and 2d, which deal with the demise of a group, explain the
unraveling of MAS as an economic and political agreement among DTO leaders. The
demise of MAS supports this study’s Hypothesis 2c, which relates to the leadership of a
group and its influence on the capacity of a group to impact policy. Hypothesis 2c states:
Hypothesis 2c: When a group has no clear leadership or is unable to impact policy, there will be
little incentive for a group’s leaders to organize and discipline their members.

Since MAS was a loose association of DTO leaders who voluntarily pulled their
resources together, members were not forced to contribute specific amounts of men,
money, or weapons. As a voluntary organization, it did not have a clear leadership or
rules to enforce cooperation from traffickers. Consequently, without intra-organizational
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enforcement mechanisms, MAS can only be considered a moderately cohesive
organization. However, after the return of the Ochoa sister, the organization became
weak and less cohesive. Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) did not create another political
goal, DTO leaders became divided on the use of political violence, and even if the
economic networks that were obtained through MAS continued to exist, the networks
existed until the international wholesale cocaine prices declined and trafficker rivalries
erupted in 1988. Lacking leadership and enforcement mechanisms, once the primary
objectives of the organization were met, MAS gradually lost cohesion.
Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) definitely disbanded when disagreements among
DTO leaders led to wars among Medellin and Cali based DTOs for the control of
domestic and international markets. Hypothesis 2d states:
Hypothesis 2d: When a group has realized a common goal, in periods of transition, consensus
among a group’s membership will decrease and the membership will pursue individual goals,
which may deteriorate the development of a group.

After Colombia’s leading traffickers united through MAS to obtain increased security the
group gradually disbanded. Events like the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla exacerbated differences among traffickers and startled those that would have
preferred to avoid the use violence to influence the political system. Although MAS
increased economic networks among cocaine traffickers, after accomplishing the goal of
suppressing the activities of subversive groups like the M-19, economic cooperation
dwindled. Gradually the economic cooperation deteriorated because increased cocaine
production saturated U.S. cocaine markets and resulted in a decrease in wholesale
cocaine prices. Once the objective of counteracting guerrillas like the M-19 was
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achieved, traffickers concentrated on managing their own businesses and on increasing
their profit margins.
The following discussion on the economic and political cohesion of Medellinbased traffickers will show that the creation of the group Los Extraditables, to ban the
extradition of nationals to the United States, corrected MAS’ weaknesses.
Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs
Medellin-based DTO leaders actively participated in MAS as a national
organization that enhanced economic networks among traffickers and operated as a
paramilitary organization to stop guerrilla harassment. Whereas MAS operated
politically between the years 1981 to 1982, individual DTO leaders engaged in
mainstream political pursuits especially during the years 1981-1983. The following
section on economic and political cohesion will explain how individual DTOs influence
mainstream politics and why the group Los Extraditables emerged.
Economic Cohesion
The economic cohesion of individual DTOs based in Medellin not only allowed
DTOs to function as profit making organizations, but also allowed DTO leaders to
become economically influential actors in politics. The discussion will analyze the
cohesion of DTOs as profit making businesses.
As business entities designed to make profit, the different Medellin DTOs had at
least six main divisions. It was possible for one organization to take care of all the levels
of the process, but based on trafficker accounts, the beginning of cocaine trade in
Colombia involved a high degree of specialization where different organizations
specialized only in one aspect of the business. When Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and
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Rodriguez Gacha started in the drug trade each participant would specialize in one aspect
of the business, but as these entrepreneurs became wealthy they created organizations
that encompassed all levels of the business. On the basis of the criminal diagrams of
Medellin DTOs (Castillo, 1987) and economic studies like that of Francisco Thoumi’s
(Thoumi, 1994, p. 140-150), all-encompassing organizations like that of Pablo Escobar
occasionally outsourced stages of production from smaller more specialized
organizations. Thoumi suggests that because traffickers needed to avoid authorities, the
need for secrecy was a major factor that created business specialization. For major
traffickers, it was convenient to have different divisions be unaware of the rest of the
business. As such, if authorities discovered one part of the business, the other parts
would not be affected. Juan David Ochoa in an interview granted to PBS’s Frontline not
only confirmed Thoumi’s belief, but also illustrated why Colombian DTOs were not
economic cartels. According to Juan David Ochoa three major methods existed to send a
shipment. The first method involved subcontracting the upstream aspect of the business.
So once the processed cocaine was bought, the trafficker would only pay for the
downstream aspect of the business—the shipment and selling of wholesale cocaine. The
second method consisted of outsourcing all of the stages, so the shipment would simply
be an investment for the trafficker. The third method avoided subcontracting, so the
trafficker through his/her full service DTO paid for all costs involved in producing
processed cocaine and in shipping the wholesale product:
I had several ways of doing this. One was to buy the cocaine and to send it the way I explained,
and my partner would sell it there. The other way would be to have your own lab where you
would process it. You'd have your own way of transporting it, a plane or a boat or something like
that. You send it at your own cost. Another way, you'd end up having to subcontract with other
people to do the different stages, like processing, transport, and the transfer of sales to the person
that you had contracted in the United States. (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).
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The statement implies that various organizations were involved in the production of
wholesale cocaine, which confirms that experienced DTOs like that of Escobar, the
Ochoa brothers, or Rodriguez Gacha could not control the supply cocaine like an
economic cartel would. In fact, if DTOs could not outsource certain aspects of the
business it would be hard for them to stay in business, in the event that authorities were
successful in confiscating their own downstream and/or upstream business divisions.
Since DTOs needed flexibility to stay one step ahead of authorities, contingency plans
and the use of subcontractors were ways to keep the business “on the move.” A case in
point was the seizure and destruction of the processing lab Tranquilandia in 1984. The
lab was a cooperative owned by several traffickers75 in the early 1980s. When authorities
took over, those same traffickers that lost their investment recovered loses by processing
cocaine in other labs or buying processed cocaine from third parties and shipping it to
salvage loses:
Jorge Ochoa: A lot of people were part owners (of Tranquilandia). Lots of people worked
there… Everybody who wanted to buy a kilo or who had a kilo or who wanted to bring it from
Bolivia, or from Ecuador--they would bring it to Tranquilandia and process it there. . . . But it
wasn't like Tranquilandia had an owner. Everybody who wanted something would have access to
this supermarket. So Tranquilandia was a sort of . . . a cooperative among several people…
Frontline: The DEA and the Colombian police had never seen such a laboratory. How big of a
blow was its loss to the cocaine business? Jorge Ochoa: I don't think it affected the traffic much.
There were many other labs all over the country, in many places. . . . (Interviews - Jorge Ochoa,
2000).
Juan David Ochoa: The initial owner of Tranquilandia was Gonzalo Rodriguez [Gacha], the
Mexican. We had a part in that lab. It was very important because it was a bridge between
Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. You could very easily process the cocaine there, because it was in
the middle of a jungle where it was very difficult to go. There was no other way to go but by
plane… (Tranquilandia) became very popular, very well known, and so there came a moment
when authorities destroyed it. They confiscated it. It was well known that it existed, that it was a
very large lab through which a lot of coca paste entered. You didn't just process coca there. It
75

Tranquilandia is popularly known as having a single owner—Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, however,
trafficker interviews like those conducted by Frontline reveal that Tranquilandia was actually a cooperative
where several traffickers were part owners of this large-scale cocaine refinery.
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was also a bridge for other coca that was processed in other labs; because the airstrip was very
large and very good for the airplanes . . . (After the destruction of Tranquilandia) Each of us on
our own kept doing our own thing. We never did anything together as a society again… to set
something like this up, in the middle of the jungle, is incredibly expensive. We might have lost
around $5 million or $10 million, something like that... But there were laboratories all over the
place. There were a lot of people who could sell the cocaine that was ready. So we stopped
processing the cocaine directly, and we had to buy the cocaine through third parties that were
producing . . . (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).

Although traffickers like the Ochoa brothers claim that there was no “official”
association of traffickers, a good level of coordination by a group of traffickers had to
exist to organize a shipment and to form networks that would “spread the word” around
about business needs such as: shipment financing, getting raw material, information on
authority operations, and especially about international routes, among other needs.
According to the Ochoa brothers, “there was no group or association that was ‘the cartel
of Medellin’… There were groups of people that were friends of course, but… it wasn't
an association or anything like that (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).” Business
ventures like Tranquilandia were called a cooperative by Jorge Ochoa (Interviews Jorge Ochoa, 2000), but regardless the name chosen for DTO coordination, the comments
by the Ochoa brothers on the illicit drug business suggests that DTO leaders had to have
good networks of communication with other DTO leaders to help each other on business
matters.
“Full service” DTOs like those headed by Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa Brothers, and
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha had six divisions of which 4 were business related and 2
divisions dealt with politics. The first division of a DTO was in charge of getting the raw
material for making cocaine. The second division refined the coca paste to cocaine. The
third division packed and transported the cocaine to the United States and Europe. The
fourth division of the business picked up the wholesale shipment and sold it to U.S.
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retailers, and then returned the money directly to Colombian traffickers via airplanes or
via international money laundering mechanisms. The fifth division of the business dealt
with security issues. Finally, the sixth division was the legal and administrative division.
Individual “full service” DTOs had to be cohesive enough to coordinate all the
divisions of labor, but, again, in the event that authorities caught one or some of their
divisions, DTO leaders could still have the flexibility to outsource a service. The only
divisions that were difficult to outsource were the security and the legal/administrative
divisions. These divisions required very loyal personnel due to the violent activities
security providers had to engage in. Loyalty was highly valued in the
legal/administrative division because of the legal and economic importance of the
information handled by the staff.
When the cocaine business started, traffickers motivated by the opportunity to
make an enormous profit tried to create economically cohesive organizations for
exporting cocaine. However, the different divisions of the illicit drug business had a
logical orientation towards producing cocaine and collecting profit, but economically
speaking this was a hard business to coordinate in a true cohesive manner because its
illegal nature kept the business constantly moving and the profit margins constantly
changed. According to Francisco Thoumi, the drug business was unable to set profit
margins or to market its drugs, through the creation of brands, to target key customers
like legal businesses, because the business’s illegality kept the divisions ready for
constant change. The need to keep ahead of authorities was more important than creating
marketing strategies, so DTOs were cohesive enough to make profit and ‘keep on the
move,’ but had low marketing cohesion. Compared to legal businesses, which could last
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hundreds of years, the economic cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs only lasted at most
10 years, without major disruptions to their trade.
Economic organizational control can exist though discipline and selective
incentives. In a business organization the overall incentive is to make profit. Former
DTO employees interviewed for this project readily mentioned that profit was the major
incentive for working in a DTO. Members of a DTO, from the coca farmer to the mafia
boss, were driven by economic incentives. The desire to make money made the
organization work. For example, if a raspachin was contracted to work for 3 to 4 months
planting and scraping coca leaves in a remote location, he expected that at the end of the
job he would get paid. The expectation of payment by all DTO employees drove their
labor, so payment was a positive material incentive, especially when employees were
paid higher than average wages for similar work in legal sectors.
However, if one of the divisions did not work as it was intended in this illicit
industry, negative selective incentives such as, intimidation and violence forced the
system to work. The reason familial, friendship, neighborhood, or community ties, were
important qualifications for workers involved in this industry was because such ties were
a basis of interpersonal trust, which were built on a system of reciprocity. If the workers
knew each other it was believed that they would not betray each other. The logic in this
relationship was that individuals in this labor force could be trusted to do their jobs,
primarly because several people vouched for an individual’s behavior. If an individual
did not follow through, he/she would be punished, but since the DTO knew who the
individual’s family was and where said family it lives, violent reprisals could also affect
the individual’s family members and this threat theoretically kept the individual in check.
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Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) insured economic cohesion through the
use of intimidation, but the use of violence if not used cautiously could disturb business
and draw the attention of authorities. For this reason, if a DTO wanted to earn profit, it
was in their economic benefit to cooperate, keep violence at a minimum, and to keep a
low profile to avoid authorities. Inter-personal trust was important because if all actors
wanted to forge long lasting working relationships in the future, they created reciprocal
working relationships of trust among employees. Trust reduced the transaction costs of
looking for new personnel every time a crop needs harvesting or of looking for new
buyers when for example coca paste dealers want to sell products. If a coca paste dealer
did not pay his farmers, he/she would most likely forgo future earnings because farmers
would not work for someone who steals wages. If farmers failed to produce output, they
would not be contracted in the future. If a cocaine refiner did not pay paste dealers, aside
from using violence to resolve the impasse, the paste dealers in all probability would not
use that refiner in the future.
Throughout the different stages of cocaine production armed personnel supervised
transactions between the different divisions within a DTO to prevent divisions from
cheating, since large amounts of money were involved. As the cocaine business was not
legal, courts did not resolve business disputes and conflicts were resolved through
violence. Again, the weakness in the Colombian government’s law enforcement
capabilities allowed DTOs to use violence on a regular basis without fear of government
persecution. Although a high level of intimidation has existed in the drug trade, it is in the
economic benefit of all actors involved that transactions run smoothly so that authorities
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are kept at bay and more durable as well as reliable trade relations among divisions can
be achieved.
In sum, the discussion on economic cohesion found that DTO leaders created forprofit organizations that were flexible and well prepared for change. A DTO’s ability to
master different methods for exporting cocaine allows trafficking organizations to: avoid
authorities, and recover loses in case authorities do happen to confiscate or discover a
division in the trade network. Also the flexibility of DTOs to outsource the different
divisions of cocaine production shows: that a high degree of specialization exists, that
many organizations are involved in the business, that these organizations communicate,
and that it is difficult for one DTO to control other organizations. The need of a DTO to
be flexible by outsourcing production to avoid authorities counters the idea that DTOs are
economic cartels that can control the supply of drugs. Finally, the need for DTOs to
constantly change to keep ahead of authorities leads to short-lived businesses, because
these organizations cannot plan for constant profit margins or marketing strategies that
could extend the business’s lifespan. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) can only
hope to avoid authorities to continue profiting from the cocaine trade.
Second, the discussion found that even though DTO employees are driven by
profits, interpersonal trust and violence are tools that ensure discipline and organizational
cohesion. Employees are motivated to do their jobs in a DTO because they enjoy the
material economic benefit from working in a DTO, more so than expressive or solidary
benefits. Though workers may know each other because of familial ties, illicit drug
industry employees do not join a DTO to enjoy the expressive benefit of feeling
satisfaction from refining cocaine. But overall, interviews conducted with former DTO
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employees sustain that money is the main incentive that drives the drug trafficking
machinery. Most members of a DTO do not join to receive solidary benefits, where they
feel satisfied because they are forming relationships with other members of the group.
Gang members living in marginal neighborhoods, who work as sicarios or bodyguards,
are the most likely among DTO employees to receive solidary benefits from belonging to
a gang because they feel part of a community. Otherwise, DTO profits motivate
individuals to join a group.
Finally, this section on economic cohesion argues that interpersonal trust and the
use of violence are necessary to ensure discipline and organizational cohesion.
Employing family and friends in a DTO reduces the risk that employees will betray an
organization by turning to authorities. The employment of family and friends can also be
used as a way to coerce a person into following orders, since a DTO employee knows
that if they make a mistake his/her family is at risk. Interpersonal trust reduces the need
to use violence and ensures longer future relationships with employees and different
DTOs. Finally, if the desire to make profit and interpersonal trust fails to motivate a
DTO employee to follow DTO rules, the use of violence functions as a coercive method
to ensure discipline and group cohesion.
Political Cohesion
As business organizations, the ideological objective of individual Medellin-based
DTOs was primarily capitalist—to make profit and reduce risks. However, during the
1980s traffickers like Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha, and other traffickers associated with Medellin trafficking networks
also had direct and indirect political ambitions. The DTO leaders became interested in
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politics because as they became extraordinarily wealthy they also desired to become
political elites. At first Medellin-based DTO leaders pursued individual political projects,
but as time progressed the separate political projects converged and became focused on
overturning the 1979 Treaty on Extradition. The political cohesion of Medellin-based
DTOs can be divided into three major periods. The first period dates from the 1981 to
1983 and it is marked by the direct participation of DTO leaders in electoral politics.
During this period the political goals of traffickers differed in agenda and strategy, so it is
a period with limited political cohesion. The second period dates October 20th 1983, to
June of 1991. In this period Medellin-based DTO leaders increasingly unified their
political agenda to nullify the Extradition Treaty. DTO leaders continued to influence
electoral politics, but indirectly, through their sponsorship of anti-extradition candidates.
Overall during this second period, the strategy of Medellin-based DTOs increasingly
became violent and the creation of the terrorist group Los Extraditables in late 1984 best
expresses the increased degree of cohesion among most DTO leaders. Finally, the period
from 1991-1993 marks the organizational disintegration of Los Extraditables. This final
period was paradoxical, since DTO leaders reveled in the 1991 constitutional ban on
extradition, but simultaneously the organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO
leaders dwindled. The following discussion details how the political cohesion of
Medellin-based traffickers evolved as their need to overturn the 1979 U.S.-Colombian
Treaty of Extradition increased.
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1981-1983
At the same time that Medellin-based DTO leaders were involved in the creation
of paramilitary groups, like MAS to counterbalance the power of guerrillas, many DTO
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leaders were participating in Colombia’s electoral process. One could claim that
Medellin-based DTO leaders were involved in electoral politics before 1981, however,
most journalistic records only report the political involvement of Medellin DTO leaders
from 1981 onward. In preparation for the 1982 electoral year, traffickers based in
Medellin began sponsoring politicians and in some cases launching their personal
political campaigns. Even though individual traffickers were active participants in
elections, DTO leaders did not unite their political agendas nor focus solely on
overturning the 1979 Extradition Treaty. One concludes that each DTO leader had
separate political objectives, although some political campaigns had similarities in
agenda issues.
Pablo Escobar’s strategy for the 1982 elections was to sponsor a few powerful
local and national level candidates and to run for office. His objective was to run as an
alternate for a congressional seat headed by Jairo Ortega Ramirez while he also
sponsored the senatorial candidacy of Alberto Santofimio Botero, who was already a
major leader within the Liberal Party. Escobar’s agenda was populist and vague,
exemplified by a proposal to sponsor sports. In 1982 Pablo Escobar succeeded in
obtaining the votes for his candidates and became an elected congressional alternate, but
his political career ended on October 20th 1983 when his congressional immunity was
removed because he was accused of being a drug trafficker. After this fiasco, Pablo
Escobar’s strategy became focused on overturning the 1979 Extradition Treaty by waging
a war against political elites.
Carlos Lehder’s electoral strategy was similar to Pablo Escobar’s because he was
public about his political aspirations. Lehder sponsored politicians for the 1982 general
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elections and for the 1984 local elections in the Department of Quindío. For the 1982
elections, Lehder, Escobar, Rodriguez Gacha, and the Ochoa brothers contributed funds
to the campaigns of the presidential candidates representing the Liberal and Conservative
Parties, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur, respectively. In contrast to
Pablo Escobar’s vague campaign agenda, Carlos Lehder’s was very vocal about opposing
the extradition of nationals. In 1983 Lehder openly admitted in television and radio
interviews that his wealth came from illicit businesses. Later, during the 1986 general
elections, Lehder continued to sponsor politicians and even ran for a congressional post,
until he was arrested and extradited on February of that year.
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha’s participation in electoral politics concentrated in
sponsoring politicians with anti-extradition and anti-insurgent agendas, who were based
in Colombian’s Magdalena Medio region. Rodriguez Gacha was also outspoken against
politicians who favored extradition and later in 1986 Gacha admitted his wealth came
from drug trafficking while being interviewed for a television show with journalist
German Castro Caycedo (Castillo, 1987, p. 89).
The Ochoa brothers, Jorge, Juan David, and Fabio, were very discreet about their
political activities. According to George Jung, who was Carlos Lehder’s business
associate, the Ochoa’s were important within trafficking circles because they knew many
politicians (Streatfield, 2001). During the Liberal Party Convention of 1982 it is widely
reported that the Ochoa brothers, along with rest of the Medellin-based DTO leaders, met
the Liberal presidential candidate, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, and bought raffle tickets to
sponsor the candidacy (Salazar, 2001, p. 95; Lopez et al., 2001, p. 142).
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On the basis of early electoral participation of the Medellin DTO leaders
examined here, the early involvement of DTO leaders in electoral politics had little
organizational cohesion. The different DTO leaders had their own political agendas and
sponsored politicians in their geographical areas of influence. The only event during this
period in which the participation of Medellin DTO leaders overlaps is in their
sponsorship of the 1982 Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur presidential campaigns.
Before October 20th 1983, the date in which Pablo Escobar is forced to resign from his
congressional post, most DTO leaders (with the exception of Carlos Lehder) hardly
mention their opposition to the 1979 Treaty on Extradition. It is only after Escobar is
criminally investigated and the Congress lifts his congressional immunity that traffickers
begin to publicly admit their involvement in the illicit drug industry, admit their
opposition to extradition, and become more cohesive in sponsoring anti-extradition
politicians. From 1983 to 1991 DTO leaders located in Medellin would continue to use
the electoral process as way to influence policy. However, instead of running direct
personal campaigns, traffickers would fund the campaigns of politicians that would run
with an anti-extradition platform. The following section on representativeness will
further discuss the electoral influence of Medellin-based DTO leaders.
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1983-1991
From 1983 to 1991 the organizational cohesion of DTO leaders increased.
Traffickers used a combination of three major strategies to influence policymakers. The
first consisted of disputing the validity of the 1979 Treaty on Extradition through the
judicial process. The second strategy was a legislative strategy that consisted of
sponsoring anti-extradition politicians to congress and the National Constitutional
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Assembly (NCA). Finally, the third and most dominant strategy consisted of resorting to
violence as a way to coerce policymakers into overturning the extradition treaty and
negotiating a legalization of their criminal status. To accomplish this last strategy,
leaders of Medellin-based DTOs created the group Los Extraditables.
Judicial Strategy
The first strategy pursued by Medellin-based DTO leaders was to block the
implementation of the 1979 Treaty on Extradition by questioning its constitutional
validity. Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) leaders hired legal teams headed by
Guido Parra and Humberto Buitrago for this purpose (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa,
2000; Legarda, 2005, p. 79). On July of 1985, a lawyer Javier Hernando Hernandez filed
a suit questioning the constitutional validity of Law 27th of 1980, which integrated the
1979 Extradition Treaty into Colombia’s legal code. However, legal proceedings were
interrupted because on November 6th 1985, the leftist M-19 guerrilla attacked the Palace
of Justice, where Colombia’s Supreme Court was housed. Eleven justices were killed as
a result of the initial M-19 attack and the ensuing battle between guerrillas and the
military. After the debacle, Colombia’s Supreme Court proceedings were stunted for a
year, since it was difficult to replace the Court’s 24 justices. Moreover, many qualified
judges and lawyers felt intimidated by the rise in violence and did not want to risk their
lives and those of their families76 (Lee, 1990, p. 121-126). In addition to the 1985 M-19
attack, judges investigating trafficking related cases were threatened or assassinated. All
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During the period 1984 to 1986 several assassinations were geared at judges to intimidate the legal
community. Among the assassinated judges are: Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil on July 1985, Penal
Customs Judge Carmencita Londoño Rojas on May 1986, the assassination of Hernán Baquero Borda, an
Colombian Supreme Court Justice on July 1986, and Superior Court Judge Gustavo Zuluaga Bernal on
October 1986 (Lee, 1990; Castillo, 1991; Escobar: Escobar: 17 años, 1993).
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of these events played in to the hands of DTO leaders because the implementation of the
Treaty on Extradition was blocked.
By December of 1986, 24 new justices were selected and they had to oversee the
year and a half old judicial case that questioned the constitutionality of the 1979
Extradition Treaty between Colombia and the United States. The Supreme Court of
Colombia ruled that the Treaty was invalid because then President Julio Cesar Turbay
Ayala, as Chief of Government and the ultimate authority regarding international matters,
did not sign the treaty himself (Kavass, 1990, p. 158-162). Instead, his Minister of
Government, German Zea Hernandez, signed the Treaty into law as Law 27 of 1980.
Consequently, the court ruled that Minister of Government German Zea Hernandez did
not have the necessary international jurisdiction because this role was solely assigned to
the President, so on the basis of the technicality, the 1979 Treaty on Extradition was
invalidated on December 12th 1986.
The DTO legal victory was spoiled when President Virgilio Barco, who had
originally negotiated the Extradition Treaty with the United States as part of the Turbay
Ayala administration, issued Decree Law 68 of 1986 on December 14th 1986 in order to
continue extraditing drug traffickers to the United States. Again, the Colombian Supreme
Court had to decide the constitutional validity of the decree, and it took half a year for the
court to make a decision. In the meantime, Carlos Lehder was the only trafficker
extradited through Decree Law 68 on February 4th 1987, the same day that he was
captured by Colombian authorities.
Once the Supreme Court was ready to decide on the validity of Decree Law 68 of
1986, the justices were tied 12 to 12 and had to appoint a special justice to break the tie.
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Once again, because of the high level of fear among the legal community, as a result of
the ongoing assassination of judges, eligible judges did not want to serve as justices, so
the first three individuals nominated for the interview process declined the nomination.
Finally, a fourth nominee, Alfonso Suarez de Castro, accepted to serve as a special justice
and broke the tie (Kavass, 1990, p. 162). On June 25th 1987, the Supreme Court
determined that even though the 1979 Extradition Treaty was still internationally viable,
President Virgilio Barco had no ability to launch a decree based on the fact that no
existing domestic law could allow him to implement extraditions. If President Barco
wanted to implement the Treaty he would have to start legislation through Colombian
legislature and have it approved as a law. Since it was believed that members of the
legislature were not going to approve passing a law permitting the extradition of nationals,
the Colombian presidency was unable to extradite drug traffickers to the United States
from 1987 to 1989.77
The judicial strategy was a victory for the Medellin-based DTOs because their
intimidation of judges coupled with the proficiency of their legal experts enabled DTO
leaders to invalidate an international treaty that threatened their safe heaven in Colombia.
Legislative Strategy
The second strategy used during 1983-1991 by Medellin-based DTO leaders
involved participating in Colombia’s legislative process primarily as political campaign
financiers. After 1983 the issue of extradition became the central issue in the political
agenda of Medellin-based DTO leaders and as a result they tried to influence politicians
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In 1989 President Barco extradited four traffickers via decree law (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 221).
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on two major policy options: to permanently overturn extradition and to agree to
favorable terms of surrender.
The DTO support for anti-extradition candidates after 1983 was given in secret,
because of the public outrage against DTOs and as a consequence of their suspected
involvement in the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. The
secrecy made it difficult to link drug traffickers directly to politicians. Also, since
Medellin-based DTO leaders were never arrested or criminally processed for financing
political campaigns, evidence of how much money was donated or which candidates
received DTO support is weak. The only record that exists on these campaign donations
relies on the declarations made by close associates of Medellin-based DTO leaders,
journalist investigations on the link between politicians and traffickers, and allegations
made by U.S. government counter-narcotics officials (Yo acuso, 1994).
It is necessary to make a caveat regarding the issue of extradition and also
regarding whether a person/politician opposed the extradition of Colombians during this
time period. Having an anti-extradition stance did not mean being pro-Drug Trafficking
Organization (DTO). A politician or an individual could oppose the use of extradition on
the desire to uphold Colombia’s sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States and still be
opposed to the existence of drug trafficking organizations. Many Colombians especially
in the period between 1988-1991 were exhausted with the upsurge in overall violence, as
a direct consequence of DTO opposition to the U.S.- Colombia 1979 Extradition Treaty
and inter-DTO wars. Instead of conceding to U.S. foreign policy demands, many
Colombians believed that a domestic solution could be created primarily to solve the
problem of violence by prohibiting extradition and jailing traffickers in Colombian
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prisons. Because of this nationalistic reasoning, it is impossible to say that all politicians
who opposed extradition were DTO representatives and were being directly financed by
DTOs. The latter point was especially true when hard evidence showing DTO electoral
influence was weak since the governments of the time headed by Virgilio Barco and
Cesar Gaviria did not open up thorough official investigations on the corruption
allegations being raised by journalists and U.S. officials (Castillo, 1991; Morales, 1990;
Yo Acuso, 1994). Regardless of whether DTOs funded the campaigns of some or all
anti-extradition politicians of the time, DTOs benefited from the support of antiextradition nationalist politicians because these politicians furthered the DTO’s cause by
placing the debate on the national stage.
Medellin-based DTO legislative influence was made evident by two attempts to
nullify the extradition policy. The first attempt consisted of changing a 1989 legislative
amnesty granted to left-wing guerrillas so that it would simultaneously benefit traffickers.
The second attempt was done either through direct money donations or by financing the
political campaigns of anti-extradition assemblypersons participating at the 1990
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). These assemblypersons would be in charge of
drafting the new 1991 constitution and DTO leaders wanted their representatives to
permanently ban the extradition of Colombian nationals.
The first attempt to abolish the 1979 Extradition Treaty was done during the
1988-89 legislative year in an attempt to pass the 1988 Constitutional Reform. The
Colombian government was in the midst of attempting to demobilize leftist guerrillas by
integrating them into democratic politics and for the purpose demobilizing leftist guerilas
congresspersons created a legislative amnesty. At that time the President of the House of
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Representatives, Norberto Morales Ballesteros (Morales, 1990) and other representatives
created a bill on November of 1989, which would change said political amnesty so that it
would extend amnesty to traffickers. The proposed bill changes would allow traffickers
to negotiate as political actors without fear of being extradited (Castillo, 1991, p. 273;
Salazar, 2001, p. 263-264). These congresspersons proposed a referendum on extradition
and an inclusion of more crimes in the political amnesty so that the amnesty would
therefore apply to traffickers.
Liberal politician, Horacio Serpa, during a speech on the issue of extradition,
accused the 1988-89 legislature of being bribed and politically compromised:
And when bribes (have not worked), it has been the terrible power of crime, the assassinations:
Rodrigo Lara, Luis Carlos Galan, and now Low Murtha. It is evident that there are no guarantees
and that the push to modify this (extradition) law is evident by the pressures that exist and by the
strange environment, which surrounds the Assembly… (Frenada la extradición, 1991).

Serpa’s declarations were corroborated by testimony given by John Jairo Velasquez
Vasquez, Pablo Escobar’s gunman and state witness against ex-Senator Alberto
Santofimio Botero during the Luis Carlos Galan murder case. According to Velasquez
Vasquez, Santofimio Botero was the Medellin-based DTO leaders’ congressional point
man during 1988-1989. The ex-Senator was in charge of giving money to
congresspersons and to constitutional assemblypersons, so that they would legally
prohibit the extradition of nationals during the late 1980s (Legarda, 2005, p. 239).
The organizational cohesion of Medellin DTO leaders was high as they attempted
to influence the 1988-89 Congress into negotiating favorable terms for their surrender.
However, the group’s high level of cohesion failed to provide an amnesty for traffickers,
because pro-extradition congresspersons and the Government Minister Carlos Lemos
Simmonds rejected the proposed legislation. No institution exists in a vacuum and the
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legislature was influenced by the high political violence affecting Colombian cities
during the years 1988 and 1989. Although political violence usually intimidated many
pro-extradition legislators, the public assassination of Presidential Candidate Luis Carlos
Galan on August 18th 1989 was still in the country’s memory and an outraged public
opinion emboldened pro-extradition legislators against Drug Trafficking Organizations
(DTOs). The legislature’s negative vote against Norberto Morales Ballestero’s DTO
Amnesty bill was a vote of protest against DTO violence. Even though newspaper
editorials reflected the public outrage with Morales Ballestero’s bill (Morales, 1990), no
in-depth government investigation was pursued by President Virgilio Barco’s
administration to find out whether DTO leaders bribed congresspersons.
The second attempt at changing the policy on extradition through the use of
legislative mechanisms took place at the 1990 National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).
Once the NCA members were elected, ex-Senator Alberto Santofimio Botero reportedly
distributed amounts ranging from $50,000 to $100,000 dollars to 27 assemblypersons
(Legarda, 2005, p. 239). The pressure of the illicit drug business lobby was significant in
the NCA because in addition to Medellin-based DTOs, many other traffickers especially
those linked to the Cali based DTOs financed the NCA campaigns of assemblypersons so
that they would raise the extradition issue at the NCA and subsequently pass a
constitutional article abolishing extradition (Castillo, 1991). In exchange for trafficker
funds, assemblypersons argued to overturn the 1979 Treaty on Extradition in their
respective NCA committees. They did so by appealing to the nationalist sentiment of
assemblypersons and appealing to Colombia’s public opinion.

149

Again, it is not possible to known with certainty whether all NCA
assemblypersons that argued against extradition received DTO funds because President
Cesar Gaviria’s government did not investigate the allegations made by journalist, proextradition politicians, and U.S. government counter-narcotics officials. Also, nationalist
arguments against the use of extradition were valid in the sense that anti-extradition
assemblypersons were attempting to uphold Colombia’s sovereignty. Many
assemblypersons like Fabio Villa and Oscar Hoyos for the Democratic Alliance M-19, or
like Francisco Rojas Birry, the representative for indigenous peoples, believed that
extradition was an imposition made against Colombian sovereignty by the United States’
government (Torres, 1991),
Francisco Rojas Birry: “No country should renounce its sovereignty, this entails the execution of
its own laws and permitting that its citizens not be judged by foreigners” (La no extradición, 1991)

Characteristically, anti-extradition assemblypersons argued for the passage of an article
to permanently overturn extradition based on three reasons: The first was that it was the
right of a sovereign nation to ban the extradition of nationals. The second reason was
that such a constitutional article would be a positive step for reducing Colombia’s
institutional system since the policy of extradition had had negative effects such as the
increase in violence (Torres, 1991). The final and third argument was that extradition
would violate human rights because the hundred year prison sentences78 that existed in
the United States would make it impossible for a person to become re-adjusted to normal
society after being imprisoned for so long, even if they survived the sentence (Torres,
1991).
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Many legislators cited Carlos Lehder’s case because he was condemned to a life sentence without parole
plus an additional 135 years in prison.
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The second legislative attempt at abolishing the Treaty on Extradition was
successful because on June 19th 1991, after months of debate, the National Constitutional
Assembly permanently abolished the extradition of nationals by a secret vote of 51 to 13.
The legislative strategy was successful because the organizational cohesion of Medellin
DTO leaders not only distributed financial resources to ensure an anti-extradition vote,
but they also pressured the NCA vote with the use of violence. During the NCA debates
the group Los Extraditables was holding journalists hostage and Medellin was suffering a
terrible bout of violence with 1200 homicides and 500 policemen dead just in February of
1991. The malleable public opinion, which had been outraged by the assassination of
Luis Carlos Galan at the end of 1989, was exhausted with violence and optimistic that a
new Constitution would create greater avenues of representation and provide peace by
June 1991.
The legislative process of the NCA initially debated the issue of extradition in
committees before it was brought to a vote in the assembly after almost four months of
debate. Key debate dates, April 18th, May 15th, and June 19th 1991 at the NCA matched
the outcomes of backdoor negotiations that Pablo Escobar was undergoing with President
Cesar Gaviria’s government officials. On April 18th 1991, the first round of
subcommittee discussions on extradition, the subcommittee drafted an anti-extradition
article to be voted on and on April 22nd Pablo Escobar agreed to surrender to authorities
and confess to a crime. On May 15th 1991, the subcommittee on extradition voted to
approve an anti-extradition constitutional article that would be sent to the general
assembly (Frenada la extradición, 1991) and on May 24th Los Extraditables released
Francisco Santos who was the last journalist to be held hostage. Finally, on June 19th the
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NCA voted to abolish the extradition of nationals and on the same date Pablo Escobar
surrendered to authorities.
Violent Strategy
The third concurrent strategy implemented by Medellin-based DTO leaders
during 1983-1991 was the incremental use of violence to influence policy. Medellin
DTO leaders organized as Los Extraditables to coerce politicians into permanently
overturning extradition and to legalize their status by negotiating favorable terms of
surrender.
The group Los Extraditables was first mentioned in Colombia’s major
newsmagazine Semana on August 1st 1983 (El destape, 1983). According to Semana, the
group Los Extraditables signed anti-extradition messages that appeared as massive
newspaper ads, bought during a 1983 media campaign against the 1979 Treaty of
Extradition. In the article, Semana attributed the authorship of the anti-extradition ads to
Carlos Lehder for two reasons: First, because the ads matched the populist-fascist
ideology prevalent in Lehder’s own political movement, Movimiento Civico Latino
Nacional. Second, because Semana editors also matched the 1981 pamphlets signed by
Carlos Lehder for the group Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS). On July 1983 Carlos
Lehder revealed in a morning radio interview with journalist Juan Guillermo Rios that he
was a “mafioso,” consequently Semana editors felt compelled to write a brief biography
to explain Carlos Lehder’s bizarre ideology and his link to Los Extraditables and MAS,
as he was a self-confessed trafficker:
Juan Guillermo Rios: Mr. Lehder in all reality, for some time now it is said throughout
Colombia’s central region that… you are a ‘mafioso,’ please excuse that we ask you such a
question in such a frontal manner, but we would like to know your position and that is why we are
interviewing you…
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Carlos Lehder: I don’t deny that I have participated in Colombia’s great bonanza, but I also don’t
deny that we (the country) are enjoying a monetary amnesty, in which many “hot monies” may
have entered (the economy) (El destape, 1983).

In this radio interview Carlos Lehder accepted the journalist’s accusation and
incriminated the government by being frank about the “double standard” held in society,
where ‘mafiosos’ were considered pariahs while the government unintendedly enjoyed
the dollar reserves that it received as a result of manipulating economic monetary
policy.79 The Semana writers seemed astonished at Carlos Lehder’s blunt honesty and
Semana’s first analysis on Los Extraditables explained the group’s anti-extradition
message and linked the issue of extradition to drug traffickers. Although this article is
the first mention of Los Extraditables in the Colombian media, the group would not
launch its first official communiqué until November 15th 1984.
A series of four events led to the official launch of the first communiqué by Los
Extraditables on November 15th 1984. The first event was Pablo Escobar’s forced
retirement from Congress on October 23rd 1983. After this event, it was evident to DTO
leaders that they could not openly participate in the political system as political
candidates. To influence policy DTO leaders changed strategies. As a consequence,
besides sponsoring anti-extradition politicians and influencing the judicial process, DTO
leaders began using violence. The shift towards violence led DTO leaders to behave less
like mainstream candidates or interest groups, and more like armed political movements
or terrorist groups.
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The Colombian governments periodically practice “reformas tributarias” where the central bank buys
dollars to stabilize the value of its currency vis-à-vis the dollar. Lehder was alluding to the fact that some of
the dollars come from the black market and are usually derived from cocaine sales.

153

The second event that led to the launch of Los Extraditables, and shook
Colombia’s political system, was the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla on April 20th 1984. Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, during the years 1983 and 1984, was
the first high-ranking government official to aggressively pursue cocaine traffickers by:
opening closed criminal investigations, grounding trafficker planes, and seizing the
industrial-size cocaine refineries. The seizure of the refinery Tranquilandia on March
10th 1984 was praised in international news. However, as a consequence of this seizure,
criminal investigations revealed that Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was harassed by DTOs,
because his telephone was wiretapped and he received death threats. Finally, on April
30th 1984, gunmen linked to Medellin-based DTOs assassinated Rodrigo Lara Bonilla
and this event marked the first time that DTOs would use political violence to express
their discontent with the government’s extradition and counter-narcotics policy.80 It
would also lead to the implementation of the Extradition Treaty by the Belisario Betancur
Presidency.
The third and fourth events that led to the official launch of Los Extraditables was
the implementation of extradition by Colombian authorities and the arrest of Jorge Luis
Ochoa in Spain. The assassination of Lara Bonilla was significant because the
Colombian government felt compelled to pursue DTOs. Consequently, Belisario
Betancur’s government reversed its policy on extradition and placed extradition as the
main tool to punish known traffickers. The implementation of the extradition treaty
placed extradition atop of DTO leader agendas. Juan David Ochoa conveys, on a
80

Most evidence suggests that Pablo Escobar was the sole author of Lara Bonilla’s assassination and only
one gunman, an eighteen-year-old Byron Velazquez Arenas, was arrested and convicted to 15 years of jail
time. The second gunman died while fleeing the crime and Colombian authorities linked both assassins to
gunmen organizations in Medellin.
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televised interview with PBS’s Frontline, how this event became a turning point in the
lives of traffickers since the fear of being persecuted and extradited became a reality:
Juan David Ochoa: Since the pressure after Lara Bonilla, the persecution was so hard against us
and our families. We thought it was a very dark future for us, so we decided that the best thing
would be to leave the business alone. We proposed this to ex-President Lopez, but that had no
answer…
Frontline: What did extradition mean to you?
Juan David Ochoa: Extradition was something that we thought was very grave for us. If
someone would extradite you, that would be like being buried alive. We respected and feared
extradition… very much (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa, 2000).

Because of the government clamp down and the potential threat that extradition posed for
major traffickers, Medellin DTO leaders fled to Panama and on May 26th 1984 held
negotiations with Colombian government’s Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gomez and
former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (Eddy et al., 1988, p. 299; Castillo, 1987;
Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000).
This first negotiation united Colombian drug traffickers and it led DTO leaders to
propose to dismantle their cocaine businesses, which at the time controlled 70-80 percent
of the world’s cocaine trade. In exchange, traffickers wanted the Colombian government
to grant them an amnesty to avoid being extradited to the United States (Eddy et al., 1988,
p. 299; Clawson et al., 1996, p. 103). The Betancur government rejected the trafficker
proposal because it believed that its justice system could pursue arrests and extradite the
traffickers responsible for Lara Bonilla’s death. On July of 1984 the Betancur
government signed U.S. government extradition requests and arrested the first traffickers
whom were extradited on January of 1985. On July 19th 1984, U.S. Federal Judge
Herbert Shapiro issued an arrest warrant for Pablo Escobar and Jorge Luis Ochoa to
begin the process of extradition to the United States, as a direct response to the
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assassination of Barry Seal, cocaine pilot turned DEA informant. The arrest warrant had
a menacing effect on traffickers because they were officially being accused of a crime in
the United States, which may lead to their eventual extradition.
Since the Belisario Betancur government refused the DTO leaders’ Panama
proposal, the leadership of Medellin-based DTOs dispersed to other countries like
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Spain, and Brazil, and later in 1984, as the government abated its
pursuit, most traffickers returned to Colombia. The only exception was Jorge Luis Ochoa,
who was the only major trafficker, based in Medellin, who did not return to Colombia
because he was arrested on November 15th 1984 in Spain. As a consequence of his arrest,
Ochoa had to await legal proceedings in Spain because the United States government
placed an extradition request for him and Cali based trafficker Gilberto Rodriguez
Orejuela.
The time period from April 20th 1983 to November of 1984 was a period of
drastic change for Medellin-based DTO leaders, as it marked the end of cocaine
trafficking’s “golden years.” Drug Trafficking Organization leaders would have to worry
for the first time about being pursued by Colombian and international authorities. The
culmination of these four events—the inability to openly participate in Colombia’s
political system, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s assassination, the implementation of extradition
by authorities, and the Jorge Luis Ochoa arrest in Spain—made the issue of extradition
the number one priority for DTO leaders based in Medellin and the focus of their
organizational cohesion. As a result, the group of traffickers headed by Pablo Escobar
and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha took the idea of Los Extraditables, originally
ascribed to Carlos Lehder in July 1983, and launched the group’s first communiqué on
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November 15th 1984—the same day of Jorge Luis Ochoa’s arrest in Spain (Legarda,
2005). According to Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, Pablo Escobar’s gunman, on the
same date a campaign was organized in Medellin to tag street walls by spray-painting the
slogan “Say no to extradition.”
Whereas in 1981 the creation of MAS allowed traffickers to use violence against
the M-19 guerrilla to stop kidnappings, in a similar fashion, after their legal political
options were diminished, Los Extraditables targeted key politicians and members of the
justice system to fulfill two objectives: First, to convey their opposition to the 1979
Extradition Treaty with the United States. The second objective was to coerce politicians
in an effort to reach a negotiation so that DTO leaders could legalize their criminal status.
The creation of Los Extraditables allowed DTO leaders based in Medellin to unite and
form a more cohesive organization opposing extradition. The DTO leaders would
essentially use a “carrot-and-stick approach” to ban extradition and legalize their status.
The violence generated by Los Extraditables would be used as the “stick” in this
approach. The “carrot” or incentive that DTO leaders’ provided was their willingness to
negotiate surrender to government officials in exchange for a permanent ban on
extradition. The DTO leaders and government officials periodically organized backroom
negotiations with an effort to reach an agreement. The following discussion will center
on the cohesion of Los Extraditables in their effort to accomplish their political goals.
The discussion will focus on the group’s leadership, decision-making process, the
group’s discipline, and how its internal organization allowed the Medellin DTOs to
secure a ban on the extradition of nationals and favorable terms of surrender.
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In contrast to Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS), which had no clear leadership that
could impose an organizational objective, Los Extraditables had a clear leadership and a
more organizied discipline because the group was able to collect funds from member
traffickers with a decision-making style that was cohesive. From the launch of the first
Los Extraditables communiqué in 1984, it is widely believed that Pablo Escobar and Jose
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha headed the group (Legarda, 2005; Casación 31761, 2011, p.
52). As leaders, Escobar and Rodriguez Gacha were responsible for deciding political
targets and organizing terrorist attempts. Jairo Velásquez Vásquez a.k.a. “Popeye”
testified that former Senator Alberto Santofimio Botero, Escobar’s political running mate,
guided Escobar by choosing political targets (Legarda, 2005, p. 58). Colombia’s
Supreme Court corroborated Velásquez Vásquez testimony by studying other testimonial
accounts, which showed that Alberto Santofimio Botero knew and was a close advisor to
Pablo Escobar from 1982-1989, but also that Santofimio Botero was the intellectual
author of the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento
(Legarda, 2005, p. 58; Casación 31761, 2011, p. 20 & 23). The Supreme Court ruled that
the motives behind Alberto Santofimio Botero’s advice were grounded on his own
political aspirations, since on August of 1989 Luis Carlos Galan was only a pre-candidate
vying for the Liberal party’s nomination. The Court’s conclusions indicate that when
Escobar carried out the Galan assassination, Alberto Santofimio Botero –as a leader of
the Liberal party– benefited from such action for two reasons: First, Alberto Santofimio
Botero still had a chance at obtaining his party’s nomination in 1989. Second, even if
Santofimio Botero did not receive the nomination, he benefited from the assassination by
furthering his position of power within the Liberal party, especially if he sought to
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support Hernando Duran Dussan, who was more likely than Botero to win the Liberal
presidential nomination of 1989 (Casación 31761, 2011, p. 42).
Even though the Colombian Supreme Court and several journalistic and scholarly
accounts have determined that the leaders of Los Extraditables were Pablo Escobar and
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, the extent of the Ochoa brothers’ participation in the
leadership and funding of Los Extraditables is uncertain. In contrast to some journalists
who have written on the Medellin-based DTOs (Gugliotta et al., 1989; Eddy et al., 1988,
p. 312-314), Colombian officials from Medellin who were interviewed for this project
and who were involved in counter-narcotics efforts during the 1980s, make a point of
explaining that the group Los Extraditables did not include the Ochoa brothers. Although
the Ochoa brothers were deeply involved in the drug business and had business
associations with other traffickers (Castillo, 1987; Gugliotta et al, 1989; Eddy et al., 1988,
p. 290), it is difficult to ascertain the degree of decision-making power that the Ochoa
brothers had within Los Extraditables. Newspaper accounts of testimony given by
Escobar gunman Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez suggests that the Ochoa brothers
contributed a monthly fund of $250,000 dollars to Los Extraditables (Hermanos Ochoa,
2009).81 Most of these inquiries are difficult to verify because Colombian authorities
never investigated the role of the Ochoa brothers in Los Extraditables and the group’s
main leaders were killed. Moreover, the Ochoa brother’s surrender to Colombian
authorities in 1991 muted all further allegations against them.
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This amount of money coincides with amounts given by Clawson et al. on the “war tax” that Pablo
Escobar expected from the Kiko Moncada and Fernando Galeano DTOs.
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Most journalistic investigations on Los Extraditables focus on Pablo Escobar and
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha as the main decision-makers among DTO leaders.
During the years1983-1991, in which Los Extraditables were active, the Ochoa brothers
were described by journalists and academics as marginal actors who participated in the
invalidation of the Extradition Treaty in 1986-87 and who gradually negotiated their
surrender with Colombian authorities in 1990 and 1991 (Clawson et al., 1996; Legarda,
2005; Salazar, 2001:265; Gugliotta et al., 1989:336).
During the time that Los Extraditables were in operation, the Ochoa brothers
seemed to be less confrontational and more open to a negotiated solution to the illicit
drug business than Pablo Escobar (Ochoa, 1989; Salazar, 2001, p. 161). In his book, Un
Narco Se Confiesa y Acusa, Fabio Ochoa explains that the problem of drug traffic in
Colombia was political for several reasons:
Yes it is political because… according to the government and the military the narcos want to take
over the country and power… it is a livelihood, it is a social problem, it is an international
problem, it is a war, it attempts against the democratic stability of the country, it is a class problem,
people want a dialogue with traffickers, it is an economy, it is political because it benefits and
affects millions of Colombians, because it is a pretext for creating state intervention policies,
because it has created paramilitary forces that finance themselves with drug money…(Ochoa,
1989, p. 106-107).

Fabio Ochoa’s claim the book reads like an extended rant and attempts to show that drug
traffic has political, social, and economic ramifications that should be publicly debated
and dealt with.82 The book also suggests that as powerful entrepreneurs, government
officials should take cocaine traffickers into account and, through the argument of being
entrepreneurs, the Ochoa brothers actively sought a negotiation with state officials

82

The book is also full of sarcasm and tries to show the double standard confronted by traffickers, where
members of high levels of society like their “narco-money,” but at the same time high levels of society did
not want to associate with them because they are not formally educated or because traffickers come from a
low socioeconomic status.
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especially during 1990-1991 to legalize their status and prevent their extradition to the
United States.
Since Pablo Escobar’s death in December 1993, the Ochoa brothers have publicly
distanced themselves from Los Extraditables. In interviews they have explained that they
did not believe that the use of violence against the state and society was useful in banning
the extradition of nationals (Ochoa, 1989; Salazar, 2001:161; Interviews – Juan David
Ochoa, 2000).
Also, the Ochoa brothers have expressed that they were intimidated by Pablo
Escobar’s use of violence, because he killed their brother-in-law83 of theirs. In the
interview that the Ochoa brothers granted to PBS’s program Frontline, when the
interviewer asks Juan David Ochoa to explain who Los Extraditables were, Juan David
Ochoa takes the opportunity define the group by distancing himself and his brothers from
the group:
Juan David Ochoa: The extraditables were all of us who are asked for in extradition . . .. That's
who the extraditables were. But the group called "the extraditables" was a nickname that Pablo
gave himself, so that he could direct all his violence and his terrorist actions towards the
extradition. It wouldn't point to him personally, but "the extraditables" terrorist group was Pablo
Escobar (Interviews – Jorge Ochoa, 2000).

During the interview Jorge Luis Ochoa’s mentions the fear he had of Pablo Escobar:
Jorge Luis Ochoa: Frankly, he intimidated us, and many other people in Medellin, Cali, and
Bogota. He intimidated everyone… He even killed my brother-in-law.
Frontline: What did you say to Pablo?
Jorge Luis Ochoa: I couldn't say anything. I was in prison in Spain when Pablo had him killed.
But I couldn't say anything to him--what could I say to him? The same thing would happen to me
(Interviews – Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000).
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According to Gugliotta et al., Jorge Luis Ochoa’s brother-in-law was a pilot and DEA informant, so this
is why he was killed. Also Gugliotta et al. suggests that it was not Pablo Escobar who killed him, but
Ochoa’s own gunmen (Gugliotta et al., 1989:78).
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Considering Pablo Escobar’s experience as a gunman, his rise to power, and his control
over criminal gangs and gunmen in the city of Medellin, it is very possible that Pablo
Escobar was feared even in trafficker circles. So it is quite possible that coercion is how
Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were able to enforce discipline within
Los Extraditables—where fellow traffickers were forced into supporting a war against
political elites to obtain a ban on extradition.
Having said how fear and coercion played a role at the time that Los Extraditables
were active, given the common desire of most traffickers to paralyze the Extradition
Treaty so that they would not be turned over to U.S. authorities, and given the fire power
most DTO leaders possessed—it is very possible that DTO leaders willingly cooperated
with Pablo Escobar to obtain a ban on extradition without feeling intimidated by him. In
fact, a problem with the narrative painted by the Ochoa brothers, which describes them as
victims of Escobar, is that during key moments when Jorge Luis Ochoa was apprehended
in Spain in 1984 or when he was jailed in Colombia in 1987, communiqués were sent by
Los Extraditables to major newspapers demanding Ochoa’s release (Gugliotta et al., 1989,
p. 313; Interviews – Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000). In addition, judges who presided over
Jorge Luis Ochoa cases, in Colombia in 1986 and later in 1987, released him under
controversial judgments, which caused much embarrassment to the Virgilio Barco
government84 (Jorge L Ochoa, 1991). Also, the Ochoa brothers have admitted that they
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The Reagan Administration penalized the Barco government because of Ochoa’s release by opposing
Colombia’s inclusion in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, among other measures. DTO analyst
Rensselaer Lee, believes that the Ochoa brothers offered judges “plomo o plata,” in other words, death if
they convicted Ochoa, or a bribe of $3-20 million dollars to judges so that they would arrange for Jorge
Luis Ochoa’s release from jail. These large amounts of money show the cynicism and huge bribing
capacity traffickers had because they undermined the United States government’s offering of $500,000 for
Ochoa’s arrest and conviction (Lee, 1990, p. 125).
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were involved in legally fighting the judicial validity of the extradition treaty
(Interviews—Juan David Ochoa, 2000), but this process also involved the use of violence
to intimidate judges. Although these events tie the Ochoa brothers to Los Extraditables,
it is still uncertain whether the Ochoa brothers actively participated in the decisionmaking process of Los Extraditables. Statements made by Pablo Escobar’s gunman, Jhon
Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, suggest that they only provided funds to the group (Hermanos
Ochoa, 2009). Finally, regardless of whether the Ochoa brothers had full, partial, or no
involvement with the decisions and activities organized by Los Extraditables, their
negotiations with Colombian authorities during 1990-1991 benefited from the violence
and kidnappings generated by Los Extraditables because the Ochoa demands seemed less
confrontational.
Carlos Lehder’s involvement in the leadership of Los Extraditables was minimal.
As the newsmagazine Semana suggests in their 1983 article, Lehder’s major contribution
to Los Extraditables was the group’s name and its anti-extradition stance. However,
from 1983 to 1987 it is difficult to know the decision-making power Lehder had in
helping select the political targets or in funding the group because, as time passed by,
many accounts suggest that Carlos Lehder became an unreliable member of the group
whilst he became very vocal about his political views to the media –at a time when most
traffickers were trying to avoid the attention of authorities (Streatfield, 2001; Eddy et al.,
1988, p. 168, 290, & 325-326). According to journalists, by the time Lehder was
apprehended and extradited to the United States on February of 1987, DTO leaders based
in Medellin had already shunned him (Gugliotta et al., 1989, p. 312; Streatfield, 2001), so
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if Lehder had any decision-making power within Los Extraditables it lasted from 1983 to
1987.
Throughout their bloody campaign Los Extraditables were very cohesive in
selecting political targets to be bombed, assassinated, or kidnapped. When government
officials killed Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha in 1989, the main leader became Pablo
Escobar, which simplified the group’s decision-making process of selecting political
targets and increased the cohesiveness of Los Extraditables. Most accounts given by
Escobar’s gunman and others close to Medellin-based DTOs during 1983-1991 suggest
that Escobar acted on his own without consulting other traffickers as to whom to
assassinate or kidnap, so the organization was very cohesive (Legarda, 2005; Garcia,
1996; Interviews – Fernando Arenas, 2000). According to a pilot for Carlos Lehder,
Fernando Arenas, who witnessed Carlos Lehder’s reaction to the Rodrigo Lara Bonilla
Assassination, Pablo Escobar did not consult anyone when he made the decision to
assassinate the Minister of Justice:
When it happened… Carlos was angry--not about the assassination or the attempt--but because he
was not warned by Pablo Escobar about what he was going to do. We were caught with our guard
down (Interviews – Fernando Arenas, 2000).

Juan David Ochoa conveys on a televised interview with PBS’s Frontline that Pablo
Escobar did not consult him on the Lara Bonilla assassination either. He also explains
how this event became a turning point in the lives of traffickers:
Juan David Ochoa: The government of Belisario Betancur started the persecution against drug
trafficking because of Lara Bonilla's death… That was from Pablo Escobar. He made the decision.
He didn't talk to any of us. He simply thought, he had ideas and he carried them out. At that time,
since he was involved in politics, surely, maybe Bonilla was an obstacle for Pablo or something.
Frontline: When you heard the news of Lara Bonilla's death, how did you react?
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Juan David Ochoa: I heard the news and I thought, "Oh, this is grave news." Because you can't
stand up to the government and society in that way. I think it was a grave mistake to kill him, or
anyone else, of the people that were killed…
Frontline: Did you make a phone call to find out who had ordered it? What did you do?
Juan David Ochoa: No. I simply heard it on the news, and a few days later the persecution
against us started. And that's when we left for Panama.

Escobar’s lack of consultation with other traffickers when making decisions on political
targets would become his modus operandi especially in 1989 when the activities of Los
Extraditables became more violent. Pablo Escobar’s hired gunmen obeyed his orders
and carried out the assassinations and kidnappings, which made the coercive nature of
this organization highly cohesive. Journalistic accounts suggest that other traffickers had
little decision-making power as to who was killed or kidnapped, even though they would
pay a “war tax” to fund Los Extraditables, so that Pablo Escobar could organize terrorist
activities through the organization (Legarda, 2005, p. 168-169). According to Jhon Jairo
Velasquez Vasquez, Supreme Court witness to the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan
(1989), Pablo Escobar made his decision by consulting with ex-Senator Alberto
Santofimio Botero alone. When Escobar informed fellow members of Los Extraditables
(whom helped fund and carry out the operation) of the assassination plan, Velasquez
Vasquez claims Escobar told them the target was not up for discussion: “I am not
consulting you, I am informing you so that you find good hiding places; either we finish
him or he finishes us” (Legarda, 2005:168).
The existence of a “war tax” strongly suggests that Los Extraditables had
organizational discipline over its membership. Los Extraditables collected funds from
member DTO leaders located in Medellin to organize their attack against political elites
in an effort to permanently ban the extradition policy. Besides the major DTO leaders
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explored in this project, other less internationally known but important DTOs in
Colombia and whom contributed funds to Los Extraditables, were: Kiko Moncada,
Fernando Galeano, Henry Perez, Ariel Otero, Albeiro Areiza, Jairo Mejia, and Fidel
Castaño, among others (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 48; Salazar, 2001, p. 195; Legarda, 2005,
p. 169; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009). The total number of traffickers that contributed funds to
Los Extraditables’s war effort is unknown, but it is suspected that members gave around
$200,000 dollars a month to fund the violent campaigns to overturn the extradition treaty
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 48; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009).
It is unclear if DTO leaders linked to Los Extraditables voluntarily gave funds to
the effort or if they were required to contribute funds, but journalistic and scholarly
accounts suggest that both positive and negative selective incentives played a role in
obtaining group discipline. Whereas some DTO leaders funded Los Extraditables
voluntarily, those who refused to cooperate voluntarily were forced to cooperate through
the use of coercion. For some DTO leaders it was in their interest to see the extradition
treaty permanently banned to prevent their potential extradition to the United States. For
these leaders it was beneficial to contribute funds to Los Extraditables. However, DTO
leader assassinations suggest that contributions were obligatory, so if DTO leaders did
not cooperate with Los Extraditables they were threatened or killed. Early discussion in
the project at hand on the Ochoa brothers’ involvement in Los Extraditables suggests that
the main enforcer of these “war taxes” was Pablo Escobar (especially after 1989), as he
had significant amount of control over gangs of gunmen in Medellin. Evidence of DTO
leader assassinations, in particular the Kiko Moncada and Fernando Galeano
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assassinations,85 suggests that DTO contributions were required and enforced by Pablo
Escobar because organizational discipline in Los Extraditables was ultimately enforced
through violence. Also the Moncada and Galeano assassinations provide evidence that it
was very probable that the Ochoa brothers contributed funds towards Los Extraditables’s
war effort to prevent disagreements with Pablo Escobar after the death of Gacha. Since
Pablo Escobar was the group’s sole decision maker and tax enforcer, his leadership made
the actions taken by Los Extraditables highly cohesive because at least from 1983-1991
the group was united in their objectives and member gave funds.
Los Extraditables’ violent campaign against political elites was done to pressure
government officials into overturning the treaty on extradition and obtaining favorable
terms for their surrender. Coercion in the form of violent events led the Virgilio Barco
and the Cesar Gaviria presidential governments to establish backdoor negotiations with
DTO leaders in an effort to end urban violence. The following discussion will focus on
the major events organized by Los Extraditables and how such events led to three DTO
leader- government negotiations.
The first communiqué that launched Los Extraditables was sent to major
Colombian newspapers on the 15th of November 1984 on the same day Jorge Luis Ochoa
was arrested in Spain. The communiqué had a logo with the picture of Hernán Botero,
one of the first traffickers arrested on July 1984 by Colombian authorities with the intent
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Kiko Moncada and Fernado Galeano were killed in La Catedral prison when Pablo Escobar was
incarcerated because he was reluctant to continue paying a “war tax” to Pablo Escobar after permanently
banning the extradition policy.
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of extraditing him to the United States.86 The letterhead of each communiqué released by
Los Extraditables read “we prefer a tomb in Colombia than a dungeon in the United
States.” The first message called for abolishing the extradition of Colombian nationals to
the United States (Legarda, 2005, p. 58-59; Mollison et al., 2007).
After the initial launch of the first communiqué in 1984, Los Extraditables wrote
about 50 communiqués (Extraditables, 1991) as their anti-extradition campaign became
more violent. One in particular was written to threaten the lives of the Supreme Court
justices deciding the constitutionality of the Extradition Treaty on December 1986. This
communiqué sample shows the level of intimidation public officials were exposed to
from 1983-1991:
We declare war against you. We declare war against all members of your family. As you may
suppose, we know exactly where they are—we will do away with your entire family. We have no
compassion whatsoever—we are capable of anything, absolutely anything. We also have families.
Baquero (a pro-extradition Colombian Supreme Court Judge murdered earlier that year) had a
family too, wife, sons, parents, and brothers. He was a miserable government patsy and an antinationalist, pro-yankee traitor to his country (Lee, 1989, p. 122).

During 1986 violence against members of the justice system ensued: two judges
and a coronel of the police were assassinated, and when the Supreme Court invalidated
the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, newly elected President Virgilio Barco tried to extradite
traffickers via decree by issuing Law 68 of 1986 on December 14th 1986. In retaliation,
Los Extraditables assassinated Guillermo Cano three days later on December 17th 1986.
Cano was the chief editor of El Espectador, Colombia’s 2nd most important newspaper
and harsh critic of Drug Trafficking Oorganizations (DTOs).87 To emphasize Los
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Hernán Botero was charged with money laundering and finally extradited to the United States on January
5th 1985.

87

Guillermo Cano not only uncovered Pablo Escobar’s criminal past, but also questioned the government’s
ability to deal with the institutional threat posed by DTOs in Colombia. One of his articles was “Donde
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Extraditables’s opposition to extradition, on January 13th 1987, a political assassination
was orchestrated against the outgoing Minister of Justice Enrique Parejo, because he was
the first to authorize the extradition of traffickers.
During the remainder of 1987 Los Extraditables were relatively inert because of
their success in legally invalidating the extradition treaty. In contrast, the Virgilio Barco
administration sought to pursue DTO leaders not only by extraditing them, but also by
confiscating their assets in Colombia. The Virgilio Barco presidency was the first to
create anti-money laundering laws via decree, which led authorities to search and
confiscate DTO properties. Such a hardline enforcement of counter-narcotics efforts
eventually led Los Extraditables to react with various acts of violence that were
logistically planned to try to obtain a negotiation with government officials. On January
1988 Los Extraditables kidnapped Conservative politician Andres Pastrana, the son of
former President Misael Pastrana, and the Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos. The
kidnapping of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos on January 25th 1988 resulted in his
immediate death, as a consequence of bullet wounds he received while being kidnapped.
Consequently, as a sign of peace, Los Extraditables released Andres Pastrana to use him
as an emissary who was to speak with President Barco about a negotiation with
traffickers. However, the early negotiations never took place. Instead, Los Extraditables
delayed pressing for negotiations with the government because the rivalry between the
Medellin and Cali DTOs broke out on January 14th 1988, when Cali DTO leaders
bombed the residential building “Monaco” where Pablo Escobar’s family resided. As a
están que no los ven?” (“Where are they, that you don’t see them”), this article criticized the government’s
inaction in arresting traffickers whose whereabouts where public knowledge (Castillo, 1987, p. 197). His
final article was titled, “Se le aguó la fiesta a los mafiosos” (“The party is over for the mafiosi”), and it was
written when Virgilio Barco launched the decree law that would extradite traffickers (Legarda, 2005, p.86).
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consequence of this war between DTOs, the operations by Los Extraditables to obtain a
negotiation with the government were on hiatus until September 1988.
Although the period between January and September 1988 was one of relative
peace for government officials who had been targets of Los Extraditables, the political
environment in rural and urban areas was violent. Virgilio Barco’s four-year presidential
tenure witnessed 78,000 homicides, 300 car bombs, and 250 police officer murders (El
Tiempo, 1990). The urban violence mainly proliferated from the wars between drug
trafficking organizations and the paramilitary extermination of the Union Patriotica
political party members (Dudley, 2004). As a consequence of this turbulent climate,
when Los Extraditables sought to pursue a negotiation with government officials during
September 1988, the government was willing to listen to proposals. One of the proposals,
which will be referred to as the Vallejo Arbelaez negotiation, was put forth by Joaquin
Vallejo Arbelaez (a former cabinet member who became a trafficker emissary88) as he
met with the Ochoa brothers, Rodriguez Gacha, and Escobar and heard their proposals
(Salazar, 2001, p. 232). According to Vallejo Arbelaez, during September of 1988 and
February 1989, he met around 10 times with Presidential Advisor German Montoya to
discuss a negotiation deal. Traffickers proposed to surrender their drug trafficking
business in exchange for permanently banning extradition and an amnesty for crimes
committed. In contrast to the 1984 Panama negotiation, during the Vallejo Arbelaez
negotiation traffickers sough to keep their economic assets:
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Apparently Vallejo Arbelaez had written a newspaper editorial in which he suggested a governmenttrafficker dialogue to resolve the problem of violence in 1988, and right after, he was contacted by Guido
Parra, Pablo Escobar’s lawyer, who proposed that Vallejo Arbelaez should become an emissary to propose
a negotiation between the government and traffickers.
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The “group A” is made up of the so-called Medellin Cartels, Bogota and the Coast, that controls
the bigger share of the drug trafficking business in Colombia, and the names of the persons
involved in these groups will be presented once the amnesty is approved. The so-called “Medellin
Cartel” that includes Bogota and the Coast, offers to retire completely from the drug business… to
collaborate with the government in the eradication of the business and to return to a normal life
under the law… The counteroffer: a) To end the extradition of Colombians. b) An amnesty for
crimes committed. c) Patrimonial amnesty. d) That subversives disarm since they kidnap, extort,
and threaten properties… (La Bomba, 1989).

Besides a patrimonial amnesty, DTO leaders were also proposing an agreement that
would negotiate guerrilla disarmament. This last point reflected Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez
Gacha’s desire to limit the power of left-wing guerrillas and their sympathizers because
through his paramilitary organization, Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y
Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM), he had already been engaging in the
extermination of the Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union), the political wing of the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The Vallejo Arbelaez negotiation was
officially rejected by the Virgilio Barco government and instead the government
launched “Operation Springtime,” which seized several cocaine labs in the Magdalena
Medio region on February 1989.
The year 1989 continued to be a bloodstained year, but increasingly so for
Colombia’s political class because Los Extraditables began another campaign to press for
negotiations. On March of 1989, a judge and a lawyer were murdered for investigating
Pablo Escobar’s role in the assassination of newspaper editor Guillermo Cano. On May,
the headquarters of a broadcasting network was bombed and an assassination attempt on
the head of the Colombian intelligence agency, Departamento Administrativo de
Seguridad (DAS), was thwarted. On July of 1989, a bomb killed the Governor of
Antioquia, Antonio Roldan Betancur and On August 18th 1989 the popular Presidential
Candidate Luis Carlos Galan was assassinated. All of these attempts at cornering the
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Barco Administration into negotiating with DTO leaders failed to get traction, and
instead, the attempts outraged the general public. Luis Carlos Galan was a staunch antiextradition candidate whom was heading public opinion polls (La Guerra, 1989) because
he was perceived as a reformist candidate who represented a younger generation that
never had strong ties to the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties of the National
Front.89 People’s perception of Galan’s leadership was reflected in newsmagazine
Semana’s article analyzing how Colombia’s narco-violence killed Galan:
When Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was killed, Semana editorial board chose “Death Foretold”90 as the
title for the magazine’s cover. When they assassinated Guillermo Cano, the title was “On Foot!”...
On Friday August the 18th, at 11:30 in the evening, when we had to make a decision on the front
cover’s title for the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan, the same journalists could not find words.
There was such a sentiment of frustration that could not be expressed. So the decision was to
publish the leader’s photo and his birth and death dates… Sometimes the intimidation gives them
(Los Extraditables) a temporary success. They have succeeded in neutralizing the justice system,
in infiltrating the Armed Forces, in preventing extradition, and in threatening the population. This
has produced a sense of impotence, which has led many to give up… With the assassination of
Galan, they (Los Extraditables) thought they would unify public opinion in favor of a negotiation.
But the opposite has taken place. Public opinion unified not to capitulate, but to keep fighting no
matter how much blood this implies…(La Guerra, 1989).

As a result of the public’s frustration with Galan’s assassination, a poll taken by the
newspaper El Tiempo right after the assassination showed a 77% approval for the policy
on extradition (Matthiesen, 2000, p. 221). Consequently, the Barco Government
increased its persecution of DTO leaders and with the approval of the Supreme Court
issued Decree 1860 of 1989 to extradite traffickers (p. 220). The revival of the extradition
policy led Los Extraditables to increase their capacity for generating violence. After
targeting specific political targets, the group began to stage dramatic and indiscriminate
89

The National Front was a power sharing agreement established in 1958 between the two major political
parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, which were elite political parties that maintained electoral power
through the use of patronage and clientelism.
90

“Death Foretold” is also an ironic reference on the title of Colombian Nobel Laureate Gabriel Garcia
Marquez’s fictional book “Chronicle of a Death Foretold,” published in 1981 about the failure of a
community to stop the murder of the main character from taking place.
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acts of violence. In addition to the ongoing DTO wars and the paramilitary extermination
of left wing political parties, during the last months of 1989, one hundred bombs were
placed in public places such as supermarkets, hotels, banks, schools, and electric and
telephone facilities (Escobar: 17 años, 1993). One major act of violence occurred every
month, with the first taking place on September 2nd 1989 when a truck filled with
explosives blew up the newspaper El Espectador’s headquarters. On October 17th 1989
the headquarters of the newspaper La Vanguardia Liberal of Bucaramanga were also
blown up. On November 27th 1989 an Avianca Airliner was blown up with 107
passengers on board and finally, on December 6th 1989 the Departamento Administrativo
de Seguridad (DAS) building was bombed killing 70 and injuring 500 people (Escobar:
17 años, 1993).
The government’s pursuit of Medellin-based DTOs was able to locate and kill one
of Los Extraditables main leaders, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha along with his oldest
son and his bodyguards on December 17th 1989. Although Colombian authorities tried to
close in on Pablo Escobar, he continued to be a fugitive and became the sole leader of
Los Extraditables. Finally on December 20th 1989 Los Extraditables kidnapped the son
of Presidential Advisor German Montoya, which culminated in a series of strategic
kidnappings of 20 family members of the Department of Antioquia’s political and
economic elite. This last campaign will be termed as the Antioquia kidnapping campaign.
On December of 1989, after witnessing daily acts of violence, public opinion
swayed again and 58 percent of Colombians favored negotiations with traffickers and 60
percent believed traffickers should be granted amnesty if they retired from the cocaine
trade (Clawson et al., 1996). The shift in public opinion and the kidnappings of elite
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members of society led the Barco government to strongly re-consider negotiating with
traffickers.
During December of 1989 a group called Los Notables,91 composed of three expresidents, Colombia’s Catholic Archbishop, and a member of the left-wing party
Patriotic Union, served as mediators with the objective of getting the release of 20
hostages. Santiago Londoño White and J. Mario Aristizabal, who were Escobar’s
emissaries, were Medellin-based politicians that had dealt with Escobar during his short
mainstream political career. During the second negotiation effort, termed as the LodoñoAristizabal-Montoya negotiation, Presidential Advisor German Montoya was determined
to rescue his son and met with Escobar’s emissaries. As a result, on January 15th 1990
President Barco called a National Security Council meeting to discuss a negotiated
solution with the Minister of the Interior, the Director of Intelligence, the Director of the
Police, and the Military General in Command of the Armed Forces (Salazar, 2001. p.
234).
Los Notables and Escobar’s emissaries were able to write a third negotiated
proposal, which was reportedly approved by the government official German Montoya
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 107). The third proposal differed from the Panama and the
Vallejo Arbelaez proposals because, in addition to surrendering their drug trafficking
business and their weapons, traffickers offered to personally surrender to authorities in
exchange for agreed upon constitutional and legal guarantees (Clawson et al., 1996, p.
107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233).
91

Los Notables were composed ex-President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, ex-President Misael Pastrana, exPresident Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Monseigneur Mario Rebollo, and Diego Montaña Cuellar Leader of
the Unión Patriótica.
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Virgilio Barco’s government strongly considered a negotiated solution to resolve
the violence generated by Los Extraditables by holding a National Security meeting with
Escobar’s emissaries. However, at the January 15th meeting the Minister of the Interior
Carlos Lemos Simmonds and Miguel Maza Marquez, the Director of Colombia’s now
extinct intelligence agency the DAS, who had recently survived several attempts on his
life (including the bomb attack that destroyed the DAS building a month and two weeks
earlier), objected to the idea of negotiating with Los Extraditables. In contrast, President
Barco and German Montoya were more flexible in considering the proposal drafted by
Los Notables and Escobar’s emissaries (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 108; Salazar, 2001, p.
233-235). For President Barco a negotiated solution to the problem of violence seemed
attractive, whereas for German Montoya the return of his kidnapped son was paramount.
Overall, President Virgilio Barco was undecided on whether to accept the latest trafficker
proposal primarily because of the objections posed by his cabinet members and since
Barco’s administration had been the only presidency to confront DTOs head on. In
contrast, the problem of violence was overwhelming and since Los Extraditables were
providing the government with signs of credibility, while President Barco contemplated
negotiating with DTO leaders, he delayed the administrative extradition of several
traffickers to obtain the release of hostages and to honor the proposed truce offered by
traffickers.
To reciprocate the gesture made by the Barco government to meet with Escobar’s
emissaries, on January 17th 1990 Los Extraditables announced a truce with the
government and released German Montoya’s son along with other kidnapped victims
(Clawson et al., 1996, p. 107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233-235). On January 29th Los
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Extraditables continued to give signs of credibility by turning over a bus loaded with
dynamite. On the eve of the February 14th 1990 Cartagena Summit organized by
President Barco to discuss the “Drug War” with U.S. President George Bush and other
Andean Presidents, Los Extraditables surrendered three large cocaine refineries in the
Darien Jungle bordering with Panama (Traffickers surrender, 1990; Clawson et al., 1996,
p. 107; Salazar, 2001, p. 233).
President Barco continued to be indecisive about negotiating with DTO leaders
while he hosted the Cartagena Summit on Drug Control on February 15th 1990. At the
Summit, then U.S. President George H. W. Bush recognized that the “Drug War” was a
global problem shared by cocaine producing and consumer nations. As such, he
promised to allocate $2 billion dollars towards counternarcotics efforts in Latin America.
In expectation of increased U.S. counter-narcotics aid and reportedly after confiding with
President George Bush on government-trafficker negotiations at the 1989 Cartagena
Summit, President Barco opted not to negotiate with traffickers. According to Clawson
et al., Bush reportedly discouraged Barco from holding negotiations because he believed
that Barco should use extradition as the centerpiece of Colombian counter-narcotics
strategy (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 108).
After more than two months of relative peace, on March 29th 1990, the truce
between Los Extraditables and the Barco government ended when military General
Harold Bedoya declared Pablo Escobar’s hometown of Envigado a military emergency
zone. As a consequence, Los Extraditables announced that they would renew the war
against the government because of human rights abuses perpetrated by Colombia’s
national police, but their underlying intention was to pressure the government to begin
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another negotiation (Escobar: 17 años, 1993; Mollison et al., 2007). From April to July
of 1990 Los Extraditables targeted the Medellin police and the number of assassinated
police officers rose to 250 assassinations. Also Los Extraditables began placing car
bombs in public places in Bogota, Cali, and Medellin (Escobar: 17 años, 1993; Salazar,
2001, p. 244), killing 93 people, injuring 450, and resulting in 3.7 million U.S. dollars in
material damages. The use of bombs subsided on July of 1990 in expectation of a
change in the presidency.
On August 9th 1990, Cesar Gaviria became the President of Colombia. After,
promising to distinguish between drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, President Gaviria
sought to provide DTO leaders with a political option so that they would surrender to
authorities. To test the seriousness of the Gaviria government proposal, on August 30th
1990 Los Extraditables began a second series of kidnappings to speed up negotiations.
These kidnappings will be referred to as the Liberal kidnapping campaign.
In response to the kidnapping of a team of journalists headed by Diana Turbay on
August 30th 1990, President Gaviria issued Decree 2047 on September 5th 1990, which
stipulated that if traffickers turned themselves to authorties and confessed to a charge,
they would not be extradited. However, Los Extraditables rejected Decree 2047 because
of two issues: First, the ban on extradition was conditioned to the admittance of a crime
and Los Extraditables wanted total amnesty. Second, there were no guarantees that the
extradition ban would be respected in future presidencies—it was not a permanent ban on
extradition. After Decree 2047 was issued, the Ochoa brothers began negotiations with
the government.
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In reaction to Decree 2047, Los Extraditables continued the Liberal kidnapping
campaign and kidnapped five relatives of Colombia’s political elite in less than two
months, from September 19th to November 7th 1990. The kidnappings were done to
increase the pressure on President Cesar Gaviria so that he would permanently ban
extraditions as stipulated in the 1991 Colombian Constitution.
The Liberal kidnapping campaign mobilized influential politicians,92 hostage
relatives, and public figures, like television personality Father Rafael Garcia Herreros, to
act as mediators between Los Extraditables and the Gaviria government. The main
purpose of the kidnapping campaign was to obtain a negotiation with the Gaviria
Administration to discuss: an extradition ban, the terms of surrender for DTO leaders,
and the release of hostages. Among those kidnapped were: Diana Turbay who was ExPresident Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala’s daughter. Francisco Santos Calderon93—the son
Hernando Santos the owner of the newspaper El Tiempo. Marina Montoya was
kidnapped in an act of revenge that would end her life because she was the sister of
German Montoya, the advisor of Ex-President Virgilio Barco who failed to bring the
1988 trafficker-government negotiation to fruition.
The sister and wife of congressman Alberto Villamizar, who led the First
Congressional Committee dealing with constitutional reform and international treaties
was also kidnapped. Villamizar was a political colleague of President Cesar Gaviria
because both Villamizar and Gaviria belonged to Luis Carlos Galan’s Nuevo Liberalismo.
As a member of the Nuevo Liberalismo and as a leader of the House of Representatives,
92

Among the politicians involved were the group known as Los Notables, who were composed of three
Colombian Ex-Presidents, among others.
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Francisco Santos became President Alvaro Uribe’s Vice President 2002-2010.

178

Alberto Villamizar was an ally of the Bentacur government in passing Colombia’s first
anti-narcotics statue in 1985; as such, Villamizar was himself targeted by DTOs and
survived an assassination attempt. Therefore, it is ironic that to save his wife and sister,
Alberto Villamizar was forced to act as the main mediator between Los Extraditables and
the government.94
The family members of the victims were influential members of the Liberal party,
Gaviria’s political party. The group Los Extraditables was very strategic when it selected
its victims because all of the relatives had influence over Gaviria with the exception of
Marina Montoya, who was kidnapped and kiled as an act of revenge (Garcia, 1996).
President Cesar Gaviria was chosen to be the 1990 Liberal presidential candidate
precisely because the son of assassinated presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan,
publicly nominated Gaviria at his father’s funeral. The kidnapping of many of his
colleagues’ family limited Gaviria’s negotiating tools because he could not “play hardball”
if he had Villamizar as intermediary.95 President Gaviria’s position was difficult because
he had to negotiate knowing full well that Los Extraditables held his colleague’s wife and
sister as well as the sons and daughters of Colombia’s most influential families. The
group’s compelling strategy created a hostage crisis, and this situation forced President
Gaviria to negotiate with Los Extraditables and make quick decisions in a period of six
months.
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For more information on how the kidnappings and the trafficker-government negotiations took place see
Noticia de Un Secuestro by Gabriel Garcia Marquez.
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Villamizar’s wife Maruja Pachon was the sister of Gloria Pachon the widow of Presidential Candidate
Luis Carlos Galan who was assassinated.
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Alberto Villamizar and Pablo Escobar’s lawyer Guido Parra mediated this fourth
and final DTO leader-government negotiation, which will be referred to as the Villamizar
negotiation. As negotiations ensued, Los Extraditables and the government exchanged
signs of credibility. At the end of November 1990, Escobar ordered his men to slowly
release members of the televisions crew that accompanied Diana Turbay when she was
kidnapped. Los Extraditables proposed the surrender of 200-300 traffickers in exchange
for the following demands: (1) No extradition, (2) An amnesty, and (3) Special detention
centers (Clawson et al., 1996). The release of hostages on November and December of
1990 led to the creation of Decree 3030 on December 17th 1990. Decree 3030 gave two
conditions: (1) A person condemned for various crimes could serve their sentences
concurrently, and (2) To prevent extradition and receive lower sentences, traffickers had
to surrender and confess to a crime. At this point Fabio Ochoa turned himself in on
December 18th 1990. Los Extraditables did not accept Decree 3030 for the same reasons
as before; the group wanted an amnesty and a permanent ban on extradition.
During January 1991 a dramatic turn of events led Cesar Gaviria’s Administration
to issue Decree 303. Jorge Luis Ochoa surrendered on January 15th. On January 24 Los
Extraditables assassinated Marina Montoya after the Medellin gang Los Priscos, who
were hit-men working for Pablo Escobar, were killed by authorities. The next day, Diana
Turbay was accidentally shot while authorities tried to rescue her from kidnappers. On
January 29th 1991 the government issued Decree 303 to prevent further hostage deaths
and to reassure that it was committed to the negotiation process. Decree 303 gave
reduced sentences to persons that admitted to one crime and no extradition for persons
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that turn themselves in. In response to Decree 303 Pablo Escobar released Alberto
Villamizar’s sister on February 4th 1991.
The creation of Decree 303 was also tailor-made to suit the Ochoa brothers.
Decree 303 was an improvement on prior decrees because its language was more precise
in specifying that those who surrendered would not be extradited and because it gave
reduced sentences to persons that admitted to one crime, instead of giving concurrent
sentences for the admittance of various crimes. Also this decree would retroactively
cover persons that turned themselves in prior to January 29th 1991. Still, at this point,
extradition was not yet permanently banned. However, on February 16th Juan David
Ochoa became the last Ochoa brother to surrender to authorities.
The political environment in the first two months of 1991 was deadly and this
created a need for peace, which benefited Los Extraditables. By February 1991, 1200
murders had taken place just in Medellin; this is a rate of 20 violent deaths per day and a
massacre every four days. About 500 policemen were dead and indiscriminate acts of
violence against civilians were common. For example, on February 16th an explosion at
Medellin’s bull fighting ring La Macarena killed 25 people and wounded 143 people
(Escobar: 17 años, 1993). The explosion set by Medellin gangs was supposed to blow up
a police station nearby, but instead it led to civilian deaths.
On March 4th 1991 Alberto Villamizar co-authored a letter with the Ochoa
Brothers to mediate the start of a negotiation for Pablo Escobar’s compliance with
Colombian authorities. The negotiation involved the plans to build a new jail and its
security, which was part of the negotiation demands made by Pablo Escobar.
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After the Constitutional Assembly drafted an anti-extradition article to
permanently ban extradition on April 18th 1991, on April 22nd Pablo Escobar agreed to
surrender and confess to a crime. On May 15th the Constitutional Assembly started the
debate on the extradition of nationals. On May 21st Pablo Escobar’s lawyer presented
three key points for his surrender: The first, demanded to screen the jail’s security. The
second discussed the police and military’s role within the jail. And the third requested
the retirement of the head of the DAS, then General Miguel Maza Marquez.96 In view of
Pablo Escobar’s eminent surrender, the government basically allowed him to plan all
aspects of his incarceration but did not agree to fire Gen. Maza Marquez.
Pablo Escobar designed the jail on a piece of property that he exchanged with the
municipality of Envigado months before his surrender. Envigado was the city where
Escobar grew up, so he had a lot of political influence. The Envigado government
constructed the La Catedral jail with $2 million dollars that Escobar donated for its
construction (Clawson et al., 1996; Legarda, 2005, p. 255). In all probability the
credibility of the committee chosen to screen jail security was compromised based on the
political posts these committee members held. The committee was composed of the
Mayor of Envigado, the prosecutor of Antioquia, and the Colombian Director of
Prisons.97 After the conditions of Escobar’s incarceration were agreed to on May 24th
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DAS was the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad an equivalent to the United State’s Federal
Bureau of Investigations.
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During this period in Colombian history the Mayor of Envigado could not have made any decisions
without the consent of traffickers. Pablo Escobar had increased the budget of Envigado through donations
from 1983 to 1989 by tenfold, so the city was spending about $40 dollars per capita on its citizens
(Clawson et al., 1996:112). Medellin is the capital of the Department of Antioquia. If the regional attorney
general of Antioquia wanted to remain alive, he could not make decisions that went against the wishes of
Medellin-based DTOs, since many public officials during this time, including the Governor of Antioquia,
received death threats if they did not succumb to DTO leader demands. The Director of Prisons in
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1991, Los Extraditables released the last hostages: Francisco Santos and Alberto
Villamizar’s wife. On May 25th 1991, the government called off all operations to capture
Escobar and on May 29th the government vowed to guarantee that Pablo Escobar would
not be extradited if he surrendered.
On the 2nd of June, DTO leader-government mediator, Father Rafael Garcia
Herreros, announced that Pablo Escobar would surrender to authorities along with 100
other traffickers. Finally, after much debate on June 19th 1991, the Constitutional
Assembly voted in favor of banning extradition and added Article 35 to the 1991
constitution. On this same date Pablo Escobar surrendered to authorities. On July 3rd
1991, Los Extraditables through their final communiqué announced that they were
dismantling their military organization because of the National Constitutional
Assembly’s vote against the extradition of Colombian nationals (Extraditables, 1991).
The discussion on the political cohesiveness of Medellin-based DTO leaders’ use
of violence finds that, once DTO leaders made the issue of extradition a top priority in
their agendas, they gradually and cohesively used violence to pressure political elites and
government officials to permanently prohibit extradition. As events unfolded, in addition
to banning extradition, DTO leaders based in Medellin used violence to pressure
government officials into negotiating favorable terms for their surrender to authorities.
Also the discussion on DTO leaders’ use of violence highlights three major

Colombia has always been a legally compromised post because Directors have to deal directly with
powerful criminals. Uncorrupt directors do not last long because they cannot do their jobs without being
threatened or bribed. Prison directors are caught between the demands of powerful criminals that can buy
them or kill them and the potentially corrupt politicians that supervise prison directors. For this reason,
directors usually retire early or receive bribes to survive such a dangerous post.
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characteristics of this phase of organizational cohesion: the leadership’s persistence in
obtaining its goals, its learning capacity, and finally its initial rifts among DTO leaders.
From the first incident that marked use of DTO violence—the assassination of
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla on April 20th 1983—to the indiscriminate use of car bombs, the
major terrorist attacks, and the final kidnapping campaign of 1990-1991, the main
objective of the group was to oppose the policy of extraditing Colombian nationals to the
United States. Because Pablo Escobar was the sole decision maker, the group’s
cohesiveness was strong. Usually the violent acts were characterized by retaliations
against the actions of government officials or offensives that consisted of pro-actively
using violence to pressure politicians into negotiating a ban on extradition and favorable
terms of surrender. The cohesiveness of the violent strategy goes through two phases.
The first was a selective assassination phase taking place from 1983-1988. Whereas the
second phase from 1988-1991 still used violence in a highly selective manner, but it was
used in conjunction with indiscriminate terrorist activities to create havoc and a sense of
urban insecurity. As a consequence, the second phase was more successful in pushing
politicians to negotiate with DTO leaders.
During the first violent phase, the selective assassinations of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla,
Supreme and criminal court judges, Guillermo Cano the editor of El Espectador,
Ministers of Justice, and of Luis Carlos Galan, were used by Los Extraditables to retaliate
against the policy of extradition and push for its prohibition. However, these acts led the
government to counterattack.
In the second violent phase, as DTO leaders progressively obtained negotiations
with cabinet level officials from the end of 1988 to the middle of 1991—during the
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Virgilio Barco and the Cesar Gaviria presidencies—the use of violence was done
selectively, but in combination with terrorist actions to corner the respective
administrations into negotiating. Specifically, as negotiations broke down, the use of
violence became more indiscriminate to show DTO power and conversely to show the
government’s inability to control violence. As a consequence, the use of indiscriminate
violence such as the explosion of an airliner and the destruction of the DAS building was
done to make the government capitulate. What aggravated the problem of violence for
the governments in power during the second violent phase was that violence was not only
generated by DTOs against the state, but also by DTO wars, and by paramilitary and
guerrilla groups.
When indiscriminate violence, such as car bombs, was paired with the use of
selective violence, such as the kidnappings of business and political elites, this
environment created a higher level of pressure for Presidents to negotiate because the
kidnappings created crises. The combination of discriminate and selective violence was
effective because Colombian Presidents were unable to control terrorist acts and, in
addition, the violence used by DTO leaders became more personal for Presidents in
power because they knew the people who were affected by DTO attacks. For example,
Virgilio Barco seriously considered negotiating with DTO leaders when his Presidential
Advisor’s son was kidnapped along with 20 prominent business elites from Antioquia on
December of 1989. The Antioquia kidnapping campaign was the event that led to the
first DTO leader-government truce and because of this crisis Virgilio Barco made
negotiations with DTO leaders a top cabinet level issue for the first time. In contrast,
prior to the Antioquia hostage crisis, the violence generated by DTO leaders only pushed

185

Colombian Presidents Belisario Betancur and Virgilio Barco to increase their counternarcotics efforts, such as reinstating extradition via Decree 1860 in 1989. In addition,
selective assassinations bolstered public outrage with DTOs assassinations.
During the second violent phase, the final rise in indiscriminate violence from
March to July of 1990, coupled with the Liberal kidnapping campaign resulted in the
fourth and final Villamizar negotiation, which led to a permanent Constitutional
prohibition of extradition and in a negotiated surrender of the major leaders of the
Medellin-based DTOs—the Ochoa brothers and Pablo Escobar. The organization of the
Liberal hostage crisis was a success for DTO leaders because they finally obtained the
Presidential attention needed to reach an agreement with the government.
The decision making process of Los Extraditables, which mainly relied on the
opinions of its leader, Pablo Escobar, showed the high degree of organizational
cohesiveness that the group had in pursing its political objectives and in implementing its
violent strategy. The accounts presented in this project suggest that Pablo Escobar was
the group’s sole decision-maker, which made deciding the group’s goals and strategies a
highly cohesive process. It is important to note that Pablo Escobar was able to learn how
to strategically use violence to obtain political results at each stage of the event.
During the first violent phase from 1983-1988, when Pablo Escobar was
selectively assassinating public officials, the group Los Extraditables was unable to
convince politicians to negotiate with DTO leaders or their mediators because the
assassinations only strengthened the Colombian presidencies of Belisario Betancur and
Virgilio Barco to pursue counter-narcotics policies since these mentioned Presidents felt
their actions were supported by public opinion’s outrage. In fact, the Andres Pastrana
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and Carlos Mauro Hoyos kidnapping on January of 1988 was the first attempt by Los
Extraditables to use hostages in an effort to establish negotiations. However, this first
hostage attempt failed because Hoyos died and Pastrana never became an emissary once
released. When Los Extraditables organized the Antioquia kidnapping campaign on
December of 1989, for the first time the group obtained the attention of the Barco
government because the government allowed Pablo Escobar’s emissaries to present the
DTOs leadership’s concerns at a cabinet level meeting. However, because Los
Extraditables released all the hostages in mid January and committed to a truce, as a
gesture of “good faith” (since they believed that the government would engage in
negotiations) once the hostages were released, Los Extraditables lost their negotiating
leverage. Consequently, the Barco government, uncompelled to negotiate with DTO
leaders, went on an offensive against Escobar on March of 1990 by declaring Envigado,
his hometown, a military objective.
As the leader of Los Extraditables, Pablo Escobar learned from the Antioquia
kidnapping campaign how to implement a more effective hostage crisis. From March to
July of 1990 police officers were targeted and car bombs were placed in urban centers to
create chaos as soon as DTO-government negotiations fell. Once Cesar Gaviria took over
the Presidency on August of 1990, Los Extraditables’ Liberal kidnapping campaign
quickly started a negotiation process. Instead of releasing hostages once the government
agreed to hear DTO proposals, as was done during the Antioquia campaign, the Liberal
kidnapping campaign became a prolonged process to obtain political results, which
coincided with the proceedings of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).
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The similarities between the Liberal hostage crisis and the Antioquia crisis relied
on the ability of Los Extraditables to choose hostages that would personalize the crisis for
the presidents in power. Since the Liberal hostage crisis involved the relatives of
colleagues belonging to President Gaviria’s own political party, the Liberal Hostage
Crisis became a highly personal event were Gaviria had to negotiate to save the lives of
people he knew. Another similarity between the two kidnapping campaigns was that
Pablo Escobar kidnaped the family members of a key politician, so the politician would
become both a victim and mediator. Whereas in the Antioquia campaign German
Montoya became a DTO leader-government mediator to Barco, as Montoya’s son was
kidnapped; similarly, in the Liberal hostage crisis, Alberto Villamizar became the main
DTO leader-government mediator, since both his sister and wife were hostages.
The Liberal kidnapping campaign became a more effective hostage crisis because
Pablo Escobar stretched the crisis by releasing hostages according to their political
importance and, also as negotiation points were accomplished. Consequently, and in
contrast to the Antioquia hostage crisis, Escobar as the leader of Los Extraditables did
not cede his negotiating leverage until most of his demands were met. During the Liberal
hostage crisis Pablo Escobar’s lawyer asked for: no extradition, an amnesty for crimes
committed, and special detention centers, but the final DTO-government negotiation
resulted in the following compromise: no extradition, a reduced sentence for admittance
of one crime, and the construction of a special detention center.
Finally the Liberal kidnapping campaign coupled with the Medellin DTO leaders
influence on the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was a convergence of the
legislative and violent strategies to permanently ban extradition and obtain favorable
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terms of surrender. While the executive was forced to reach an agreement with DTO
leaders on their terms of surrender (as a consequence of the hostage crisis), the financial
influence of DTO leaders on NCA assemblypersons facilitated the passage of the
Constitutional Article forbidding the extradition of Colombian nationals. Both strategies
came to fruition when on June 19th 1991, the NCA voted against extradition and Pablo
Escobar surrendered to authorities at La Catedral—the detention center constructed for
Escobar in the city of Envigado.
The discussion on the cohesiveness of the DTO’s violent strategy as implemented
by Los Extraditables also highlights the initial rifts separating DTO leaders. By 1983
following the Rodrigo Lara Bonilla assassination, as the Colombian government
intensified its pursuit of traffickers, DTO leaders realized that to avoid state persecution
they had to seek a negotiated solution to their legal troubles. The DTO leaders also
agreed that the issue of extradition became the most important agenda, since traffickers
wanted to avoid being sent to the Unites States on drug trafficking charges. While Pablo
Escobar was willing to fulfill these objectives by using violence, others –in particular the
Ochoa brothers, preferred peaceful negotiation with the government. The accounts
presented here suggest that in 1984 Medellin-based DTO leaders created Los
Extraditables to force a negotiation process with government officials. At the beginning
Los Extraditables was highly cohesive in pursuing and fulfilling their objective because
Pablo Escobar was the group’s main decision-maker and because DTO leaders based in
Medellin provided funds to launch the violent campaign against political elites.
Nevertheless, the initial rifts between DTO leaders began to show towards the end of
1990. While Los Extraditables organized the second kidnapping campaign from
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September to November of 1990, as soon as President Cesar Gaviria issued Decree 2047
on September of 1990, the Ochoa brothers began negotiating with the government
separately from Pablo Escobar. By December of 1990 Fabio Ochoa surrendered to
authorities, and by mid February of 1991 all of the Ochoa brothers had surrendered to
authorities following Decree 303. In contrast, Pablo Escobar organized the Liberal
hostage crisis and turned himself in once extradition was permanently prohibited in the
1991 Constitution. The Ochoa brothers’ separate negotiation process suggests that they
wanted to resolve their legal status separate from Los Extraditables’ Liberal hostage
campaign, even if it meant being extradited by another presidency or serving long
sentences for admitting to one crime as the early Decree drafts demanded. Moreover, the
Ochoa brothers were tired of the government’s pursuit:
When we presented ourselves to the law, there was a lot of violence. But the whole world knew it
was Pablo Escobar. We presented ourselves even when the treaty was in force. They had not
removed the treaty… In 1990 we presented ourselves, and the [extradition] treaty was repealed in
1991. And so then we were very removed from everything. We were hiding and they were
looking for us at that time to kill us… They weren't looking for us to extradite us, but to kill us.
And I think that we paid very highly for that (Interviews- Jorge Luis Ochoa, 2000).

Once in jail, the Ochoa brothers became intermediaries between mediator Alberto
Villamizar and Pablo Escobar to obtain the release of hostages and to negotiate Escobar’s
terms of surrender (Interviews – Juan David Ochoa, 2000).
Finally, this section on the cohesiveness of the violent strategy shows the
evolution of the terms of the four DTO leader-government negotiations. The 1984
Panama Negotiation was the most generous offer proposal created by the DTO leaders.
Traffickers proposed to dismantle their businesses, surrender laboratories, runways, and
aircraft, which according to DTO calculations would set the illicit drug industry back for
at least 10 years. Drug Trafficking Organization leaders proposed to bring their financial
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assets to Colombia, which would be taxable income that would increase government
revenue and to “help rehabilitate drug addicts” (Lee, 1990:140-143). In exchange DTO
leaders wanted an amnesty for crimes committed and to not be extradited.
In contrast, the 1988 Vallejo Arbelaez Negotiation was the least generous
proposal created by the DTO leaders. In the Vallejo Arbelaez Negotiation DTO leaders
proposed to surrender their illicit business in exchange for a permanent ban on extradition
and an amnesty for crimes committed, but in addition they wanted a patrimonial amnesty
and the surrender of leftist subversives—a demand the government had little ability to
implement.
The 1989 Londoño-Aristizabal-Montoya Negotiation was a more pragmatic
proposal created by DTO leaders and emissaries, also it served as a blueprint for the
fourth and last negotiation. The 1989 Londoño-Aristizabal-Montoya Negotiation terms
were basically the same as the 1988 Vallejo Arbelaez proposal, but the emissaries
suggested that the DTO leaders should surrender to authorities in order to add more
credibility to the proposal.
Finally for the 1990-1991 Villamizar Negotiation, it was the Cesar Gaviria
government, based on the previous negotiation, that set the negotiation proposal through
Decree Law 2047 published on September 5th 1990, which stipulated that traffickers
should: surrender and confess to a crime to avoid extradition. The proposal would set off
a series of offers and counter offers. As the leader of Los Extraditables, Pablo Escobar’s
counter offer was: no extradition, an amnesty, and construction of special detention
centers. Finally, the government issued Decree Law 303 on January 29th 1991, which
gave reduced sentences for admitting to one crime and no extradition for persons that
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surrendered. After agreeing to Decree Law 303, on May 21st 1991, Pablo Escobar was
granted the construction of the special detention center, La Catedral. Although DTO
leaders did not get the amnesty they wanted, they were successful in obtaining a
patrimonial amnesty, such as not disclosing business assets (like airstrips, cocaine
refineries, or routes); more importantly, they were promised not to be extradited, received
low sentences for admitting to one crime, and were allowed special detention centers.98 In
exchange, the government obtained their surrender and hoped to decrease urban violence.
Political Cohesion of Medellin-based DTOs 1991-1993
The organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO leaders drastically weakened
after Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers surrendered to authorities. During the 199091 Alberto Villamizar negotiations between DTO leaders and government officials, the
Ochoa brothers sought a separate negotiation process, which allowed the brothers to
surrender to authorities by February of 1991, while Los Extraditables were in the midst
of a hostage campaign. The Ochoa brothers saw the Gaviria government decrees as an
opportunity to avoid being held responsible for the violence generated by Los
Extraditables and to end the government’s persecution:
Frontline: Why did you decide to turn yourselves into the government?
Juan David Ochoa: We were tired of having to run. We were afraid we would get killed. We
wanted a normal life with our family, to dedicate ourselves to our businesses, to our kids, and once
and for all to finish with the headache, that nightmare that we lived.
Frontline: Did the government win the war?
Juan David Ochoa: All of us won. The government won, in the sense that they didn't have to
persecute us anymore. And we won also because we solved our problem. There's no winners or
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Although Pablo Escobar constructed his own detention center, the Ochoa Brothers and other DTO
leaders that surrendered to authorities added amenities to their prison cells like kitchens, offices, televisions,
phones, and computers, and took advantage of family and conjugal visits as permitted by Colombian penal
code.
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losers. Everybody was a winner, when there is a settlement like ours (Interviews – Juan David
Ochoa, 2000).

The Ochoa-government agreement illustrated fissures between the Ochoa brothers and
Pablo Escobar as the leader of Los Extraditables because Escobar wanted to obtain a
negotiation process through the use of violence, while the Ochoa brothers believed that
non-violent methods to obtain a negotiation process would result in a more favorable
outcome. Although the Ochoa brothers distanced themselves from Los Extraditables and
the violence generated by this group to obtain a negotiated solution to their legal status,
they indirectly benefited from the violence because it led President Cesar Gaviria to start
negotiations with them. Without the use of violence it seems improbable that the
government would have negotiated with traffickers because both the Betancur and Barco
governments failed to be receptive to trafficker demands when their proposals were
offered in the midst of relative peace—at the 1984 Panama negotiation, or at the
beginning of 1990 during the Antioquia kidnapping crisis, when DTO leaders released all
the hostages without conditions. As discussed earlier, the government was most
responsive to DTO leader demands after Los Extraditables engaged in both
indiscriminate violent campaigns and hostage crises. In fact, the theatrical terrorist acts
of late 1989 and the pervasive car bombs of the 1990s led President Cesar Gaviria to
condemn “narcoterrorism” while campaigning. Yet, the violence also led Gaviria to
create a negotiated opportunity of surrender for traffickers with the objective of reducing
urban violence. Consequently, the Ochoa brothers took advantage of this opportunity.
Other Medellin-based DTO leaders also began to distance themselves from Pablo
Escobar once he was imprisoned at La Catedral. As the leader of Los Extraditables,
Pablo Escobar had organized the war against the political establishment and had received
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contributions from fellow traffickers to fund the war, where payments ranged from
$100,000 to $250,000 a month to obtain a prohibition on extradition (Aranguren, 2001, p.
145; Clawson et al., 1996, p. 47; Hermanos Ochoa, 2009). Escobar had agreed with other
DTO leaders that, once he surrendered to authorities, DTO leaders based in Medellin
would continue paying Pablo Escobar the “war tax” while he was imprisoned. They
agreed because Escobar was powerful and he had pushed for a constitutional ban on
extradition. According to some accounts (Clawson et al., 1994; Salazar, 2000), after
Escobar surrendered, he had increased the “war tax” from $250,000 a month to a million
dollars a month by July of 1992. As a consequence of this increase, once DTO leaders
refused to pay, a conflict ensued which resulted in the death of four DTO leaders: Kiko,
William Moncada, Fernando, and Mario Galeano. Some accounts (Legarda, 2005;
Salazar, 2000; Aranguren, 2001) suggest that in addition to the “war tax,” because
Escobar had little monetary liquidity as a result of his “war effort,” he continued his
activities in the drug business and used kidnappings of fellow traffickers to support his
organization.99 It is believed that Pablo Escobar had the Galeano and Moncada brothers
killed to set an example for other DTO leaders, who: (1) thought about refusing to pay
the war tax, or (2) considered taking over Escobar’s market share in the cocaine trade.
As a result, some traffickers that had supported the activities of Los Extraditables in their
anti-extradition efforts united to oppose Pablo Escobar because of the exemplar DTO
leader assassinations. Consequently, the vigilante group Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar
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The Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez, a.k.a. “Popeye” (Legarda, 2005), account suggests that some of
Escobar’s gunman stole $20 million dollars from Fernando Galeano and when Galeano and Moncada went
to La Catedral prison to speak with Escobar, Escobar refused to give the money back and had Galeano and
Moncada killed and, allegedly, their assets were signed over to Escobar (Legarda, 2005).
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(PEPES, Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) emerged following the death of the Galeano and
Moncada DTO leaders on July 3rd 1992. This group’s leaders, Carlos Castaño and Don
Berna,100 who in the mid-1990s would participate the anti-insurgent paramilitary group
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), pursued Pablo Escobar and his allies, and
created a feud among Medellin-based DTO leaders.
The organizational cohesion of Medellin-based DTO leaders broke down because
of four main reasons: the death of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, the imprisonment of
the Ochoa brothers, Pablo Escobar’s imprisonment, Escobar’s war tax increase, and
finally, Escobar’s assassination of the Moncada and Galeano brothers. Rodriguez
Gacha’s death left a void in terms of gun power and funding for the activities of Los
Extraditables. The imprisonment of the Ochoa brothers, removed their leadership
position within DTO leaders and distanced them from violent acts. Escobar’s
imprisonment reduced his capacity as an enforcer of DTO leaders because he was
running out of funds, and because other DTO leaders such as Don Berna began
challenging Escobar’s capacity to control urban gangs of gunmen throughout Medellin.
In addition, some DTO leaders believed that since the group’s main objective—a ban on
extradition—had been accomplished, a war tax was unnecessary. Finally, because Pablo
Escobar had four of his fellow DTO leaders killed, DTO leaders believed Escobar could
not be trusted. The creation of Personas Encontra de Pablo Escobar, People Against
Pablo Escobar (los PEPES), signified the collapse of Medellin-based DTO leader
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“Don Berna,” a.k.a. “Adolfo Paz,” is Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano who had worked as chief
security man for the Fernando Galeano organization and was well connected among gunmen in Medellin
(Aranguren, 2001). He became part of the AUC and after Pablo Escobar’s death “Don Berna” became one
of Medellin’s most powerful DTO leaders because by 2004 he consolidated power among gangs in
Medellin. He was extradited to the United States on drug trafficking charges on 2008.
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cohesion, because the Pepes epitomized the collective action problem that Medellin DTO
leaders where having after the Extradition Treaty was banned and Pablo Escobar
surrendered to authorities. The accomplishment of a goal such as banning extradition and
the failure to create a new organizational objective, coupled with a distrust of Escobar as
a leader, led DTO leaders to decrease their cooperation since they did not have a new
common goal to accomplish.
Analysis
The discussion on the economic and political cohesion of DTOs showed the
influence of external events over these organizations, and the capacity of DTOs to change
their environment through the use of resources to impact politics. Economically, DTO
leaders were able to take advantage of the trade opportunities available as a consequence
of the U.S. counternarcotics policies, which prohibited the sale and production of cocaine
domestically and internationally, thereby inflating the price of a good that has a market
demand. In addition, the risk involved in producing and transporting cocaine from
Colombia to the United States increased the price of this commodity at each stage of the
trade, which makes the trade on a prohibited commodity like cocaine a profitable venture
for smugglers. The high earnings that DTOs obtained from the cocaine trade also allow
traffickers to wield political power. The great political influence allowed DTOs to run
for public office and sponsor politician campaigns, but their increased political power
also led to their increased persecution. The following discussion will summarize how the
economic and political cohesion enjoyed by DTOs allowed them to fulfill their political
objectives.
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Economically, the organizational objective of Medellin-based DTO leaders was to
reduce risks and increase profit. Whereas at the beginning of their incursion in the
cocaine trade DTO leaders were small specialized dealers, by the time they became
wealthier Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos
Lehder were able to create full service DTOs or had large scale specialized smuggling
organizations. When smuggling cocaine DTO leaders could use their full service
organizations designed to produce and export cocaine, but they could also work with
freelance dealers specialized in specific trade functions. If a trafficker would use his own
full service DTO, all employees worked cohesively to fulfill the objective of making
profit.
The organizational cohesion of a drug trafficking organization was driven by
positive and negative selective incentives. The main positive incentive driving DTO
leaders and employees to work cohesively and with discipline was the higher than
average salaries received from working in a DTO. Whereas DTO leaders made
millionaire profits, DTO employees at all stages of production earned higher than average
profits. A raspachin, who is one of the lowest paid workers in the trade, could make
earnings equivalent to the Colombian minimum monthly wage in one week. The need to
make stable profits led DTO leaders and employees to create networks of high
interpersonal trust to avoid using violence and to ensure organizational discipline;
because the higher the degree of interpersonal trust that existed within an organization
and among DTOs, the lesser need for violence to enforce discipline and resolve conflicts.
For this reason, strong familial and friendship networks were built to prevent DTO
member betrayal.

197

The use of negative selective incentives within and among DTOs also resulted in
a high degree of organizational cohesion and discipline. Violence was a negative
incentive that was widely used to enforce contracts among DTOs and to insure
organizational cohesion within a DTO. Intra-DTO violence deterred employees from
cheating DTO leaders, and since many employees had familial and friendship ties, it was
easier for organizational enforcers to track down cheaters within an organization. InterDTO violence was used to settle disputes among DTOs in the absence of legal conflict
resolution, such as courts. Although violence was widely practiced to enforce discipline
within and among DTOs, as a consequence of the weak law enforcement institutions in
Colombia, the use of violence for some DTO leaders was an enforcement mechanism of
last resort because its use attracted the attention of authorities, which could pose legal
problems for organizations.
The section on the economic cohesion of DTOs also delves on the economic
relationships among DTO leaders. Cooperation among DTO leaders was done in an
effort to maximize profits in practicing economies of scale and to allow the cocaine trade
to be flexible enough to avoid and keep ahead of authorities. One of the most notorious
cooperation among national level DTO leaders was the creation of the industrial sized
coca paste refinery called Tranquilandia, where DTO leaders would process coca paste in
massive quantities so that it could be exported in ton quantities on airplanes or in cargo
shipments. The economic cooperation among national DTO leaders lasted from 1983,
with the creation of the group MAS, until January of 1988, which marked the start of the
war between the Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations—Pablo Escobar and
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the Cali based Rodriguez Orejuela brothers primarily fought over the control of cocaine
market share when international wholesale cocaine prices plummeted.
Politically, DTO leaders based in Medellin cohesively worked to influence
politicians. DTO leaders ran in elections, donated to political campaigns, contested the
judicial validity of the Extradition Treaty, and used violence to fulfill their main political
objectives—to prohibit extradition and resolve their legal problems. Although the
electoral, judicial, and legislative strategies worked because they invalidated the Treaty
on Extradition through the use of the legal system, underlying all of these strategies was
the strategy of violence used by DTO leaders to influence politics. Using violence as a
strategy allowed DTO leaders to reduce presidential autonomy. The creation of Los
Extraditables was done to coerce policymakers into invalidating the 1979 Treaty on
Extradition, which was seen as the main threat to DTO leaders.
In general, the political cohesion of Los Extraditables was strong because Pablo
Escobar was sole leader, had clear objectives, and was supported and unchallenged by
other DTO leaders. Moreover the activities organized by Los Extraditables were well
funded by Medellin-based DTO leaders who contributed monthly dues of approximately
$200,000 dollars a month. From 1983 to 1991, this strong organizational cohesiveness
allowed Pablo Escobar to have the necessary coercive power to compel Presidents
Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria to negotiate with DTO leaders.
The interest group model used in this project is useful to look at the evolution of
Medellin DTO leader cohesion because it answers two questions: (1) how do
environmental factors affect a group’s cohesion? And (2) how does a group change its
internal dynamics to cohesively achieve policy objectives? In the case of Medellin-based
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drug trafficking organizations, the hypotheses of the Micro and Macro interest group
model explains group cohesion and fragmentation.
Hypothesis 1 of the Macro Model, designed to test the influence of external
events on groups, states that: developments in the internal organization of an illicit
interest group should follow changes to its role within a larger political environment. In
the case of Medellin-based DTO leaders, the salience of the issue of extradition in 1983
and 1984, led DTOs to invalidate the Treaty on Extradition, as a consequence of— Pablo
Escobar’s forced retirement from Congress on October 23rd 1983; the assassination of
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla that increased Colombian government counternarcotics efforts; the
U.S. Government indictments on Pablo Escobar, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and the
Ochoa brothers; in addition to the Spanish government arrest of Jorge Luis Ochoa. These
events led Medellin-based DTO leaders to realize that the extradition of nationals should
be prohibited and that is why they began to influence policy through legal and violent
means.
Hypothesis 1a states that: changes to the internal organization and structure of an
illicit interest group are related and deal with the environmental events that influence the
group and, furthermore, the changes made should be collective goods because they
benefit the organization as a whole. In the case of Medellin-based DTOs, the Extradition
Treaty’s invalidation was seen as a collective goal because, if achieved, DTO leaders
would have a Colombian “safe-haven” from U.S. legal prosecution. Consequently,
Medellin-based DTO leaders cooperated and collectively funded the implementation of
several strategies to invalidate the Treaty.

200

Both Hypotheses 1 and 1a test the Macro model because they shows how external
variables influence internal group behavior. In the case of Medellin-based DTOs,
external factors examined in this section provide evidence that supports the claim that
DTO leaders were motivated to organize based on environmental factors that
consequently influenced their behavior. Environmental factors, like increased Colombian
government persecution, U.S. indictments, and trafficker arrests, led DTO leaders to view
extradition as an important issue, the model allows a researcher to focus on the type of
internal changes that an organization may undergo. The formation of the group Los
Extraditables to counteract the Treaty on Extradition is an obvious internal change to an
environmental challenge. However, when the discussion on cohesion focuses on the use
of violence and the capacity that Pablo Escobar had for learning and changing strategies,
the model allows for a focus on subtleties—even thought it is popularly known that Pablo
Escobar and Los Extraditables used violence to influence policymakers and to change
policy—the model allows the researcher to learn why a group’s violent targets changed
from selective political assassinations to selective political kidnappings and also answers
why were selective political kidnappings were used in conjunction with indiscriminate
targets like car bombs or blowing up buildings, airliners, and newspaper headquarters.
Without a closer examination of the environmental factors that influence a group’s
leadership, it is impossible to fully understand a group’s inner workings to predict the
strategies that will be implemented to change policy.
The first hypothesis that tests the Micro Model is Hypothesis 2a, which states:
that if members of an illicit interest group need to deal with a particular issue, then they
will work together to solve the issue and, as a result, the political achievements obtained
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by the group will benefit all actors. Because overturning the 1979 Treaty on Extradition
became Medellin-based DTO leadership’s highest priority, DTO leaders worked together
in a cohesive fashion. Consequently the period of 1983-1991 was the period of highest
cohesion, as most DTO leaders funded and employed a judicial, a legislative, and a
violent strategy—to achieve the invalidation of the extradition treaty. Traffickers pooled
funds to hire lawyers that disputed the judicial validity of the 1979 Treaty, and
successfully obtain favorable judgment. Drug Trafficking Organization leaders also
financed the campaigns of congresspersons and NCA assemblypersons to constitutionally
ban extradition. Concurrent with the judicial and legislative strategies, DTO leaders
pooled funds to organize violent campaigns against judges and politicians through Los
Extraditables to compel them to annul the policy of extradition. It is during this period
that Medellin DTO leaders’ actions appear more akin to a terrorist organization than an
interest group.
Hypothesis 2a complements Hypothesis 2b that states: once a group has clear
leadership and influence, the group will have greater incentive to discipline its
membership and attain internal cohesion. Medellin-based DTO leaders, in particular
Pablo Escobar, learned from the formation of MAS that to achieve a common goal, a
group needed clear leadership and discipline. Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS), as an
anti-subversive organization, was a loose association of traffickers with little discipline.
Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) was a more pragmatic organization created to deal with
a hostage crisis, but it disintegrated because other DTO leaders did not want to succumb
to the leadership of Pablo Escobar. Whereas MAS was short-lived, it took Medellinbased DTO leaders about a year to create Los Extraditables in 1984, but this organization
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would now have clear leadership, funding, and discipline: Pablo Escobar and Jose
Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha became the group’s leaders until Rodriguez Gacha’s death.
DTO leaders based in Medellin agreed to contribute funds to finance campaigns and
violent offensives. Finally, Pablo Escobar, as the group’s chief enforcer, was respected
and feared among DTO leaders for his power and economic wealth, which allowed him
to convoke DTO leaders, create strategies, and finally enforce DTO leader agreements if
leaders failed to cooperate.
Hypothesis 2d, which also examines the internal workings of a group, states that:
when a group has realized a common goal, in periods of transition, consensus among a
group’s membership will decrease and the membership will pursue individual goals,
which may deteriorate the group development. The period dating from June 1991 to
December 1993 was a transitional period for Medellin-based DTOs because of their
success in prohibiting extradition, but also because Pablo Escobar surrendered to
Colombian authorities. This period was paradoxical because DTO leaders accomplished
their objectives, but their alliances were beginning to disintegrate as a consequence of
their political success. Some of these alliances began to deteriorate as early as 1990
when the Ochoa brothers began their own negotiation with government officials. During
this period of transition marked by Escobar’s surrender to authorities on June 19th 1991,
DTO leaders began pursuing individual pursuits. Although they initially agreed to
continue to pay a “war tax” to Pablo Escobar, their support for Escobar began to wane
especially after two events: (1) When Escobar raised individual DTO leader contributions
from about $200,000 dollars a month to one million dollars a month. (2) When he
ordered the assassination of four DTO leaders for questioning his authority. After these
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two events, which culminated with Pablo Escobar’s prison escape in July of 1992, several
Medellin-based DTO leaders challenged Pablo Escobar and created their own group, Los
PEPES, to assassinate him.
Hypothesis 2d complements Hypothesis 2c, which states that: when a group has
no clear leadership or is unable to impact policy, there will be little incentive for a
group’s leaders to organize and discipline their members. The period, from July 1992
until Pablo Escobar’s death on December 1993, was a period of chaos where Medellinbased DTOs had no policy impact and in which these groups were essentially criminal
groups engaged in organizing vendettas. Revenge killings were difficult to control, and
they affect DTOs’ leadership and general membership because the violence generated at
all levels was hard to reign. The DTO leaders and gangs in the city of Medellin initially
became divided between those who followed Pablo Escobar and those who followed Los
PEPES, and this clear division finally ended when authorities killed Escobar. However,
the period that followed Escobar’s death (1994-2004) was a period of chaos and death in
Medellin because different DTO leaders vied to control the cities gangs and cocaine trade,
and eventually, after about ten years of conflict, Don Berna consolidated power in 2004,
but this “peace” only lasted for about four years, ending when Don Berna was extradited
to the U.S. in 2008.
To conclude, tracing the evolution of organizational cohesion of DTOs and DTO
leaders allows researchers to examine how groups are affected by external events and
how a group’s internal structure is reorganized to manage such events with an effort to
alter policy, so that policy suits the group’s best interest. If the Macro organizational
aspects of this discussion are left out, the historical account can become mythological
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biographic tales of individual drug dealers and their larger than life experiences, because
the conditions that gave rise to these leaders are omitted from the analysis. If the Macro,
external factors, influencing DTOs become the sole subject of discussion, then it is
impossible to know with certainty how DTOs adapt to their environment and
consequently impact policy. Moreover, focusing only on the Micro organizational
aspects, by studying the individual actions of DTO leaders and their interaction, the study
would leave out interactions between DTO leaders (as participants in an organization
similar to a trade association) and their greater social context. Omitting the social context
would reduce the capacity to understand how individuals impact policy. Finally the
analysis of a group’s cohesion, coupled with an analysis of selective incentives and an
organizational approach is important because the model explains and illustrates why
individuals are driven to work for a common goal, but also how such alliances form and
dissolve.
Group Expertise and Technology
A group’s expertise focuses on a group’s human capital and how a group uses
such skills to influence policy. The expertise the leaders and employees of Medellinbased DTOs evolved over time because as DTOs became wealthier and more specialized,
the organizations became both economically and politically relevant. The economic
specialization was faster than the political specialization because DTOs were primarily
businesses. As DTO leaders became millionaires, around 1978, DTOs grew and
developed which led a greater number of employees to be hired by the specialized
divisions of said Drug Trafficking Organizations. Also with growth came more
specialization, since DTO leaders were less involved in the more basic shores of a DTO.
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It is not until the 1982 elections that DTO leaders openly delve into politics and hire
consultants or become surrounded by politicians.
When DTO leaders analyzed in this project started trafficking cocaine in the mid
1970s, traffickers would specialize in one aspect of the business, such as the acquisition
of coca paste, whereas others specialized in the actual transportation and smuggling of
cocaine to the United States. For example, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha specialized in
acquiring coca paste from Bolivia and Peru and refining it in Colombia. The Ochoa
brothers specialized in transporting refined cocaine to the United States at first, through
the use of human mules, and later through the use of small airplanes. Pablo Escobar also
specialized in procuring coca paste in the early trafficking stages, when he would pick up
the coca paste in Ecuador or Peru via land or air, but would outsource the management of
human mules to the United States to mule managers, like Griselda Blanco, whom
associated with Escobar and other traffickers to export cocaine. Carlos Lehder
specialized in cocaine transportation to the United States and in providing landing
facilities to other traffickers.
With time, specifically in the early 1980s, DTO leaders became wealthier and the
business grew to such a degree that drug entrepreneurs were able to build “full service”
organizations that encompassed most aspects of the trade. At this point of development,
DTO leaders still relied on outsourcing certain aspects of the business at their
convenience, but they could also delegate the work to specialists within their own
organization. Coca farmers, coca paste refiners or “cooks,” coca paste dealers, chemists,
hidden compartment builders, engineers, pilots, radio operators, security personnel,
lawyers, accountants, public relations consultants, and real estate agents, among other
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workers, were hired by DTOs for the six divisions of what can be termed as “full service”
DTOs.
The six divisions of full service DTOs organized the workload involved in the
traffic of cocaine and used specialized labor to produce cocaine. In the 1970s and early
1980s most traffickers obtained coca paste from coca farmers in Peru and Bolivia
because Colombia had not yet become a coca producer. For this reason this project’s
DTO divisions start with the procurement of coca paste in other Andean countries instead
of with coca farming. The first division of the illicit drug traffic was in charge of
obtaining raw material for making cocaine. Initially traffickers like Pablo Escobar and
his cousin Gustavo Gaviria would pick-up coca paste from Ecuador by land or air
transport. Once Escobar became wealthier, the procurement of coca paste was delegated
to workers within his organization or by outsourcing coca paste from other organizations
specialized on dealing with coca paste.
The second division of a DTO was responsible for refining coca paste. Coca
paste refinement was done in small countryside labs, in urban centers, and at industrial
sized labs found in hard to reach jungle areas—the most notable refining lab was
Tranquilandia. The use of industrial sized labs was done once DTO leaders were
wealthier and were able to finance large-scale labs, which were monitored by workers
close to each DTO leader involved in such cocaine refining cooperative (Eddy et al.,
1988). Labs hired security personnel, managers that would monitor input materials used
to transform coca paste to cocaine as well as the output, and cooks that would do the
actual transformation. The third division of the business was in charge of shipping the
cocaine through routes. This division involved human mules and their managers, pilots,
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cocaine distributors in destination countries, and government officials such as politicians
and/or police. The cocaine shipping was one of the riskiest parts of the business, but also
the most profitable for wholesale cocaine dealers. The Ochoa brothers and Carlos Lehder
became very rich because they were the first to specialize in the most lucrative aspect of
the cocaine business. However, Carlos Lehder made traffickers that specialized on the
production of cocaine like Pablo Escobar very rich because, when Lehder began
trafficking, he needed cocaine producers to supply his routes. As a consequence,
specialization was how business associations were made between major traffickers like
Escobar and Lehder, and others.
Finding safe routes was pivotal to a successful cocaine business and this division
of traffic needed the assistance of government officials. When the traffic started and
cocaine was shipped through the use of human “mule” and small airplanes that would fly
directly to secret airstrip along the U.S. coastline, finding safe and remote places for
refueling or for loading shipments was instrumental. Carlos Lehder’s ownership of
Norman’s Cay in the Bahamas, from the late 70s to the early 80s, was essential for
traffickers because they could land and refuel at a “safe station.” However, many times
“safe stations” were created with the aid of government officials in Central America and
the Caribbean Islands (Clawson et al., 1996). Paying off officials in countries where
layovers were done to refuel, pick up cocaine, or drop off money was a necessary
business cost to reduce risk. This is why Panama’s General Antonio Noriega and
Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling were key players for money laundering
and/or to facilitate cocaine shipping (Eddy et al., 1988). Lower level officials were also
paid off to facilitate traffic. During the 1970s Mexican local officials and police were
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paid off to allow traffickers to land airplanes in small airstrips. Pioneer traffickers like
Jaime Builes would pay off the Mexican police to allow his shipments to land so that they
could be transported through the Mexican border into the United States (Castro, 1994).
The fourth division of the business picked up the wholesale shipment and sold it
to U.S. retailers. In addition to distribution managers, this division employed money
launderers. Pick-up teams like those established by Fabio Ochoa, Max Mermelstein, Jon
Roberts, Mickey Munday, and Rafael Cardona Salazar or by Griselda Blanco’s
organization, were all infamous Miami wholesale distributors for the Medellin DTOs that
would manage the product pickup and money delivery (Mermelstein, 1990).101 This
division would then have to send the money back to Colombia either by shipping it
directly in hidden compartments of goods like laundry machines or cars, or by starting
the laundering process at financial institutions in the United States or elsewhere. Money
launderers varied in skill, they could range from high-end bankers working for financial
institutions to non-skilled workers employed by a DTO. Non-skilled money launderers
were in charge of regularly wiring small amounts of cash or by depositing small amounts
of cash in U.S. banks, which then could be withdrawn through the use of automated teller
machine (ATM) cards in the United States and Colombia.
The fifth division of the business dealt with security, since DTOs needed a
security apparatus to protect themselves from authorities from guerrillas, but also to
resolve disputes among traffickers. The security division involved payment of bribes so
authorities would allow traffickers to obtain gun permits, smuggle shipments, and to
establish informants on the activities of law enforcement (Castro, 1996). The security
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division of DTOs also involved hiring gunmen to carryout political assassinations,
silencing witnesses, and intimidating judicial system officials. To defend their assets and
families from guerrilla harassment, traffickers created small militias to fend off guerrillas.
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha was strongly anti-guerrilla and was the first DTO leader
to organize militias in conjunction with cattle ranchers to oppose FARC guerrillas in the
Magdalena Medio region. Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) and Associacion Campesina
de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM) were created for this
purpose, which have left a legacy of paramilitarism in Colombia.
Since the drug industry cannot turn to courts to settle business disputes, traffickers
settled disputes among themselves through the use of “trafficker mediators,” where DTO
leaders discuss how to resolve a problem at the lower levels (Castillo, 1987). However,
the use of violence was another way to resolve problems and this led traffickers to hire
bodyguards and gunmen.102 Violence in Medellin became a specialized business on its
own right, where assassins were contracted to kill in venues termed as “offices” or
oficinas. Assassin managers would pay out the contract once it was carried out on behalf
of the client, but if an assassin failed to carryout the contract in a specified period of time,
then his/her death would be contracted to another assassin, and so forth (Interview Jair
Bedoya, 2005; Interview DSS0040, 2005).
The sixth and final division of the business was the legal and administrative
division. This aspect of a DTO sought to create ways to represent DTO leaders in courts
and to launder cocaine money proceeds by establishing legal businesses and to clean up
revenues from the drug traffic. The legal teams managed the ownership of properties,
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supervised contracts, and represented traffickers in commercial and criminal courts.
Teams of lawyers specialized n extradition were hired to invalidate the 1979 Treaty of
Extradition in 1986, and to write the language for constitutional Article 35 that banned
the extradition of nationals in 1991. Accountants and financial planners managed and
created legal avenues that would clean drug proceeds by ‘fixing books’ that disguised
revenues through creative accounting, establishing faux businesses, and managing legal
businesses to make more licit money. Finally this division many times was in charge of
funneling trafficker funds to political campaigns, and some DTO leaders hired many
politicians and consultants to run campaigns or their political organizations.
The specialization and expertise of DTOs allowed these organizations to run their
business with the overall objective of making profit, which in the 1980s, the estimated
billions of dollars that DTO leaders made translated economic wealth into political power.
DTO leaders invested their money into their political campaigns or those of receptive
politicians in order to have greater status and influence within Colombian society.
Gradually, as legal avenues were closed to DTO leaders, DTO wealth and expertise was
used to fund violent offensives primarily aimed at public officials. Many of the
employees like lawyers and security personnel hired to manage the economic aspect of
the business later handled political aspects of the business for DTO leaders, such as
judicially invalidating the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, lobbying legislators, and/or
advising on the political targets for the implementation of the violent offensive—to ban
extradition and obtain a negotiation process.
Throughout every division of the business, illicit drug organizations relied on
technology for their development. Technology helped DTOs conceal the cocaine trade
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from authorities. In the 1980s, even before Global Positioning System (GPS) devices
became commercially popular in the new millennium, GPS devices aided in the
navigation of boats and planes to avoid authorities, but also in locating the coordinates
where shipments that had been unloaded in the ocean. Communications equipment such
as landline telephones, fax machines, portable two-way radios, beepers, satellite and
cellular phones allowed DTOs to communicate with their U.S. distribution cells and keep
track of shipments, which facilitated transactions and were also used to avoid authorities.
Fishing boats, speedboats, and small aircraft allowed traffickers to transport cocaine
shipments. Compartment builders were hired for hiding drugs or money in clothing,
luggage, airplanes, boats, and within shipments of goods. Chemists were hired to create
products that would be made out of cocaine, which would pass of as ceramic figures or as
book covers (Caen, 2008; En caja, 2008). Engineers were hired to construct shipping
vessels such as submarines and geneticists developed high quality coca crops that grow at
a variety of elevations. In sum, the use of technology allowed traffickers to reduce risks
and increase profits, which in turn gave traffickers greater economic and political power.
Group Size, High Low Demanders
The size of a group is an important variable because it can determine the interest
and capacity that a group’s members have in achieving a common good. It is believed
that small organizations are more efficient than larger ones because its members have a
greater interest in achieving objectives. In small organizations members can
voluntarily103 do the work necessary to obtain a collective good because it is more likely
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that the benefit will exceed the costs of doing work. If the membership is smaller, the
benefits will not have to be divided among so many members, which gives members a
greater incentive to do the work necessary to achieve a group’s objective. The size of the
group allows the membership to coordinate their actions quickly. Small groups are also
able to keep their members accountable for their responsibilities because the members
know each other. The close relation among members of an association allows a
mechanism of “peer pressure” (or “social sanctions,” as Mancur Olson would have put it
(Olson, 1971:60-65)) to make members to evaluate their coordinated effort and keep
members accountable for their actions.
The exact number of DTO leaders based in Medellin during the 1980s is not
known but some researchers and journalists estimate that around 10 to 60 core
organizational leaders existed in the 1980s. When they started to operate, DTOs were
composed of a very small number of merchants that specialized in a particular part of the
trade. According to Juan David Ochoa, only about 50 to 60 merchants existed in Bogotá,
the Coast, Medellin, and in southern Colombia, in his words, “…There were groups of
people that were friends of course...” (Interview – Juan David Ochoa, 2000). This number
is vague because it does not differentiate between DTO leaders and managers. Clawson
and Lee’s analysis of the illicit drug industry in the 1990s estimate that around 10 to 13
core organizations were involved in the drug trade (Clawson et al., 1996:19-21). They
cite Sidney Zabludoff’s104 study that suggests that 10 core organizations existed with 500
hundred-core managers. Francisco Thoumi suggests that 13 core organizations managed
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the industry. Journalistic accounts based on the MAS meeting suggest that at the peak of
Medellin-based DTOs, there was a number between 20-200 DTO leaders that met to
discuss business, political influence, and paramilitary activities, but these numbers again
do not distinguish between leaders and managers. If the numbers for the core
organization leaders provided by Juan David Ochoa, Zabludoff, and Thoumi are
considered then it could be said that there were at least 10 and at most 60 core
organization leaders.
This number is small enough to constitute a small business association that
organized to discuss business and policy issues. From this project’s discussion on the
organizational cohesion and the representativeness of the Medellin-based DTOs
cooperation among DTO leaders in Medellin was at least moderate, since DTO leaders
pooled resources for business ventures like Tranquilandia and donated funds to antiextradition politicians, or to form the groups MAS and Los Extraditables. Their
coordination generated great economic and political benefits for each DTO leader since
the extradition of nationals was an issue that concerned all DTO leaders of the time and
many voluntarily contributed resources either in funding or manpower to convince or
coerce politicians and public opinion that a ban on extradition was necessary.
Besides “peer pressure,” some DTO leaders, in particular the Ochoa brothers,
reported that fear was also a motivating force, which drove DTO leaders to cooperate in
the campaigns organized by Los Extraditables. “Peer pressure” in a small group like
Medellin-based DTO leaders, would have manifested itself by the need for each DTO
leader to show to others that he/she was doing their part in invalidating the Extradition
Treaty –so as to look involved in the process. If a DTO leader did not do their respective
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job or avoided paying dues, it is suggested that coercion was used by a groups’ leaders to
prevent “free riders,” i.e. people who did not contribute to a collective effort but benefit
from the efforts of others (Ainsworth, 2002:225). In the Medellin case study, an example
peer pressure can be the expressions of fear that the Ochoa brothers have mentioned
about Pablo Escobar. An example of coercion used among Medellin DTO leaders was the
Moncada and Galeano assasinations, where Pablo Escobar, as the enforcer in Los
Extraditables, collected a “war tax” from fellow traffickers so that he could pressure the
government to ban extradition. Escobar allegedly raised the “war tax” in July 1992 from
$200,000 to $1,000,000 a month. When members of the Gaelano and Moncada
organization failed to comply, Escobar ordered their assassination to enforce discipline
(Clawson et al., 1996:47-48).
The size of an organization, as a determinant of what drives a group of individuals
to accomplish a common good, is complemented by whether the organization has high
demanders or low demanders for a good. In small organizations, typically most of its
members are high demanders for a good and will strive to accomplish said good.
In the case of Medellin-based DTOs, all leaders were high demanders for banning the
extradition of nationals because they did not want to be sent to a jail in the United States
where they could serve long sentences. When Carlos Lehder was extradited he was
condemned to serve 100 plus years. In the following quote Juan David Ochoa expresses
the fear of being extradited, “…If someone would extradite you, that would be like being
buried alive. We respected and feared extradition…” (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa,
2000). The fear, of being far away from their family, losing their property and lifestyle,
is the reason the political coordination among DTO leaders made them an illicit interest
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group. High demanders are members who place a higher value on a particular good than
the rest of the membership. Consequently, a high demander may be more apt to pay most
if not all of the cost of producing a collective good. Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo
Rodriguez Gacha, in forming Los Extraditables, crowned themselves as the highest
demanders for the extradition ban because, apart from financing political campaigns, they
used violence to compel government officials. The motto of Los Extraditables
communiqués read “we prefer a grave in Colombia to a dungeon in the United States,”
and in line with their motto, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar died
invalidating extradition. Yet, all the violence generated by DTO leaders only resulted in
ephemeral results, since U.S. government pressure on Ernesto Samper’s presidency
amended Article 35 of the 1991 Constitution to allow for extradition of nationals from
1997 onwards.
Low demanders for extradition in DTOs were lesser known DTO leaders and
DTO employees that did not contribute much from their own resources to ban extradition,
but benefited when the ban took place. Lawyers or accountants of DTOs, who had a high
risk of getting extradited if they were apprehended by authorities, were low demanders
for extradition since they did not contribute much of their resources to overturn the
Extradition Treaty, but benefited from not being extradited.
The combination of small groups of 10 to about 60 DTO leaders and their high
demand to see the 1979 Treaty on Extradition invalidated, so that they would not be sent
to the U.S. legal system, allows the cooperation among DTO leaders to be very effective
since they were willing to contribute resources for a common good. Whether it was peer
pressure to do their part in banning extradition or fear of being punished for not
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contributing resources to overturn the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, the high demand for
banning the policy extradition drove DTO leaders based in Medellin to cooperate in
achieving this common objective, which they believed would allow them to remain in
Colombia with their lifestyle intact.
Representativeness
Representativeness is a group’s policy position relative to society (Bashevkin,
1996). This variable measures the ability a group has to convince members of society
that its political objective represents them. It is assumed that if a group represents a wide
sector of society, then it is possible that it will receive support for its cause and
consequently it will be successful at influencing policy. Medellin-based DTO leaders not
only built local, but also national electoral and public support for overturning the 1979
Treaty on Extradition. Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and the
Ochoa brothers created a nationalist argument, which presented the issue of extradition as
a violation of Colombia’s sovereignty. They proactively campaigned against extradition
by sponsoring candidates, launching their own political campaigns, and distributing
propaganda on the issue. In forming paramilitary organizations to combat leftist
guerrillas, some DTO leaders also sought to increase their representativeness among
traditional cattle ranchers and landowners. The following discussion will be limited to
the Medellin-based DTO leaders—Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, Gonzalo Rodriguez
Gacha, and the Ochoa brother’s—involvement in politics, legal and illegal, to show their
desire to influence public opinion and the opinion of politicians in Colombia.
Pablo Escobar started his political life by mainly sponsoring Liberal politicians.
In his quest for a national congressional seat in the 1982 elections, around 1979, Escobar
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established two social organizations, a newspaper, and sponsored a political party
(Legarda, 2005:35). The social organizations were Civismo en Marcha (Civicmindedness on the March) and Medellin Sin Tugurios (Medellin Without Slums). He
created a party that was an offshoot of the Liberal party called Renovación Liberal en
Antioquia (Liberal Renovation in Antioquia) and a newspaper called Medellin Civico
(Civic Medellin). Civismo en Marcha allowed Escobar to fund social projects and donate
about 100 lit soccer courts to marginal neighborhoods throughout Medellin (Salazar,
2001:78). Medellin Sin Tugurios was a project that built about 500 homes for people that
were living in Medellin’s trash heap called Moravia. These two organizations along with
other social projects in towns surrounding Medellin allowed Escobar to build a strong
base of electoral support among the urban and rural populations. At the end of his life,
when he was being pursued, it was this populist base of support that viewed him as a hero
and allowed him to remain in hiding and survive persecution from government and
enemies.105
Pablo Escobar’s political party, Renovación Liberal, sponsored Jairo Ortega for a
congressional position. Ortega was a former lawyer for the Lopez Gomez organization
that employed Escobar (Castillo, 1987; Salazar, 2001, p. 91). Escobar’s campaign
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Many people tell stories of Pablo Escobar when he was a fugitive. People of Medellin and in
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centered itself on the defense of natural resources and on the promotion of sports. For his
background information, Escobar presented himself as a sportsman who promoted sports
in various municipalities and as an industrialist and a developer.
In preparation for the 1982 general elections Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega
initially joined a new faction within the Liberal party called El Nuevo Liberalismo. Luis
Carlos Galan and Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who were two up-and-coming politicians,
launched this faction to separate themselves from the clientelist practices of the Liberal
Party. Galan and Lara Bonilla were perceived as reformers and inspired a lot of
optimism amongst people who wanted a less corrupt system of politics associated with
Colombia’s mainstream political parties. Ironically, it is believed that Pablo Escobar
wanted to belong to the Nuevo Liberalismo faction because Galan and Bonilla were a
new force in the political system and Escobar was hoping that, as a new force, the Nuevo
Liberalismo faction would accept him since he was presenting himself to mainstream
society as a progressive entrepreneur (Entel, 2009). In the documentary “Sins of My
Father,” about the life of the son of Pablo Escobar, the film reveals how Escobar initially
expressed his support for Galan and Lara Bonilla’s Nuevo Liberalismo. Rodrigo Lara
Restrepo, Lara Bonilla’s son recalls the event:
He (Rodrigo Lara Bonilla) told me, that they, my father and Galan, went to the Magdalena Medio
and he told me that they did not understand why they were receiving so much support. Why so
many euphoric people were coming (to the political rallies) to support them, when they had never
in their lives been to these municipalities, so they didn’t understand! So my dad said, ‘that is great,
what a success, what resonance the campaign has had!’ So they started to ask (people), ‘so tell us
why are you…who is the political leader that is bringing you over here (to the rally)?’ And they
(the people at the rally) said, ‘that is Don Pablo Escobar who tells us to vote for you and Don
Pablo is generous, he gives us refrigerators, and gives us money!’ and (my father would say) ‘who
is this Don Pablo Escobar? Who is so nice, this Mr. Escobar!’ He (Rodridgo Lara Bonilla) asked
around, and would tell me, if my memory doesn’t fail me, and he asked some one at the Medellin
stock market, and they said, ‘look, that man is extremely rich, but extremely dangerous’ (Entel,
2009).
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As the interview reveals, the two politicians investigated who Pablo Escobar was and
found out that he was a drug trafficker. When Galan and Lara Bonilla found out that
Jairo Ortega joined their movement and was placing Escobar as his alternate, they were
outraged. Because they were the reformers of corrupt political practices, Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla and Luis Carlos Galan publicly expelled Escobar from the Nuevo Liberalismo
faction at a campaign event held at the landmark Parque Berrío in downtown Medellin
(Salazar, 2001, p. 92). This expulsion made Lara Bonilla and Galan political enemies of
Pablo Escobar and very likely cost them their lives.
After being publicly humiliated, Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega allied with
Alberto Santofimio Botero’s wing of the Liberal Party. Alberto Santofimio Botero had
been a Minister of Justice for the Alfonso Lopez Michelsen presidency and the president
of the lower chamber of congress in 1978—a seat he had to resign from because of a
corruption scandal (Guillen, 2007, Salazar, 2001, p. 92). For the remainder of the
electoral campaign, Ortega and Escobar were able to mobilize the votes of people from
marginal neighborhoods that benefited from Escobar’s social projects. Their political
appeal was that they represented a new emerging entrepreneurial force. The trio,
Santofimio, Escobar, and Ortega, would campaign using Escobar’s airplanes and would
arrive at political rallies with an entourage that included other politicians and a famous
television presenter Virginia Vallejo (La bella, 2006). The 1982 political campaign was a
success because it won Botero a senatorial seat, Ortega a lower chamber seat, and
Escobar became Ortega’s congressional alternate. Escobar and Ortega arrived at the
Colombian House of Representatives to openly oppose the extradition of nationals.

220

Escobar’s incursion into legal politics ended about little over a year after
becoming a congressman. The newly appointed Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla, started clamping down on traffickers in late 1982 and early 1983 by: opening
closed investigations, grounding trafficker airplanes, showing trafficker links to football
and politics, and limiting weapon permits domestically and abroad (Salazar, 2001, p. 116).
During 1983 and 1984, the United States government had processed many extradition
petitions. However, since the newly elected President Belisario Betancourt was opposed
to the extradition of nationals on the basis of being an infringement of Colombia’s
sovereignty, Lara Bonilla ignored the petitions. Nevertheless, because the government
was beginning to crack down on traffickers, as the extradition requests were being
processed, and in reprisal for being expelled from the Nuevo Liberalismo faction, Pablo
Escobar and Jairo Ortega orchestrated a congressional debate on August 16th 1983 to
tarnish Lara Bonillas’ moral prestige. They presented a campaign check signed by
trafficker Evaristo Porras and cashed by Lara Bonilla. After much scandal and
controversy, President Betancur backed his Minister of Justice. Many experts on this
subject believe that Betancur showed support to Lara Bonilla because he was afraid that
traffickers would use their contribution records to extort favors or silence politicians,
since many campaigns that year received trafficking proceeds otherwise termed as
dineros calientes (“hot monies”) (Castillo, 1987; Salazar, 2001).
After the debate on “hot monies,” a September 1983 report on ABC news
presented Pablo Escobar’s involvement in the cocaine business. Soon after, Guillermo
Cano, the director of the newspaper El Espectador openly accused Escobar of being a
cocaine trafficker by exposing a 1976 arrest. It is at this point that Lara Bonilla begun a
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judicial investigation into the 1976 assassination of two DAS agents killed after Escobar
and his cousin were arrested for trafficking cocaine paste from Ecuador. After Escobar’s
criminal past was uncovered, on October 20th 1983, Escobar’s parliamentary immunity
was lifted and he was forced to resign his post, which ended his legal political career.
Soon after, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was killed in April 30th 1984 after the government took
over the industrial sized cocaine lab, Tranquilandia, at service of Medellin-based Drug
Trafficking Organizaions.
The direct electoral involvement of Pablo Escobar in politics is brief and
representatively inconsequential. His political campaign dealt with superficial issues.
Even while in Congress, the major debate Escobar participated was to tarnish the image
of a politician (Lara Bonilla) who crusaded against drug trafficking. Ironically, while
Escobar was an alternate congressman, he was unable to push for policies that would
undermine the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, his biggest political objective (Eddy et al.,
1988, p. 300). What little social representation escobar achieved, he mostly
accomplished in a preparation for the congressional elections while building an electoral
base of support. It was during this early stage that Escobar helped marginalized sectors
of society by constructing housing for the homeless and soccer fields in low-income
neighborhoods.
Besides forming legal political ties with marginalized sectors, Escobar formed
links to guerrilla and paramilitary organizations. These links were apparent especially
active after he is denied participation in legal politics. Pablo Escobar was not generally
regarded as an individual with leftist ideological leanings precisely because he was a
pioneering entrepreneur of the illicit drug business. However, his populist politics and
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the social work he did for marginal neighborhoods throughout Medellin point to his
leftist tendencies. He forged a relationship with M-19 commander Ivan Marino Ospina
after a truce was achieved between MAS and the M-19 after the kidnapping of the Ochoa
sister, Martha Nieves Ochoa (Salazar, 2001, p. 102-104). According to paramilitary
leader of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), Carlos Castaño, he and other
traffickers were present when M-19 Commander Carlos Pizarro spoke to Pablo Escobar
about the 1985 attack on the Palace of Justice that killed eleven Supreme Court Judges
(Aranguren, 2001, p. 39-48). Castaño mentions that traffickers present at the meeting
(including his brother Fidel Castaño) pooled weapons and money. According to
interviews done with M-19 members, they admit to a relationship with Pablo Escobar,
but they suggest that the relationship was forged at first with M-19 commander Jaime
Bateman and especially with commander Ivan Marino Ospina (Salazar, 2001, p. 102-104).
According to Jorge Luis Ochoa and Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez a.k.a. “Popeye” who
was one of Pablo Escobar’s gunmen, both mention that Pablo Escobar discussed the 1985
Palace of Justice attack with Ivan Marino Ospina (Legarda, 2005, p. 142).106 Movimiento19 de Abril (M-19) Commanders, Jaime Bateman and Ivan Marino Ospina died before
the November 1985 attack of the Palace of Justice materialized. So, Carlos Pizarro, as
the new M-19 commander, possibly had some communication with Pablo Escobar to use
his airstrip at Hacienda Napoles for the receipt of munitions from Nicaragua. The deaths
of the two commanders and the interviews with former M-19 members indirectly
corroborate Carlos Castaño’s account that he witnessed a meeting between Escobar and
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Pizarro (Aranguren, 2001, p. 39-48). According to M-19 members, the 1985 Palace of
Justice attack was the idea of the M-19 command and that Pablo Escobar did help, but
that he did not provide much armament or money (Salazar, 2001, p. 141). Jorge Luis
Ochoa believed that Escobar knew that burning legal records on extradition would not
benefit him judicially because authorities had copies. Ochoa said that the original plan
involved kidnaping the Justices to another country, and that Escobar wanted to support
the attack just because he liked the action (141). Even so, the deaths of eleven Supreme
Court Justices stalled the judicial process for at least a year. The inability to fill these
vacancies stalled the process of revising extradition cases and the further assassination of
judges led many judges and lawyers to avoid becoming justices because many feared for
their lives. Escobar’s involvement in the M-19’s Palace of Justice attack failed to
materialize into support from left-wing or general sectors of the population because this
attack has been one of the most unpopular events in contemporary Colombian history and
has tarnished the political careers of former M-19 members that have attempted to
participate in electoral politics.
Los Extraditables, a group that has been extensively discussed in the cohesion
section of this project, was instrumental in changing the political attitudes of Colombian
society on the issue of extradition. Los Extraditables, created to pressure politicians into
invalidating the 1979 Extradition Treaty and to open a negotiation with traffickers, was
successful in shaping people’s attitudes towards the issue of extradition. Although at first
the public was indifferent to the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, the initial violence generated
by DTO leaders led public opinion to be outraged at DTO violence. The first instance of
public outrage was felt on April of 1984 with Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s assassination.
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When the press covered news of a Panama negotiation, people were outraged that
government officials would negotiate with traffickers and this latter anger led the
Belisario Betancur and Virgilio Barco governments to pursue traffickers. The last bout of
public anger against DTO leaders position on extradition took place when Presidential
candidate Luis Carlos Galan was assassinated on August 1989.
However, as the war between DTOs, Los Extraditables and the state, and between
paramilitaries and guerrillas became prolonged events, the public grew tired of urban and
rural violence. In late 1989, the targets of Los Extraditables became less selective and
their violent campaign sought to demonstrate their power by blowing up large targets to
forcefully convince the general public that a negotiation with authorities was needed to
obtain peace. By targeting people's sense of insecurity Los Extraditables succeeded in
changing public opinion, from public outrage towards early political assassinations, to
public acceptance of DTO leader demands such as the need for negotiation, amnesty, no
extradition, and peace. In December 1989, four months after Galan’s assassination, a
survey done by the newsmagazine Semana found that 58 percent of those polled favored
a negotiation with traffickers and 64.3 percent favored pardons for traffickers if they
retired from the trafficking business (Clawson et al., 1996:100).
Because of Galan’s assassination, Cesar Gaviria –a friend and member of Galan’s
Nuevo Liberalismo wing of the Liberal Party, was elected by a wide margin of votes on
March of 1990 mainly as a show of popular support for Luis Carlos Galan. Cesar Gaviria
was a complex candidate because his campaign message was conciliatory instead of
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combative, which is what many107 expected since he was a close advisor108 to Galan
before his death. Gaviria campaigned promising to end narco-terrorism and the violence
it generated by offering traffickers a negotiated option, which coincided with public
opinion polls. On November of 1990 another survey conducted by Semana found that 60
percent of those polled favored an amnesty for traffickers and 80 percent answered that
they would accept an “Extraditable” as a cabinet minister –if it meant that Colombia
would be at peace (Clawson et al., 1996, p. 101). The poll reflected the general
exhaustion with the car bombs attacks in Colombia’s major cities and that most people
wanted peace at any cost.
By November of 1990 most indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated by Los
Extraditables had subsided, while the selective Liberal kidnapping campaign was
underway. This campaign led Gaviria to negotiate terms of surrender with traffickers. By
1991, 82 percent of the Colombian population believed that extraditing nationals should
be invalidated through the creation of a Constitutional Article (Botero, 1991). This
opinion gave NCA assemblypersons the support they needed to prohibit the extradition of
nationals in the 1991 Constitution. The immediate need for an end to urban violence was
an argument that helped many Colombian’s rationalize their support of invalidating the
1979 Extradition Treaty as a tool to combat DTO leaders. In the view of many
Colombians, the “War on Drugs” was going to be a prolonged war because the demand
for cocaine would continue to fund DTO leaders’ war against the state, consequently,
many believed that the bloodshed in Colombian streets would be difficult to stop.
107
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Cesar Gaviria was Luis Carlos Galan’s chief of debate in Galan’s presidential campaign.
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According to this logic, if politicians could reach an agreement with DTO leaders, the
agreement would not end the “War on Drugs,” but it was thought that in the least a DTOgovernment agreement could end the violence in Colombian streets. In 1991, this antiviolence position aligned with the anti-extradition position pursued by DTO leaders
increased the representativeness of Pablo Escobar as leader of Los Extraditables vis-à-vis
the general population.
Pablo Escobar’s involvement with MAS gave way to his participation in other
paramilitary organizations. Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) had little representativeness
impact in Colombian society because it was a subnational organization in pursuit of
another subnational organization, the M-19, and though it sought to obtain the acceptance
of the general population or authorities by spreading anti-kidnapping flyers in stadiums, it
was an organization that appealed mostly to traffickers.
Soon after, Pablo Escobar joined forces with Rodriguez Gacha and other
landowners to fund right-wing paramilitary forces that would primarily protect their
properties from FARC harassment in the Middle Magdalena region. According to
judicial investigations into the massacre of individual leftist activists or sympathizers of
the FARC’s political wing the Union Patriotica (UP), Pablo Escobar was involved with
the Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio
(ACDEGAM) (Castillo, 1990, p. 233). The ACDEGAM was a paramilitary group
composed of cattle ranchers and drug traffickers turned landowners in the Magdalena
region. Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio ‘s
(ACDEGAM) leaders were Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Henry Perez. Pablo
Escobar’s involvement in ACDEGAM was less extensive as was Rodriguez Gacha’s, but
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Gacha sought to defend properties located in the region from being taxed by the guerillas
and that is why he gained legitimacy among landowners and paramilitary leaders in the
Magdalena region such as Henry Perez. However, after the 1989 death of Rodriguez
Gacha and Henry Perez the relations between Pablo Escobar and paramilitary groups was
short lived, especially after 1992 when Escobar escaped from prison since many of these
paramilitary leaders, in particular Carlos Castaño, formed Los PEPES to pursue Escobar.
In sum, of all the organizations that Escobar formed or participated Los
Extraditables had the most representativeness and policy impact. The local social
projects he built had a following among marginalized sectors of Medellin whom felt
much loyalty towards him. Los Extraditables was a violent organization, but its
persistence and strategy gradually led the general population to oppose extradition and to
approve of a negotiation with traffickers.
Carlos Lehder became politically active when he returned to Colombia around
1978. Around 1980 he began offering money to politicians for their campaigns (Orozco,
1987, p. 63). He created the political party Movimiento Latino Nacional (MLN) in 1983
and bought a newspaper called Quindío Libre. In a sociological analysis of Lehder’s
impact on the town of Armenia, Quindío during the early 1980s, Jorge Eliécer Orozco
depicted how Lehder destabilized the political and social environment of the town.
Lehder launched the careers of politicians with budgets that far surpass those of career
politicians with 20 years of service. Politicians sponsored by Lehder were given:
airplanes to campaign across the Department of Quindío, free media (Lehder would buy
newspaper ads and stories), and organized events called ‘Patriotic Saturdays.’ During
Patriotic Saturdays candidates could explain their platforms and people were given
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lunches with cash prizes. Basically, Lehder obtained votes by appealing to the masses
through populist messages and by giving out money (Orozco, 1987). People would write
to Lehder asking him for money to fix their houses, pay tuitions, and hospital bills among
other favors. Carlos Lehder even created an organization so that peasants could buy land
without needing down payments. All of the economic favors were popular and done in
an effort to obtain political support.
Lehder’s financing of political campaigns included contributions to the campaigns
of his opposition. He did this to compromise them so that they would not accuse his
candidates of receiving ‘dirty money.’ Since Lehder’s money was tempting, many
opposition candidates received the money because without Lehder’s contribution the
electoral competition would be skewed towards Lehder’s own candidates, so opposition
candidates received contributions to level the playing field (Orozco, 1987:145). In an
interview, Lehder said to have contributed to the political campaigns of national
politicians in both the Liberal and Conservative parties—which included Senatorial
candidate Alberto Santofimio Botero (Escobar’s Candidate) and both Presidential
Candidates Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and Belisario Betancur (Orozco, 1987:145 and
225-226). In 1982 and 1983 when President Betancur would openly refer to the 1979
Treaty of Extradition as an infringement to Colombia’s sovereignty, Lehder praised
Bentacur for being a defender of Colombia and regarded him as a proud exponent of
“Colombia’s peasant heritage” (Orozco, 187:157).
In Lehder’s newspaper, Quindío Libre, he would present a variety of political
ideas. Lehder opposed traditional political parties, the imperialist American government,
multinational companies, and also the policy of extradition (Orozco, 1987:154-172). He
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was a nationalist, and his paper promoted a form of fascism (where the Latin race,
specifically “the Paisa” culture of north central Colombia, was regarded as the supreme
race). Lehder fostered Colombian industry, promoted environmentalism and the
legalization of marijuana. When speaking against the 1979 Treaty on Extradition, Lehder
denounced President Turbay Ayala and his Ambassador to the U.S. government Virgilio
Barco, referring to them as “damned puppets of the imperialist mechanism at the service
of the American interests and government” (168).109 He believed that Article 17 of the
Penal Code protected Colombian nationals from being extradited because it stated, “that
in no case would Colombia offer the extradition of nationals nor would concede those
already condemned of political crimes” (208). Lehder believed that Law 27 of 1980,
which recognized the 1979 Treaty of Extradition between Colombia and the United
States, should not exist because, according to him, the constitution should not override
the penal code. He would use this nationalist stance to appeal to people’s sense of
patriotism and therefore gain political support.
Initially Lehder’s political party was seen as something innovative and was
offering ideas that were more practical than what traditional parties had done in the past.
Many students, unions, and politicians linked to traditional parties became part of the
Movimiento Latino Nacional (MLN) because they saw Lehder and his politicians as
innovative, but overall they saw him as a person with a lot of economic means that could
fund their own political projects (Orozco, 1987, p. 153). Lehder’s own political
aspirations lasted until 1986 when he ran for the Senate. However his movement was
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This quote denotes how Lehder was so hard to classify because he referred to himself as a fascist but his
rhetoric was communist.
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weakened as early as June 1983 when Lehder openly admitted of being a drug trafficker
to Yamid Amat, a journalist of the national Caracol Radio chain. During the interview he
spoke of Norman’s Cay, his transportation business, and denounced the 1979 Treaty of
Extradition. After these declarations, on October of 1983 Lehder was a fugitive and his
economic largesse was being misspent. For the March of 1984 elections MLN obtained
10,857 votes out of a total of 97,422 departmental votes but, despite the low number of
votes and thanks to proportional representation, Lehder’s party won two Departmental
congressional seats and 11 city council seats.
On April 30th 1984 ,when Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was
assassinated, President Belisario Betancur changed his nationalist anti-extradition policy
in order to actively pursue traffickers. After holding President Belisario Betancur in high
regard, in a letter written on September of 1984, Lehder expressed that Betancur was a
traitor and a hypocrite. According to Lehder, Betancur not only received funding from
traffickers, but also that Bentacur campaigned using trafficker airplanes, one of which
was painted in the Conservative party’s blue campaign colors (Orozco, 1987, p. 226;
Escobar, 2000, p. 158; Salazar, 2001, p. 93). Given the national turmoil over the violent
impact of drug trafficking in 1984, the Governor of Quindío forbade Lehder’s candidates
from taking over their elected posts. Even as a fugitive, Lehder ran for a Senatorial seat
on March of 1986, which he lost. He was later captured on February 4th 1987 and
immediately extradited via decree. Although Lehder used the same clientelist strategy
and formed the same type of organizations and media outlets as Pablo Escobar to obtain
political power, Lehder’s political message failed to obtain traction with the public in
Quindio or in Colombia because his ideas were scandalous and less mainstream. Mostly,
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politicians and some citizens were interested in his money than his nationalist, populist,
and fascist ideas.
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha “El Mejicano” was a major contributor to political
campaigns of Conservative politicians and a founder of paramilitarism in Colombia.
According to Fabio Castillo, a journalist who did in-depth inquiries on the lives of
traffickers at the height of their power, Rodriguez Gacha was the primary benefactor of
Belisario Betancur’s presidential campaign in 1982 (Castillo, 1987). Rodriguez Gacha
along with Carlos Lehder, Pablo Escobar, and the Ochoa brothers admitted they
contributed to the 1982 presidential campaign of Liberal candidate Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen so he would oppose the extradition treaty. Though Lopez denied that he
knowingly received the funds, his campaign manager was Ernesto Samper Pizano.
Samper later was involved in one of the biggest campaign finance scandals when he
became President in 1994 and was accused of receiving $6 million dollars from Cali
DTOs. Lopez only admitted that while campaigning in Medellin, for Samper, he stepped
into an Intercontinental Hotel suite full of people, but that he did not know who they were
(Salazar, 2001, p. 93-95; Lopez et al., 2001, p. 142).
Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha also supported the political campaigns of many
local level politicians especially in the Middle Magdalena Region throughout the 1980s.
The Magdalena region was an area where he owned large tracts of land.110 Rodriguez
Gacha like Lehder also admitted to being a drug trafficker in a TV interview granted to
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During this period of time many traffickers bought large tracts of land in areas harassed by guerrillas
because they were cheap, as landowner wanted to sell them because they did not want to deal with
guerrillas. The Magdalena Medio region was one harassed by guerillas were Pablo Escobar, Rodriguez
Gacha, and many other traffickers bought land. Needless to say this area has suffered from violence
because it, to this day (2012), is caught in the crossfire between traffickers turned paramilitaries and
guerrillas.
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journalist German Castro Caycedo. Rodriguez Gacha did not see anything wrong with
his profession probably because he was brought up surrounded by illegality throughout
his life. He believed that he had a right to his wealth even if it was made by dubious
means. His frankness to the media on his profession was evidence of his amorality when
it came to the drug business and the use of violence. Since he funded the careers of
politicians, and because in many instances police and military forces provided him with
protection against guerrillas, in his view, legal sectors in Colombia were compromised
and had little credibility (Castillo, 1987, p. 238). For Rodriguez Gacha, people were
naïve if they did not know the system worked through corruption and violence. In his
“dual” worldview, where people were his allies or his enemies, politicians, members of
the justice system, and guerrillas operating in the Colombian political system could be
bought, but if legal sectors and guerrillas were an obstacle they thus could be killed.
In the face of FARC guerrilla harassment in the Magdalena Medio region, and
because of ideological and business disagreements he had with the guerrilla’s leadership
(Dudley, 2004; Castillo, 1990), Rodriguez Gacha formed alliances with cattle ranchers
and founded Movimiento de Restauración Nacional (MORENA). This group was a
movement that agglutinated the supporters of the ACDEGAM with those of Tradición
Familia y Propiedad (TFP). While ACDEGAM was a military organization that
coordinated counterinsurgency efforts (Clawson et al, 1996, p. 187), MORENA was the
political wing of this counterinsurgent paramilitary group. Its political platform
supported: democracy, the right to life, education, political, social, and economic
development, but it opposed the leftist UP, which was the political wing of the FARC in
the 1980s. Fifty percent of MORENA was supposedly funded by Rodriguez Gacha
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himself and the rest of the movement was to be funded by cattle ranchers led by Henry
Perez (Castillo, 1990, p. 238-239). For the 1988 elections, MORENA was able to fund
the careers of Magdalena Medio politicians and won six mayoral races (Lee, 1989, p.
136; Dudley, 2004, p. 121). Rodriguez Gacha became a true patron who worked within
clientelist parameters because he not only launched the careers of politician, but also
personally paid citizens to vote for his candidates (Cockburn et al., 1990). Pablo Emilio
Guarin Vera, a famous paramilitary leader, won a congressional seat for MORENA. One
of MORENA’s mayors, Luis Rubio had a warrant for his arrest because he was charged
with helping mastermind a massacre that killed 40 people in two villages of the bananagrowing region of Uraba in the north of Colombia (Lee, 1989, p. 161, Castillo, 1991, p.
228, Clawson et al, 1996, p. 189, Dudley, 2004, p. 121). Besides making allies with legal
sectors of Colombia’s cattle ranching community, Rodriguez Gacha’s paramilitary
operations in the region involved organizing massacres and assassinations of UP
members, which were done with the complicit knowledge of police and military
commanders (Castillo, 1991, p. 228; Dudley, 2004).
In sum, Rodriguez Gacha’s political views coincided with those of newly rich
traffickers and traditional landowners who had been harassed by guerrillas, such as the
FARC, which charged landowners guerrilla war-taxes on their property. Rodriguez
Gacha’s participation in electoral politics shows that he contributed funds to the same
anti-extradition candidates as other traffickers. He also sought to finance the campaigns
of extreme-right wing politicians who saw the political left as an enemy that should be
eliminated. Rodriguez Gacha like Pablo Escobar and Carlos Lehder used clientelist
methods to buy votes and obtain support for the campaigns of his candidates. Although
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Rodriguez Gacha was skeptical of the legality of government officials, he believed in the
need to defend private property at all costs and that is why he was respected among
landowner and paramilitary circles.
The Ochoa brothers were politically less vocal than the rest of the Medellin-based
DTO leaders analyzed in this project. The Ochoa brothers were not concerned in forming
a political party or movement, they used violence to a lesser degree than Pablo Escobar
and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, though they were key actors in the formation of
MAS in order to rescue their sister Martha Nieves Ochoa and the Ochoa brothers were
suspected of organizing the assassination of U.S. Federal Witness pilot Barry Seal. The
main interests of the Ochoa brothers was to make profit and use their money to influence
politicians in order to ban extradition. Since the Ochoa family was famous nationally for
raising horses, they had a higher social status than most traffickers (Terrorismo, 1982;
Eddy et al., 1988). Due to their higher social status, the Ochoa brothers built ties with
Colombia’s political and economic elite without recurring to violence (Streatfield, 2010).
Proof of their good political networks were the declarations of key businessmen done to
vouch for the origins of their wealth and their legal standing, which were done during the
1984 detention of Jorge Luis Ochoa in Spain (Castillo, 1991, p. 64).
As it has been mentioned, especially during the 1982 presidential elections, the
Ochoa brothers gave money to the presidential campaigns of Liberal Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen and Conservative Belisario Betancur. These donations reflect that IIGs
behaved similar to legal interest groups because the Ochoa brothers and other DTO
leaders gave funds to opposing parties to insure that whomever won would enact
favorable policies. Yet, individual DTO leaders had their own preferences and according
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to Juan David Ochoa, the Ochoa brothers favored Liberal candidates since they
considered themselves Liberals (Interviews - Juan David Ochoa, 2000). Their political
involvement during the 1982 elections highlights some moderate coordination among
Medellin-based DTO leaders because the Ochoa organization supported the same
candidates as other DTOs leaders.
Analysis
The wealth generated by illegal drug proceeds allowed DTO leaders based in
Medellin to become politically powerful at local and national levels. At local levels
Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder, and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were able to build
strong bases of support by exchanging economic favors for redundant electoral support.
This type of exchange was not new in Colombia because its political culture has strong
clientelistic overtones especially in rural and poor urban sectors where political patrons of
all stripes broker favors, such as government services, for votes. The emergence of
cocaine traffic simply injected more money in the clientelistic electoral system and DTO
leaders themselves not only became political patrons or leaders that could buy votes from
citizens, but also launched the campaigns of many political candidates. In contrast to
traditional party patrons, traffickers during the 1980s did not need to control the state
bureaucratic apparatus to dole out favors to citizens; traffickers had their own cocaine
proceeds to finance political campaigns. The political rally example of Lara Bonilla and
Galan’s first encounter with Pablo Escobar’s economic power illustrates that these
traffickers were looking for “the political leader” that would send them outstanding
electoral support—a public support that was bought through gifts of household
appliances. Whether it was Escobar’s Renovación Liberal, Lehder’s Movimiento Latino
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Nacional, or Rodriguez Gacha’s MORENA, all of these political parties or movements
used clientelism to gain local support and were successful in doing so. Also, the
interaction of DTOs with politicians showed their capacity to act as illicit interest groups
because they were able to fund political campaigns in exchange for policy outcomes.
By participating in legal electoral politics, be it their personal candidacies or the
sponsoring of anti-extradition politicians, traffickers were able to place the issue of
extradition on the political agenda of many politicians and the general public specifically
by focusing on nationalist arguments. Traffickers were able to sell their particularistic
goal—their right not to be extradited for drug traffic—as a violation of national
sovereignty, a general issue that affects all Colombians. Though their electoral strategies
varied, the donations to similar politicians with anti-extradition positions like Alberto
Santofimio Botero, Belisario Betancur, and other candidates, showed that DTO leaders
had some degree of coordination.
Although DTO leaders used clientelism and legally participated in the electoral
process, they also worked with or founded illegal armed groups such as M-19, Los
Extraditables, MAS, and ACDEGAM. Pablo Escobar’s collaboration with the leftist
guerrilla M-19 was of a utilitarian nature where he helped them acquire munitions so they
would destroy judicial records. DTO leader participation in paramilitary organizations
like MAS and ACDEGAM was also utilitarian, where these right-wing organizations
were created to counteract actions of left-wing guerrillas and to defend the lives of
hostages and to protect private property. However, in contrast to the collaboration of
some DTO leaders with left wing organizations, the right-wing agenda was accepted by
legal sectors such as landowners and cattle ranchers in the Middle Magdalena region.

237

Finally, although a wide range of the population repudiated many of the actions
committed by Los Extraditables, the public’s opposition to the group’s actions was
malleable. The power and ruthlessness of DTOs in their creation of Los Extraditables
and in their implementation of violent campaigns showed the weakness of the presidency
in its inability to monopolize the use of force. Although DTOs sold the issue of
extradition as a broad nationalist concern, for urban dwellers, the issue of extradition
became a personal safety issue because people were more concerned about their own
safety in cities living amidst violence. Los Extraditables violated dwellers sense of
personal security with the staging of car bombs, or the blowing up of airliners,
government buildings, and police stations. For the great part of the population, if
approving of negotiations with DTO leaders, amnesties, and cabinet positions for
members of Los Extraditables, would lead to peace, then support for such policies was
acceptable, rather than suffer persistent terrorist attacks employed by Los Extraditables.
The issue of personal security was more important for urban populations than was the
Liberal kidnapping campaign, or fighting “the Drug War.” The latter two issues were not
problems directly affecting the general population. Instead, the concern of popular
opinion was the increase in the use of indiscriminate violence by DTOs. The violation of
personal safety was essentially the success of the DTOs violent campaign because it
showed the power of DTO leaders to coerce the general public into accepting their policy
demands not only on extradition, but also for an amnesty for crimes committed, if peace
could be achieved. As a consequence, the issues pursued by DTO leaders overlapped
those pursued by the general population thereby increasing the representativeness of
DTO leaders vis-à-vis the general population. The use of clientelism, the use of
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nationalist rhetoric, and finally the use of violence and the states' inability to control it,
led public opinion to accept the traffickers' position on the issue of extradition as a means
to put a stop to urban violence and to increase the public's sense of personal security. As
a consequence, Cesar Gaviria was able to win the 1990 presidential elections by being
able to tap into the public’s desire for security, by offering a negotiated option to
traffickers.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
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With an effort to understand the political influence of informal organizations
involved in the psychoactive drug trade, I ask three main questions at the outset of this
project: Under what conditions do illicit interest groups (IIGs) develop? What effect do
IIGs have on policy? And, what are the effects of these groups on democratic
institutions? The questions are influenced by my own research on U.S.-Colombian
relations and by the works of Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee’s real-time research
on Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in Colombia. Both Thoumi and Lee conclude
that DTOs—although illegal—operate in similar fashion to interest groups, which band
together to protect their established interests and, as a consequence, actively seek to
influence political decisions.
My previous research on U.S.-Colombian relations focused on the Colombian
executive branch and its capacity to implement international counternarcotics agreements.
My research conclusion was that “pressure groups” such as DTOs have a significant
impact on the implementation of bilateral counternarcotics agreements.
In addition, Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer Lee’s pioneering work during the
1980s paved the way towards a serious inquiry into: (1) how the cocaine industry works
(Thoumi, 1994; Lee, 1990); (2) what were the early incentives that allowed DTOs to
flourish (Thoumi, 1994); and, (3) the dynamics between the government and DTOs (Lee,
1990; Clawson et al., 1996). Thoumi and Lee’s initial insights on the relations between
DTO leaders and politicians inspired my project. Both Thoumi and Lee concluded that
“…narcotics barons (were) possibly the dominant interest group in Colombia” primarily
because of their substantial economic power (Lee et al., 1999).
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In another study analyzing DTO-government negotiations, Lee and Clawson
(Clawson et al., 1996) concluded that DTO leaders had limited political agendas, which I
found to be an interesting conclusion because such behavior was reminiscent of legally
established interest groups that have narrow agendas and have valuable political impact.
Consequently, my dissertation sought to build on previous research by analyzing illicit
groups, such as DTOs, through the lens of an interest group model. The interest group
model allows for the study of DTOs as informal political organizations. Initially I argue
that an interest group model would be useful, especially in analyzing real-life
circumstances because DTOs play a measurable role in affecting politics in similar ways
to established groups. Specifically, when a DTOs’ non-violent mechanisms for
influencing policy are taken into account.
My dissertation’s main argument is, however, that although DTO leaders’ agenda
may be limited, their political impact merits the study of DTOs as illicit interest groups.
In studying “criminal” organizations through an interest group model researchers can
fulfill three goals: (1) examine external influences that lead to a group’s development; (2)
examine internal dynamics that permits a group’s organization the pursuit of a common
policy objective; and, (3) examine a group’s political impact on its environment. As such,
it is possible to learn why informal organizations continue to exist and have an impact on
politics.
To answer the project’s three main research questions on the political influence of
Medellin-based DTOs I devised an interest group model that studied their effect on
politics, as well as, an organizational analysis to study their political lifecycle. The
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following discussion will center on: a brief overview of the model, the project’s three
main questions, implications, and areas for future research.
In a nutshell, the interest group model created for the analysis of Medellin-based
DTOs is a hybrid model called the Macro-Micro-Model (covered in Chapter 2).111 The
structure of the model fused two differing schools of thought within interest group
literature—the pluralist and institutionalist schools of thought—which have
complementary approaches to the study of societal groups and their interaction with state
institutions. The theoretical differences between the two models may lead researchers to
conclude that these models are theoretically incompatible. However, the opposite is true
because the models’ differences compensate for each model’s own deficiencies. The
fusion of both models increases their explanatory power, by utilizing their deficiencies as
complementary parts, in similar fashion to pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. For example, the
more descriptive aspects of the pluralist model are compensated by the analytical
qualities of the institutionalist approach. Also, the “impartial absence” of the state in the
pluralist model is compensated by the institutionalist focus on how a state’s institutions
delimit group competition. Consequently, the hybrid Macro-Micro-Model provides for a
more complete explanation of interest group behavior.
The Macro-Micro-Model is useful because it works with valid variables that have
previously been used to measure the effectiveness of group’s effort in influencing policy.
In essence, the model provides two sets of independent variables. The Macro-model
studies a set of external influences on group development. As such, the Macro-model
111

The name of the model was derived from Amie Kreppel’s organizational analysis on the EU legislature
(Kreppel, 2002).
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focuses on the conditions or context in which a group flourishes. The Micro-model on the
other hand, examines a set of internal variables of a group’s organizational dynamic to
explain policy successes or failures. Since the Micro-model examines a group’s internal
dynamic, it can focus on showing why and how a group embarks on achieving a policy
goal. The Micro-model can also show how a group’s internal dynamic leads to a group’s
demise. Finally, the model also studies a group’s influence on democratic institutions by
examining the interaction between an IIG’s organization and a state’s autonomy.
The hybrid Macro-Micro-Model I constructed in the dissertation allows
researchers to draw a causal relationship between external variables and the internal
functioning of a group, while at the same time identifying the influences that cause a
group to develop and disband. In The model, as applied to Medellin-based DTOs in this
project, shows how external variables affect a group to form and, in turn, how internal
variables allow Medellin DTO leaders to influence policy, but also how the group
dynamic results in a group’s decline.
The first question my dissertation set out to answer was: under what conditions do
illicit interest groups, such as DTOs, develop? My research found supporting evidence
that external environmental conditions do, in fact, lead to group development.
Political events such as the creation of the “Drug War” by the Nixon
Administration had political and economic effects, which led to the formation of DTOs as
economic entities. When an historical perspective is taken, the role of Medellin-based
DTOs in the psychoactive drug trade was opportunistic and its behavior was similar to
other informal organizations that have participated the trade. United States government
policies designed to prohibit the production and sale of psychoactive drugs, like cocaine,
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overvalued the drug’s price because the policies increased the risk involved in trading
cocaine across U.S. borders. Consequently, the policies, which aimed at reducing the
supply of drugs in the international market, unintentionally stimulated trade as an illicit
commodity, by default of the high profit margins to be had by traffickers.
Directly influenced by the profitability of the cocaine market and following an
economic logic, Medellin-based DTO leaders sold cocaine to meet the international
market’s underground demand and to benefit from the high profit margins at a time (a
wholesale kilo of cocaine was priced at $60,000 dollars). In the words of Jorge Ochoa,
“The business started growing like any other business. It becomes like a ball of snow. It
grows by itself, and demand makes it grow… It seemed like a game, and nobody paid
attention to it. Nobody, nobody. That was something very easy, I thought” (Frontline,
2000a).
The last phrases of Jorge Ochoa’s quote is telling of the deficiencies in state
capacity, which directly contributed to the economic and political rise of drug trafficking
organizations. My research found that DTO members and law enforcement authorities
concurred that, during the mid-1970s, heroin and marijuana were of primary concern for
U.S. law enforcement officials, in part because heroin and marijuana were socially
trendier than cocaine during this period. It is not until the early 1980s that U.S. authorities
begin to focus law enforcement capabilities on the cocaine trade. Consequently, during in
the 1970s, when DTO leaders began to experiment with the cocaine business, the lack of
international and domestic controls on the cocaine trade allowed DTO leaders to obtain
great economic wealth and to increase their trafficking organizations to the point of
creating vertically integrated businesses, otherwise known as full service DTOs.
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Weak state capacity in the form of corrupt law enforcement allowed DTO leaders
to purchase influence in order to protect their trafficking routes. The accounts of Pablo
Escobar’s early incursions into the smuggling world revealed that DTO leaders learned
from their mentors how to buy off public officials. These accounts also reveal that public
officials, specifically police and military personnel, sought smugglers to obtain extra
income, which shows how corruption is a symbiotic relationship. My study found that
counternarcotics efforts create contrasting roles for law enforcement officials because, on
one hand, officials have to enforce the law and curve smuggling operations but, on the
other hand, the high profits derived from the drug trade lure authorities to become active
participants and sometimes facilitators of the trade.
The study also found that weak state capacity contributed to the rise of non-state
actors like rural paramilitary groups, left-wing guerrillas, and urban gangs. In the absence
of state institutions that may provide security throughout the Colombian territory, power
vacuums have created a “problem of stateness” because state institutions do not enforce
rule of law equally throughout a territory. Subnational groups fill the geographic power
vacuums in rural and urban areas left by state institutions and set their own authority
upon the population. My research found that DTOs created paramilitary groups to protect
their newly acquired rural assets—Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) developed to
counteract the M-19 guerrilla’s harassment, and later another paramilitary group,
ACDEGAM, was created to fight off FARC guerrilla activity in the Magdalena Medio
Region. Even though MAS and ACDEGAM ceased to exist, the legacy of DTO funded
paramilitary groups persists today (2012). Evidence of the persistence of paramilitary
activity is the emergence of the now demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
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(AUC) during the mid-1990s, and the current development of a myriad of other armed
groups linked to new DTOs termed by Colombian government officials as BACRIM—
Bandas Criminales (Criminal Bands). The BACRIM operate throughout Colombia and
have mainly formed to fend off FARC guerrilla activity. The BACRIM span across the
Colombian territory and have taken over the illicit drug business of DTO leaders who
have been arrested, extradited, or killed by Colombian authorities (El Espectador, 2011).
Some of the known BACRIM groups are: Los Urabeños,112 Aguilas Negras, Los
Rastrojos,113 Los Paisas, and the Ejercito Revolucionario Popular Anti-Subersivo de
Colombia (ERPAC),114 among others. Since the 1980s, the creation of DTO-linked
paramilitary groups has continued a legacy of protecting rural properties with non-state
actors and has led to human rights violations, forceful land takeovers, an internally
displaced population of 3.7 million (HRW, 2012), and a high homicide rate of 33
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC, 2011).
State capacity is also an important variable, when discussing the rise of urban
gangs because the inability of state institutions to establish the rule of law in urban
centers has caused the creation of hundreds of gangs linked with DTOs, which in turn
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The group, Los Urabeños, (during January 2012) staged a boycott, which forced businesses to close and
which blocked several highways in Northern Colombia to protest the death of one of its members by the
Colombian government. This has led many to question the capacity of the Colombian government to keep
paramilitary groups from influencing commerce and security in many regions (El Tiempo, 2012, January 5;
El Tiempo, 2012, February 26).
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Recent reports on BACRIM activities suggest that different paramilitary groups have negotiated a ceasefire with left-wing guerrillas, in particular the FARC, to profit from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and
extorsion. Where the FARC supplies the different DTOs with coca paste for cocaine production and DTOs
become responsible for exporting the cocaine (El Tiempo. 2012, February 15).
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The ERPAC, on December of 2011, engaged in talks with Colombian government officials to arrange a
process were its members and its leadership would be able to surrender to authorities (El Tiempo, 2012,
January 17).
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have professionalized networks of hit-men or gunmen and have extended their activities
into the practice of urban extortion and the urban retail sales of drugs. The role of gangs
in urban centers supplants state actors because gang member leaders not only provide
security but also oversee and arrange the installation of public utilities and roads.
In addition to the economic logic that clearly motivated many individuals towards
the business of trafficking illicit drugs, my research found that the state of the Colombian
economy is a distal but contextual cause that led many individuals to pursue a career in
smuggling. Colombia’s high-income inequality and constrictive social class structure
provides few options in terms of upward mobility and consequently leaves individuals of
low socioeconomic status with limited low-income job prospects. The low socioeconomic status of most DTO leaders drives many to enter the illicit drug business
because they desire to rise above their original social status. During the 1970s the illicit
drug business became a vehicle for social mobility, so the smuggling of imported goods
and the export of illicit commodities like cocaine provided many individuals with the
opportunity to become, in some cases, wealthier than traditional economic elites. In
addition, my study found that the “special” social status enjoyed by smugglers within
Colombian society made smuggling goods an attractive career choice especially for many
young men and women of low income. Although smugglers belonged to the underworld,
they were respected and considered businessmen who met a demand for imported
products at affordable prices. The biographical sketches of most traffickers, but
especially of Jaime Builes, Pablo Escobar, and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, illustrate
how smuggling provided instant upward mobility even in a society with high income
inequalities and rigid social class structures. Because the economic incentives that drive
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the cocaine industry have not changed, since the 1970s and 1980s, the illicit drug industry
has become a career choice not only for young people in Colombia, but throughout Latin
America as the informal trafficking networks have expanded beyond Colombia.
Social conditions such as consumer tastes and immigration trends also led DTOs
to flourish. The shift in consumer demand for cocaine and the establishment of cocaine as
a “status drug” increased the demand for the illicit drug in the 1970s. The demand
directly influenced Colombian DTOs because as demand grew, industrial-size labs like
Tranquilandia were built to refine cocaine. Drug Trafficking Organizations transported
bigger shipments of cocaine to meet demand. Instead of shipping kilos through human
mules, during the 1980s DTOs modified their operations to send large shipments so that
tons of cocaine could be transported via airplanes or in cargo ships.
Today methamphetamine is “the fastest-growing illicit drug in the world” and its
consumption ranks second to marijuana as the most-used illegal drug. According to the
United Nations, consumption of synthetic drugs has surpassed cocaine and heroin
(Beaubien, 2012). U.S. consumer demand for methamphetamines and increased
regulation of precursor chemicals to make methamphetamines in the United States has
caused the wholesale price of a kilo of methamphetamine to increase to $25,000 dollars
(The Economist, 2012; Beaubien, 2012). In similar fashion to the Colombian DTOs of
the 1980s, the rise in price and demand for methamphetamine has driven Mexican DTOs
to industrialize their drug production of methamphetamine to meet demand. The
industrialization of methamphetamine has risen chiefly because the price of selling a
wholesale kilo of methamphetamine is higher than a wholesale kilo of cocaine, which is
priced at about $12,500 according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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(UNODC, 2010, p.79). Also, the production of methamphetamine is a more efficient
business venture for Mexican DTOs because a smaller dosage of “meth” has a greater
psychoactive effect than cocaine. Consequently, DTOs can obtain more profit from a kilo
of methamphetamine than a kilo of cocaine. Mexican criminology experts believe that the
market of methamphetamine has also developed because the drug’s production is more
efficient than the marijuana and cocaine production in Mexico. For instance, the
production of Mexican marijuana is less profitable and requires DTOs to rely on farmers
to grow the plant. The cocaine traffic relies on other intermediary dealers to send
wholesale shipments from the Andes to Mexico. Instead, methamphetamine production
can be done in Mexico, which thereby increases the profit margin for Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations (The Economist, 2012).115
The increased involvement of Mexican DTOs and other country specific DTOs in
the illicit drug industry vis-à-vis their Colombian counterparts can be explained by the
existence of immigrant networks in the United States. The availability of Colombian
immigrant networks in the United States, from the 1960s to the 1980s, initially allowed
Colombian DTOs to have a comparative advantage over all other DTO networks in Latin
America. Colombian DTOs had both, access to the illicit commodity and access to the
U.S. market. The linkage to the U.S. market during this period was made via a network of
Colombian immigrants in major U.S. cities who were linked to DTOs. Peruvian, Bolivian,
and Mexican DTOs of the time did not have as much access to both, the upstream and
downstream aspects of the business. Originally Colombian smuggling networks were
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Mexican DTOs do have to obtain precursor chemicals from India, China, and other countries to create
methamphetamine. The international market for precursor chemicals is difficult to control because
precursors are legal and can be shipped to any number of countries, which can later send the precursors to
Mexican DTOs.
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initially helpful at reducing the risk of U.S. government infiltration into a DTO’s
operations. However, once U.S. authorities focused their efforts in targeting Colombian
DTO networks within the United States, the networks became conspicuous and
authorities successfully disrupted the smuggling networks. The disruption allowed
Mexican DTOs and other country specific DTOs to take over most of the U.S. cocaine
distribution networks. In addition, the dissolution of the Medellin and Cali DTOs that
operated in the 1980s until the mid-1990s contributed to the rise of other country specific
DTOs which operated from the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico. Immigrants
from these areas took over the U.S. distribution cells for the “new” DTOs. The loss of
Colombia’s comparative advantage in the U.S. distribution marked led Colombian DTOs
to become specialized solely on the cocaine wholesale traffic to Mexican DTOs, and to
DTOs operating in Central America, Latin American transit countries, and Europe.
In contrast to Colombian DTOs, Mexican DTOs currently have a comparative
advantage to other country specific DTOs because of their proximity to the U.S. border,
but also because of the larger Mexican immigrant population (when compared to the
smaller Colombian immigrant population), which resides in the United States. Since
Mexico has a larger immigrant population, it makes DTO networks less conspicuous than
the smaller Colombian DTOs that operated in the 1980s. Mexican DTOs operating with
Mexican distribution cells in the United States are harder to disrupt because they can hide
within the larger population of Mexican immigrants. Moreover, the smuggling networks
built by Mexican DTOs throughout the 20th century for the smuggling of marijuana are
currently being used for cocaine and methamphetamine (Astorga, 2004, p. 90; Beaubien,
2012).
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Although technology plays a minor role in the political development of DTOs, it
plays a major role in the economic rise of drug trafficking organizations. Airplanes and
communications equipment allowed pioneering DTOs to increase their wealth by
allowing for the transport of massive quantities of illicit drugs to international markets.
Since the technology to produce and refine cocaine has been relatively accessible, the
simplicity of the technology has allowed a many actors to participate in the trade and
contribute towards the expansion of the drug trade. With the passage of time, DTOs were
able to develop technology to create transportation innovations. Whereas traffickers in
Colombia have developed the use of submarines to transport drugs, Mexican traffickers
have created long underground tunnels to facilitate the trade and reduce the risks of being
apprehended by authorities.
My study found that a state’s legal parameters also had an influence in the
development of DTOs in Colombia. The lax regulation of practices like money
laundering and political campaign financing has been instrumental in the development of
DTOs both economically and politically. Economically, early counternarcotic efforts
(1960s and 1970s) underestimated the demand and market value of cocaine. The legal
system had little control over dollar transfers and such deficiencies benefited DTOs
because they could readily obtain the drug proceeds without much supervision.
Consequently, once traffickers became wealthy enough they acquired banks to directly
control and legalize their drug proceeds through money laundering schemes. In the area
of campaign finance, the Colombian legal system did not regulate how politicians
obtained their political funding until as late as the mid-1990s. As such, it was not illegal
for politicians to receive funding from DTOs and this lack of regulation allowed
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traffickers to have great political influence. DTO influence was evident not only in the
1982 election but also during the 1991 Constitutional Convention, which led to the
invalidation of The 1979 Extradition Treaty (via a Constitutional Article). At the frontline
of the “war” against political corruption, some politicians have tried to protect regulations
on money laundering and on financing of political campaigns, and others, influenced by
DTOs, have introduced legislation to limit regulations or punishments. Since the 1980s,
legal battles have taken place during major political scandals involving politicians and the
Cali DTO (mid 1990s), and some politicians and the AUC paramilitary group during the
2000s. Both scandals have implicated at the least 10% of congresspersons during the
respective congressional years in which the scandals took place.
The individual preferences of Colombian officials examined in the study suggest
that government officials created a permissive environment that allowed for the
development of DTOs. During the 1970s, as the cocaine trade began to take off,
authorities did not regulate the trade because they did not believe or foresee that the trade
would have negative repercussions on society, such as high homicide rates, the disruption
of the court system, and terrorism. For example, the 1979 Extradition Treaty was not
implemented until 1985 because President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) was
philosophically opposed to the Treaty claiming an infringement to Colombia’s
sovereignty, rather than on the calculus that the treaty was the only legal tool available
with which to regulate DTO leaders and the illicit drug trade. Also, economically, the
cocaine trade benefited the growth of legal sectors of the economy. Consequently,
political elites or state officials did not perceive traffickers at the time as a security threat.
The DTO leaders examined in this research did not have pending investigations and they
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were not actively pursued for their involvement in the cocaine trade in the 1970s or early
1980s. Socially, DTO leaders were discriminated against by elites because of their lack
of formal education and social status. To counteract their lack of social pedigree,
traffickers constructed parallel social institutions like social clubs and bilingual schools in
order to lead a comparable lifestyle enjoyed by elites.
Politically, DTOs (as emergent economic groups) were implicitly accepted by
politicians during the 1970s and consequently became more powerful during the early
1980s. I found that the 1982 election year was a turning point in the relationship between
politician preferences and DTO leaders. During the 1982 elections, many politicians from
all political parties openly accepted campaign donations from DTO leaders. Because of
their wealth, DTO leaders of the time believed that they were entitled to participate in the
political process and to make demands like any other legal actor. The 1982 presidential
elections were a turning point in the interaction between politicians and DTO leaders
primarily because reformist politicians like Rodrigo Lara Bonilla and Luis Carlos Galan
began to politically and publicly exclude traffickers from the political system. The
political exclusion gradually led to the use of violence a means to represent DTO interests.
For the most part, and after the 1984 assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, in rhetoric,
state officials and the presidency condemned DTO involvement politics. However,
political scandals such as the “narco-cassettes” and “proceso 8000” scandals of the
1990s, and the ongoing “parapolitica” scandal, which developed in 2006, reveal that
some politicians continue to accept DTO leader influence and campaign donations.
The implicit acceptance of politicians towards DTO leaders continues because of
electoral concerns such as (1) the continually rising political campaign costs and (2)
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major governability issues as a result of state capacity problems—in many areas of
Colombia, politicians have to ask permission from DTO leaders to run for public office
(Semana, 2010, April 29). This last factor reveals that the “problem of stateness” does
have great implications for the quality of a democratic regime because it is difficult to say
that a consolidated democracy exists when candidate selection in a geographical area
depends more on the political influence of DTO leaders rather than on the influence of
voters.
After examining the external variables that influence a DTO’s economic and
political development, it is evident that the variables used to study DTO development are
useful across time and space. Variables such as: the profitability of the illicit drug
business; income inequalities; weak law enforcement and laws; the preferences of state
officials; the tastes and demand of drug consumers; and the presence of immigration
networks among others, were useful in analyzing group development in Colombia in the
1980s, and they are still useful to explain group development in the new millennium
because said external influences can be used to analyze the rise of new DTO groups or
new paramilitary groups. As such, the use of the Macro-model goes beyond analyzing the
rise and actions of one kingpin or a singly drug trafficking organization, and it is useful in
analyzing the development of a variety of groups given same contextual setting.
The second question my project sought to answer was: what effect do IIGs have
on policy? The dissertation focused on the policy of extradition because DTOs
challenged the 1979 Treaty on Extradition. The treaty became an issue of concern for
DTO leaders when Pablo Escobar, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder
perceived that their livelihood was threatened due to two major events: The first event
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was the increased government clampdown on traffickers in reaction to the assassination
of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. As part of the government’s pursuit, the
Betancur administration implemented the 1979 Extradition Treaty for the first time. The
second event, which led to the official launch of the terrorist group Los Extraditables,
was the arrest of Jorge Luis Ochoa in Spain on November of 1984. The arrest personally
and directly affected a major DTO leader, especially since the United States used the
arrest as an opportunity to issue indictments against Jorge Luis Ochoa and the other
Medellin-based leaders in an effort to have Jorge Luis Ochoa extradited from Spain to the
United States.
For the first time, since Medellin-based DTO leaders began trafficking in the
1970s, the three events threatened DTO leaders with the stark reality of serving actual
prison time in the United States. The realization led Medellin-based DTO leaders to unite
human and economic organizational resources to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty.
The different skillsets that DTO leaders acquired early in their youth influenced
how they pursued changes in policy. DTO leaders studied in this project obtained training
while smuggling goods when they were young. All had mentors that taught them the
smuggling trade and how to deal with authorities. As a result, the level of formal
education did not have an impact in their ability to influence politicians, whereas
informal training did have an impact. Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha
were initially trained as gunmen, while Carlos Lehder and the Ochoa brothers began their
training in the actual smuggling of goods. The difference in training marked how DTO
leaders dealt with politicians. Lehder and the Ochoa brothers were less confrontational
with politicians, whereas Escobar and Rodriguez Gacha were purposively confrontational.
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Overall, the Ochoa brothers seemed more prone to seek a negotiated solution to problems
not only with politicians, but also with other traffickers.
The economic resources derived from the drug trade enhanced the capacity of
traffickers to make contacts with politicians willing to adopt their policy demands. The
wealth derived from the cocaine traffic enabled traffickers to launch their own political
campaigns and the campaigns of politicians at national and local levels of government.
Drug trafficking organization leaders went to political party conventions, used their own
airplanes to fly candidates to events, and funded political campaign material like banners,
flyers, and newspaper advertisements. Traffickers used their wealth to create charity
programs such as the construction of homes for people living under levels of extreme
poverty, soccer stadiums, and provide school supplies for school children, among other
activities. These charity programs allowed DTO leaders to obtain followers. In addition,
the wealth of DTO leaders allowed DTOs to hire experts to help carryout policy demands.
When DTOs engaged in the judicial strategy for overturning the 1979 Treaty on
Extradition, they hired teams of lawyers to engage in the legal battle.
Drug trafficking organizations increased their issue’s representativeness by
successfully influencing politicians and by appealing to a wider sector of society through
nationalist arguments in favor of invalidating the issue of extradition. When DTO leaders
began their political participation, they practiced non-violent means to influence the
political system. DTOs financed the careers of politicians at all levels of government
(local, departmental, and national). Drug trafficking organization leaders relied on
traditional political practices used such as clientelism to launch the careers of politicians
and to obtain popular support for their agendas. During this time period, it is probably
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more useful to analyze these groups as simply another set of political actors engaging in a
very traditional Colombian political practice—clientelism (Martz, 1997). The anecdote,
in which the son of former Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla shares the story of
how his father stumbled upon the name Pablo Escobar while on the 1982 campaign trail,
reveals the ease in which nouveau rich traffickers emulated clientelist political customs to
obtain political power (Entel, 2009). According to the anecdote, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is
told by a political rally attendee that Pablo Escobar was the political leader who gave
people appliances in exchange for their attendance to Lara Bonilla’s Nuevo Liberalismo
political rally. The account, which describes how political leaders exchange material
goods for political participation, is not any different, than the actions of established
Colombian politicians of the time, whom disbursed government jobs, scholarships, a bag
of groceries, or a lunch to constituents in exchange for constituent participation at a
political rally or for their vote (Leal Buitrago et al., 1991). During 1982, none of the
DTO leaders discussed in this project had an active criminal investigation against them;
they were relatively unknown and the image they were trying to present of themselves
was of being business entrepreneurs. Their “clean record” and economic power allowed
DTO leaders to feel entitled to participate in the political process. Funding campaigns to
obtain favorable political outcomes can also be seen simply as the exercise of another
traditional practice of any large-scale business bent on influencing the policy process.
The difference is that in contrast to licit business interests, once legal avenues were
closed, DTOs used violence and started acting like an armed social movement with a
limited political agenda.
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Of the traffickers that actually campaigned for public office, only Carlos Lehder
mentioned his opposition to the 1979 Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Colombia. Other traffickers, who were candidates or political campaign financiers, were
initially silent on the matter in an effort to become elected to office. Paradoxically, once
in office, DTO candidates like Pablo Escobar failed to obtain policy objectives because,
as soon as their trafficker backgrounds were disclosed to the general public, they were
ostracized from public life by political elites within the legislature. The ousting of DTO
leaders led them to focus more on financing the campaigns of politicians instead of
directly running for office.
In implementing policy objectives, Medellin-based DTO leaders efficiently
carried out strategies to accomplish policy goals because said association was a small
sized group of approximately 10 to 60 DTO leaders. The small group of DTO leaders was
comprised of high-demanders for the invalidation of the 1979 the Extradition Treaty as
all of them were threatened with extradition to the United States if apprehended by
authorities. The desire to ban extradition was a major incentive to unite economic
resources. Consequently, DTO leaders organized and implemented a judicial, a
legislative, and a violent strategy to invalidate extradition. Moreover each paid a “war tax”
of about $200,000 to the terrorist group Los Extraditables to wage a war against political
elites with the objective of banning extradition and obtaining favorable terms of surrender
with an effort to legalize their status in Colombia.
In particular, Pablo Escobar and Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were such high
demanders for a ban on extradition that they became the leaders of Los Extraditables,
which gave them a high degree of decision-making power. Since Escobar and Gacha
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were known for their ruthless use of violence, both had the capacity to collect the “war
tax” from other DTO leaders and insure discipline. However, at least from 1983-1991,
the incentive to ban extradition to protect their livelihoods in Colombia increased the
political cohesion of all Medellin-based DTO leaders in an effort to invalidate the
extradition treaty. Also, during this time period, the presence of internal variables such as
strong political cohesion, leader skillsets, economic resources, group incentives, and
capacity to ensure discipline, allowed DTO leaders to obtain short-term policy successes
such as the judicial invalidation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty in 1986 and the
Constitutional invalidation of extradition in the 1991 Constitution; but the successes were
strongly tied to the use violence.
My study found that initially, when DTOs engaged in non-violent mechanisms for
influencing policy, DTOs behaved more like an interest group, however, as legal
mechanisms to influence government policy closed off, Medellin-based DTO leaders
began engaging in politics by other means and behaved more like a terrorist organization.
Drug trafficking organization leaders gradually changed their political strategies to mimic
existing guerrilla movements—in particular, the actions of the urban guerrilla group the
M-19. Drug trafficking organization leaders organized as Los Extraditables to protest
Jorge Luis Ochoa’s arrest in Spain and, on November 15th 1984, launched their first
communiqué. Since the organization’s political objective was to overturn the 1979
Extradition Treaty, Los Extraditables used violence to intimidate or assassinate
government officials especially those tied with law enforcement. Los Extraditables used a
variety of terrorist methods including the use of car bombs, the staging of theatrical
bombs on buildings and airplanes, and the use selective political kidnappings. The violent
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actions were done to pressure government officials, in particular the presidency, to
invalidate the policy of extradition and to create a negotiation process that would allow
DTO leaders to receive a criminal amnesty similar to that received by guerrilla group
members. Although DTO leaders were not granted the political status or the amnesty
given to the members of guerrilla organizations like the M-19 and other contemporary
guerrilla organizations, the violent strategies used for closing off the presidency’s policy
options did work and allowed DTO leaders to negotiate favorable terms of surrender.
That violence reached such extreme levels is rooted in the fact that the state itself
relied on violence to respond to these groups. As Thoumi and others have argued, the use
of extreme violence is a perverse logical extension of the illicit nature of the industry and
the absence of legal mechanisms to resolve disputes either between competing trafficking
groups and between these and the state. My findings indicate that the confrontational
dynamic between the state and Medellin-based DTOs allowed Medellin-based DTO
leaders to influence policy because they used a combination of selective and
indiscriminate violence which was effective in reducing the presidency’s political
maneuverability but also in targeting public opinion. First, the use of selective
kidnappings reduced President Gaviria’s capacity to use violence on Los Extraditables
because it was feared that in retaliation Los Extraditables would assassinate the
kidnapped victims. Second, the use of violence worked as a political strategy because
DTO leaders were able to shift public opinions on the issue of extradition to the point that
public opinion polls showed that people supported a negotiation with traffickers and, in
1991, 82 percent of the Colombian population believed that extraditing nationals should
be invalidated through the creation of a Constitutional Article (Botero, 1991).
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Finally, the use of violence worked as a political strategy because violence was an
effective tool in reducing the general public’s morale in support for government’s efforts
to stop narco-terrorism with violence. Moreover, the pervasive use of violence by all
existing non-state actors in Colombia during 1989 and 1990 exhausted public tolerance
for violence. During the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, the Medellin-based
group through Los Extraditables was able to use violence to shift public opinion’s
concern with the issue of extradition. As a consequence of car bombs and other urban
violence, public opinion increasingly associated the extradition issue with public security
concerns, instead of an issue concerning international relations and drug trafficking. As a
security issue Colombian urban dwellers believed that invalidating the extradition of
nationals was of paramount concern to reduce violence.
In sum, to offset counternarcotics efforts economically powerful DTO leaders
pooled resources to ban extradition. The creation of a group like Los Extraditables
allowed DTO leaders to intimidate political elites and law enforcement institutions to
obtain a negotiation process. This last point leads to the third question I asked at the
outset of this project—what effect do IIGs such as drug trafficking organizations have on
democratic institutions? Drug trafficking organizations had short-term and long-term
effects on democratic institutions. In the short run, DTOs had a disastrous effect on the
judicial system. The systematic killing and intimidation of judges presiding over criminal
cases and the M-19 attack on the supreme court, which was partially funded by Pablo
Escobar, had a devastating effect on the ability of judges uphold rule of law. The high
level of intimidation led many to abstain from practicing their professions or to receive
bribes to avoid death.
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It is known that DTO influence did reach the legislature in 1982 as is evident with
the election of Pablo Escobar and Jairo Ortega to Congress and Santofimio Botero to the
Senate. Yet the degree of influence that Medellin-based DTOs had on the legislature from
1982-1991 in unknown because no in-depth government investigation was ever done on
the legislature in order to ascertain the degree of Medellin-based DTO influence on the
1989 legislature and the 1991 Constitutional Assembly.
My study’s analysis of state autonomy shows that DTO leaders specially reduced
the presidency’s maneuverability. Starting in 1986, with the invalidation of the 1979
Extradition Treaty, the presidential power of Virgilio Barco was dramatically limited on
the issue. From 1990 to 1991 President Cesar Gaviria’s power was also reduced as DTOs
used coercion via selective kidnappings and through the use of indiscriminate acts of
terrorism, which shifted public opinion in favor of DTO policy objectives—a permanent
ban on extradition and favorable terms of surrender.
In the long run, DTO influence on democratic institutions is mixed. After DTO
leaders accomplished their policy goal of invalidating the 1979 Extradition Treaty on
June 1991, the group’s cohesion and discipline began to disintegrate, as a consequence of
internal disputes. The group’s unraveling also decreased the DTO leaders’ capacity to
maintain their pressure on politicians or government officials. With time, in the absence
of DTO pressure and because the U.S. government pushed the Colombian presidency to
reinstate the policy of extradition, the constitutional ban on extradition was repealed,
albeit without DTO reprisals thereby increasing state autonomy on this matter.
On the one hand, the rise of DTOs has increased counternarcotics efforts,
strengthened the judicial system, and placed some legal restrictions on activities like
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money laundering and campaigns finance. On the other hand, the long-term effect of
DTOs on democratic institutions is that their political influence is pervasive especially at
local and national levels of government and within the state bureaucracy. The influence is
substantiated by the cyclical political corruption scandals involving presidents, senators,
congressmen, city councils, mayors, and all types of state agencies. Another long-term
effect is the continuous rise of DTO financed paramilitary groups and gangs, both of
which dramatically reduce the quality of life for those living in marginal sectors were the
state is unable to protect populations from the whims of powerful sub-national actors.
The practical significance of this study is that its analysis can be used to examine
the political influence of the illicit drug trade, as the trade has gradually expanded to
more countries in Latin America since the 1980s. Many countries that had an
insignificant illicit industry in the 1980s are now major transit countries for cocaine and
other drugs. Some of these countries possess similar economic and political contexts to
Colombia, which have led to the political rise of DTOs. As the drug trade has spread
from the Andean region to Central and South America, studying Colombia and the rise
and development of DTOs can help explain the political impact of DTOs on the
democratic institutions of countries newly engulfed by the illicit drug trade. For example,
many countries in the region have: an increased number of actors engaged in the illicit
drug trade because it is profitable; high levels of income inequality; weak law
enforcement and laws; legacies of using violence for resolving conflicts, clientelistic
practices; a reliance on private security to protect property and lands; a strong legacy of
smuggling; and a large immigrant populations in the United States.
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The use of the hybrid Macro-Micro-Model allows for a holistic examination of
the persistent social, economic, and political context that continuously gives rise to DTOs.
It avoids focusing solely on the personal characteristics of DTO leaders. It also corrects
research biases by examining the political impact of “criminal” groups, especially in
contexts where the state apparatus is weak vis-à-vis DTO leaders. Future research on the
political influence of DTOs will test the model across time and space by including more
cases within Colombia and throughout region.
Finally, the study of drug trafficking organizations is politically valuable even if
their policy agenda is limited. Their political impact should be studied because they are
economically powerful, organize continuous attempts to undermine the legal system over
time, finance campaigns at national and local levels, and enhance the formation of armed
social movements in weak states.
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